Category Archives: Times of Israel blog posts

Imagine a watchdog that barks at everything that moves: people, birds, vehicles. Not much use, right? The same can be said when Democracy’s “Watchdog” – the media – bark incessantly and without distinguishing between true, false or something in-between.

The latest brouhaha regarding Israeli PM Bennett’s remarks while in New York regarding Corona decision-making, is a good (i.e., bad) case in point. In brief, he remarked that in the final analysis, it is the political leadership that must make the final decisions regarding how to deal with the pandemic. Not only is this true practically, but even more so philosophically. We have democratic elections to select the people on top of the pyramid who will take all interest groups, professional advisers, and disparate areas of life into account. Anything else leads to myopic policy, or even worse: anarchy.

The Israeli media went into a feeding frenzy, as if Bennett had “attacked” Israel’s professional health officials – and from there the epidemiologists, hospital managers, and Ministry of Health officials took umbrage. For what? For the prime minister offering the most banal description of how democratic Israel really works? For “seemingly” undermining the health officials – when he did nothing of the sort?

One of the more serious and highly professional reporters on Israel’s public radio and TV (to remain anonymous to protect his professional standing) actually made an incredible statement (I roughly translate here from the Hebrew): “What Bennett said was true, but it didn’t sound good…”. Now the media are in the business of interpreting “intonation”?!?

Among the many absurdities in this tempest in a teapot is the fact that last year, when the previous government locked down the entire country, the media attacked it for not taking into consideration non-health elements: thousands of small businesses that went bankrupt; severe psychological stress of children and parents stuck together at home for lengthy periods of time; pedagogical harm as many kids couldn’t learn much through Zoom classes; and so on.

Clearly, health professionals have a duty to provide all the health information at their disposal. Just as clearly, the government has to listen to them carefully. But like everything else in life, “it’s complicated” – not only society in general (economy, education, etc.) but even health information is usually not completely clear cut until some time has passed and all the data has been collected, not to mention that Corona itself has mutated and changed its own patterns. Meanwhile, decisions of national import have to be made.

It is precisely here that the media fall down on the job – not on reporting the facts. On that, the Israeli media (print and electronic) are doing quite a good job overall. The problem lies in “insinuation, innuendo, and interpretation.” As a professor of communication, I am well aware that reporters are human too; there is no way that they can completely neutralize their own biases. However, the general approach (or to use a fancier, but more germane word, their weltanschauung) as journalists has been to criticize first, and report later. I call this the post-Watergate syndrome.

Yes, Watergate! It is now almost fifty years since that huge story broke. It had two effects. The short-term: the president of the United States was forced to resign in disgrace – justifiably so. The longer-term consequence, with which we still live to this day in most world democracies, is the incessant search first for “what’s wrong” and only secondarily “what’s (really) going on.” The watchdog of democracy is no longer just barking when appropriate; it is now biting everything in sight.

This is a problem for the media and for society at large. Trust in the media has been declining for decades – not coincidentally starting soon after Watergate. That’s bad enough. Far worse is that it has been accompanied by growing mistrust regarding the leaders and democracy in general. Not all of that is the media’s fault, although as Churchill once said: “democracy is the worst form of government – except for all the others that have been tried.” But constant media bashing can’t be a positive thing when it slashes and mashes without distinction (pun intended).

Another recent Israeli news item is a case in point: the tragic traffic accident in the Golan that killed a mother and all her three children (the husband is in critical condition) – when a bus crashed into their car. The 76-year-old bus driver was immediately vilified in the press, having received 51 traffic “citations” in the past: “killer,” and “murderer” were merely some of the characterizations leveled at him. Moreover, the media started attacking the Transportation Ministry: “how did it allow such a bus driver to stay on the road?” Except that they forgot to mention that he has been a bus driver for fifty years, driving 8-10 hours a day, and that in Israel, minor infractions are registered as “violations.” Under those conditions, who wouldn’t have 51 traffic “reports”? Proportionality and nuance are also part of the journalists’ job requirement.

Israel’s traditional media seem to be in competition with social media as to who can be more “biting.” That’s a strategic mistake for the former, and for society at large. Being a responsible watchdog is what we want and need: howling when really necessary and called-for; but also holding back the bark until it’s clear whether the external sound is a “burglar” or merely natural, democratic and societal noise.

[1].   With the transfer of presidential power in the offing, a standard refrain we hear is that regarding support for Israel, it doesn’t much matter who is in the White House or running Congress. The basic reason for that is the American public’s rock-hard support for its Middle East ally. But is that support still stable and strong? After all, politicians cannot run too far ahead (or behind) their democratic citizenry.

A new, very comprehensive study – The American Public and Israel in the Twenty-First Century – published by the Begin-Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University, authored by Prof. Eytan Gilboa, set out to answer that question (for the full monograph, see: https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/181-web.pdf). In contradistinction to almost all other studies of this type, his study provides a long-term trend (2000-2020) encompassing data of numerous U.S. public opinion surveys from several reputable sources (polling agencies, academic think tanks, serious media, etc).

For anyone who cares about Israel and this bi-national relationship, there is mostly good news here but with a modicum of concern looking into the future. The good news is that the two-decade trend reveals strong and stable support in American public opinion for Israel on a variety of issues discussed. In fact, Gallup surveys actually show public support for Israel increasing by 12% – from 62% favorability in 2000 to 74% in 2020.

What’s the cause for worry? Prof. Gilboa didn’t just look at the gross numbers but rather at sociodemographic breakdowns. First, the American public is far from homogeneous in its support of Israel. There are significant differences between Republicans and Democrats, younger and older people, and even different groups of American Jews.

Let’s take each in turn. First, whereas historically, Democrats were more supportive than Republicans, this has now been turned on its head: by 2020 the gap had reached 24%! As “white” (largely Republican) America declines and “multi-ethnics” (leaning Democratic) increase in number, that does not bode well for continued future support at the same level.     Second, younger Americans are less supportive than their elders, and obviously young adults are the future. Third and in the opposite direction, the more traditional a Jew, the more supportive of Israel. With Orthodox and especially ultra-Orthodox birthrates far higher than other Jewish denominations, that could serve as a small counterbalance to the above negative trends.

If there’s anything in this study that can be said to connect to the current U.S. presidential elections, it is this: In 2019 (Ruderman Foundation poll), 67% of American Jews said they were emotionally attached to Israel, whereas 31% said they weren’t attached. When asked for their “reasons for being less connected to Israel,” American Jews cited “Israel’s support for President Trump” (33%) and “Netanyahu’s support for President Trump and his policies” (39%) as most important. Whichever candidate ultimately prevails, for the sake of future bipartisan support Israel would do well to heed this not-too-subtle critique of the Netanyahu government’s extremely close relationship with the present Republican establishment.

The religion of non-Jews also plays a role. On the one hand, over the entire 2001-2019 period practicing U.S. Christians supported Israel much more than people who weren’t religious. Surprisingly, U.S. Evangelicals are not Israel’s most supportive non-Jewish denomination – the Mormons are: 79% pro-Israeli compared to 11% pro-Palestinian – 13% more Israel support than even the Evangelicals evinced! (Gallup: 2001-2014) Viewed historically, American Christians are altogether arguably closer to the Jewish people today than any Christian group has been for close to 2000 years.

Related but different: one other future trend that is hardly mentioned in such analyses – Hispanics, who by 2050 will double their proportion and constitute around 30% of the total U.S. population by then. They are much less familiar with Israel and are mostly Catholic (less supportive of Israel than other Christian denominations); thus, it’s not surprising that the few surveys that looked at Hispanics have shown a lower level of support and greater lack of knowledge or interest on issues related to Israel.

When the polls focus on the Palestinian issue, the trends are similar, but if anything even starker. In 2018 (Gallup), nearly twice as many liberal Democrats said they sympathized more with the Palestinians than with Israel (35% vs. 19%). Moderate and conservative Democrats were almost a mirror image: more supporting Israel (35%) than the Palestinians (17%) – but with a large drop among the former. Since 2016, conservative and moderate Democrat sympathy for Israel declined 18% (from 53% to 35%). The Republican trend in the opposite direction is even more pronounced: from 2001 to 2018 their comparative sympathy for Israel compared to the Palestinians increased 29%, from 50% to 79%. Beyond the Palestinians as a people, what about a Palestinian state? The trend is similar, albeit with not much overall change: American public support for a Palestinian state went from 40% pro/24% con in 2000, to 55% pro/34% con in 2020.

Finally, what of the Middle East’s 800-pound gorilla: whether and how to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons development? Public opinion is somewhat favorable regarding American military action against such Iranian efforts – and far more supportive of Israeli action. Diplomacy? After the Obama/Europe nuclear treaty with Iran, not a single U.S. poll found majority support for the deal.

Prof. Gilboa is a world authority in public diplomacy, and he concludes with an analysis of, and prescription for, what Israel and the American Jewish community can do to maintain the strong support that the American public has held vis-à-vis their steady ally across the sea. Based on the huge amount of thought-provoking data in this study, moving into the future they all have their work cut out.

Nov. 9, 2020

[1] Full disclosure: In 2014 I followed Prof. Gilboa as Chairman of Bar-Ilan University’s School of Communication.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has a reputation of being politically invincible. True, he is now Israel’s longest-ever serving PM (Ben-Gurion left of his own volition; he could have served several more years had he wished to do so). However, the historical record belies Bibi’s “invincibility”.

So try to answer this question correctly: in the nine Knesset elections that Netanyahu has run (either as a direct PM candidate in the 1990s, or as leader of the Likud afterwards), in how many did he win outright, how often did he clearly lose, and how many ended in a virtual tie? (Don’t peek; I provide the answer in the paragraph after the next one).

This isn’t merely an interesting, Israel electoral history trivia question. Rather, given the results of the three elections this past year and a half, and the Likud’s steady and steep drop in recent polls, the question of Bibi’s “electionability” (or if you will, electoral ability) has become increasingly germane, especially given his poor – some would say catastrophic – Corona policy, along with the nation’s severe economic pain. So how vulnerable is he? Part of the answer is to look at how well he has done in the past.

Since 1996 he has actually won four campaigns (1996, 2013, 2015, and in 2020 – not by much: 36 to 33 seats), lost two (1999 and 2006 – tied for third place with only 12 seats for the Likud!), and ended more or less with a tie in three elections (2009, April 2019, and September 2019 – in the latter, the Likud had one seat less than Blue & White: 33 to 32). In terms of soccer standings overall: 4-2-3; not bad, but hardly “invincible”.

Obviously, not every Likud loss can be ascribed exclusively to Netanyahu – just as not all Likud victories were solely his doing. Nevertheless, with Israel’s electoral politics becoming increasingly “personalized”, paralleling the country’s concomitant, overall decline in ideology, it is clear that the top of the ticket bears much responsibility for most Israeli parties’ victories and defeats. This is certainly true for those parties with a chance of winning a plurality of the votes, thus almost guaranteeing that its party leader would be asked to form the coalition government (only in 2009 – Tzipi Livni from Kadima – failed to translate her party’s plurality into becoming the prime minister).

If anyone is aware of this electoral record it is Netanyahu himself. That’s an important reason for his great hesitance to call another election, despite the present, dual-headed coalition not working very well. But the stakes are much higher for him this time than ever before because of the three criminal indictments and upcoming trials.

There are few examples in modern democratic countries of a leader successfully staying in office for over a decade (Angela Merkel notwithstanding) – and when that does happen it’s almost always due to some extraordinary circumstance, e.g. FDR during World War 2. The Corona pandemic could have been such a situation for Netanyahu, but he botched it badly (after the initial success), telling Israelis after Passover ״תעשו חיים״ – “get out and enjoy life”!

So here stands Bibi: trials about to start; economic devastation; massive, ongoing protest demonstrations all over Israel; policies (blocking a 2021 budget, no permanent Police Chief appointment, trying to prevent outdoor protests) that suspiciously seem to be determined by his legal difficulties, or so many Israelis claim.

However, given the evisceration of Israel’s Zionist left wing, what/who could replace him? The polls show that Israelis have not abandoned the right wing camp; but they have moved in very significant numbers from one right-wing party (Likud) to another (Yeminah) led by Naftali Bennett whom Bibi left out of his present coalition for personal pet peeve reasons, among them the fact that Bennett – a former very successful, high tech entrepreneur – has consistently presented a more systematic and doable Corona plan than what has emerged from the present government’s chaotic, decision-making process.

How, then, could Bibi lose the next election? That’s the wrong question to ask, as the Likud will probably still obtain more votes than any other party. The real question: how can anyone else form a governing coalition? The answer is becoming clear, although certainly not a done deal: in order to finally get rid of Bibi (the Israeli counterpart of the “never-Trumpers”), Yeminah could form a coalition with Lapid’s Yesh Atid, Gantz’s Blue & White, Lieberman’s Yisrael Beitenu (he absolutely detests Netanyahu), and Meretz. Yes, strange bedfellows (especially the first and last on this list), but given the immediate, critical issues at hand – Corona and the economy – these parties could live with each other for a year or two. Especially if it means finally getting rid of the “Invincible”.

Nov. 2, 2020

With less than a week to go in the American Presidential (and other levels) election campaign, it is useful to look at Israel’s law regarding the publication of polls during the last five days of an election: prohibited! The U.S., of course, has no such law (free speech über alles).

Israel is not the only country with a poll publication prohibition. In fact, approximately two-thirds (!) of all countries in the world with elections have some sort of pre-voting day restriction on publishing polls. Some countries – e.g. Bolivia, Cameroon, Honduras and Tunisia – embargo polls for 30 days or more before voting day, while another ten (some highly democratic, e.g. Chile and Italy) have poll blackouts for at least two weeks pre-election day (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330509451_Freedom_to_Conduct_Opinion_Polls_A_2017_Worldwide_Update)

All of this leads to the question: why? Why would otherwise perfectly functioning democracies restrict “polling speech” during the latter part of an election campaign? The basic answer is that there is a general feeling that the voters might be unduly influenced by such survey results, i.e. many people will vote by following the pack and not for reasons of real personal preference. As a political scientist, I can say two (somewhat contradictory) things: that’s probably true to a limited extent; there is virtually no hard evidence for that happening.

However, there’s a completely different problem with polling publication (during the entire campaign) and it has to do with the news and what is called the “media agenda”. There are actually three types of agenda: media (what the news purveyors focus on), political (what the politicians want you to think about), and public (what the citizenry actually cares about). Each influences the other, but in our hyper-media age (traditional media, e-media, and social media), it is the media agenda that rules supreme. And that’s the source of our problem.

During elections campaigns there are three types of news: policy, personality, and polls. The latter is actually called “horserace journalism”: who’s ahead, who’s behind, and who’s fading or coming on fast? In and of itself, that sort of thing interests all of us, but if it overwhelms the other two, then democracy is in trouble.

It is no coincidence that over the past several decades, as polling became more widespread and sophisticated (not merely gross numbers but group or regional breakdowns) horserace journalism pushed policy discussions off the public agenda. In Israel, with its traditional party list system, polling has also strengthened “personality” issues as a driving force in the campaign, with the pollsters starting to ask questions like “Who is most fit to be prime minister?” – this, even though there are no direct elections for that post!

None of this is to suggest that polling is useless. Paradoxically, it is most helpful in between election campaigns (“normal politics”) in order to clue government leaders as to what the public wants on specific issues. This can even be the case when a survey does not ask about a specific policy question. For instance, it is clear that the Likud’s fast decline in the recent polls is in large part due to Netanyahu’s failed mid-summer Corona policy – not only because he didn’t always listen to the medical professionals but also more recently for not holding the Haredi (and in the first wave, the Israeli-Arab) sector to account for not adhering to the government’s Corona regulations.

Returning to campaign polling: looking back at this U.S. election cycle, one would have to search with a magnifying glass to find any serious news coverage of policies. It’s been almost all “Biden maintains a big lead” (the horse race) or “Trump is angry at his Cabinet” (personality). Of course, a candidate’s temperament is important (President Trump is a good/bad example of that), but in the final analysis we want to know what our leaders plan to do if and when they enter office. The candidates’ policies could be poles apart, but by unduly focusing instead on the polls we are hardly able to know if that’s indeed the case.

Oct. 28, 2020

As a political scientist, I can vouch for one very common denominator underlying the American and Israeli electoral/political systems: they are both dysfunctional and efficient – for totally opposite reasons. With U.S. elections shortly taking place, and with serious noises coming out of the Israeli government about the need to call for another round of elections (that would be the fourth in less than two years!), it is worth considering their respective central weakness.

The U.S. has a “winner take all” system, on the Presidential and Congressional levels. That’s because each district, state or the country as a whole is considered to be a “district” with only one winner. That inevitably leads to a race between only two parties or candidates. On the opposite side of the spectrum lies the Israeli system that views the country as a whole as one district in which all parties compete for a proportional part of the entire Knesset. The result: many, many parties vie for seats in the legislature.

What’s the problem? The American system is seriously deficient in representativeness. This essentially means that each voter has a choice between only two candidates (we can ignore third-party candidates, who almost never win an election, although occasionally they can influence the outcome by drawing votes from one of the two main candidates). With such limited choice, it is rare indeed for any voter to find a candidate with whom s/he agrees on many issues. In short, the U.S. electoral system leaves little room for a result that truly reflects the wishes of many voters.

On the other hand, with around fifteen parties running in Knesset elections – and around ten passing the minimal voting threshold (3.25%) – Israeli voters have a virtual supermarket of parties for which they could vote. In such a rich electoral smorgasbord, the chances are great that each voter can find a party that represents his or her position on the most salient issues.

However, when one turns the picture around to look at governability, we arrive at a mirror image of the situation. Because America has only two parties, when it comes to running the ship of state there is one party that acts as the “captain” and only occasionally there’s one other that is involved in “navigation”. For much of American history that situation has enabled the leadership to govern in relatively efficient fashion. Quite the opposite state of affairs is the norm for Israel, what with the need to form a governing coalition of (usually) four to six parties. That’s not a ship of state but rather akin to a carriage with four/six horses pulling in different directions.

Adding to Israel’s governability misery is the fact that in its parliamentary system, new elections can – and usually do – take place well before the four-year term is completed. In other words, the threat of “toppling the government” from within is a constant worry for the prime minster. Compare that to the American Constitutional mandate of a four-year term no matter what (even the president’s death does not change that). Israeli governance instability is counterpointed by American governing constancy.

Which system is “better”? That depends on whether one considers representativeness or governance to be more important for democracy. As to the question of “better”, most political scientists will say “neither”. There are plenty of election systems in the democratic world that combine these two elements in far better fashion. To take but one example (without getting too bogged down in the details), the German “mixed” system is far more stable than Israel’s (governments almost never “fall” before their term is up) but it’s also significantly more representative (four major parties vying at the national level). The German “secret sauce”? Half the legislative seats are elected by district, with the other half being proportionally representative.

None of this is to say that the “election system” is the only factor determining how well a democracy can function. Political culture is important, e.g. the Weimar Republic collapsed in 1933 in large part because Germany didn’t have much of a democratic past; given traditional Jewish argumentativeness, Israel’s political system would be “boisterous” no matter what the system; in light of its territorial separation from most of the world, America did not have to worry about foreign wars or serious entanglements for at least its first 120 years, lending a level of democratic stability that European countries could only dream of.

So when Israelis look at the American election system, they are nonplussed by the lack of choice and almost complete dearth of ideological variety. Conversely, Americans viewing Israeli elections are appalled by its quasi-“anarchy” (Israelis call it “balagan”). Both would do well to heed Churchill’s immortal description: “democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

Oct. 21, 2020

In Israel today, and for several weeks, protest has been rife all over the country – despite and also because of Corona. Much has already been written and argued as to whether this is appropriate during a plague. Whatever one’s position in that respect, one thing should be very clear: not only is this not a new phenomenon on the Israeli political scene, but it is the quintessential way that Jews have expressed themselves from time immemorial.

About thirty years ago, after a decade of research and numerous academic articles, I published a comprehensive (scholarly) book on the phenomenon, first in English (Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System: The Evolution and Roots of Israeli Public Protest, 1949-1986), and then a few years later I updated it in Hebrew: מחאה ציבורית בישראל, 1949-1992. Among the things that I discovered was that Israel led the entire democratic world in protest participation per capita! From there I added a chapter (to the revised work) on the Jewish origins of the phenomenon (it can be read here in article form: http://profslw.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/Am-Kshe-Oref.Oppositionism-in-the-Jewish-Heritage.pdf).

In precis, there are four forms of protest: argumentation, public protest, civil disobedience, rebellion. Judaism has always encouraged the first two, and discouraged the latter pair. It all started with Abraham arguing/protesting against God (!) regarding Sodom and Amorah’s destruction if it had holy people; it continued with the Israelites constant complaining in the desert (a “stiff-necked people”, indeed); then came the Prophets who lambasted the Jewish kings (!!) as well as the people who had gone astray; and ultimately produced the greatest tome in Judaism – the Talmud – consisting of thousands of arguments between the rabbis, and even a few telling God that he was no longer much needed (!!!) regarding these halakhic disputations (Bava Metziah, 59/b: “it is no longer for the Heavens to decide…”).

What underlay such a seemingly brazen approach to the Almighty and human authority? In a word: Covenant. By “signing a contract”, both Man AND God were mutually obligating themselves to do the right thing. If not, the other side was not only justified in protesting, but actually required to do so by the Talmud: “Anyone who should protest against a relative and doesn’t is guilty; similarly against a townsperson; and even against the world, bears as much blame” (Shabbat, 54/b).

Little wonder, therefore, that if one could chide the Almighty, the Prophets had no compunctions either about protesting against human kings. Skip a few thousand years, and we’re in modern Israel where protest has become a serious national sport (not to mention arguing with each other).

The good news: such a moral mentality demands that the Jew of whatever social status hew to a strict ethical norm of behavior – and when the leadership does not hold to such a norm, Jews will raise their voices, quite vociferously. The argumentation element also leads to “thinking out of the box”, ergo Israel’s “Start-Up Nation” as well as world Jewry’s great success in sundry professional, cultural and intellectual pursuits.

The bad news: the old Jewish jokes are not really that funny in practice – two Jews, three opinions; two synagogues built by one survivor on a deserted island: “that second one I would never step foot in…”. Even in a health emergency like Corona, Israelis can’t “get it together”. Running the Israeli ship of state is akin to handing out pails to bail out the Titanic.

For better and for worse, protesting is in the Jewish blood – indeed, I would argue (I’m Jewish too!) it forms the very cells of our personal and political bloodstream. And if you disagree with me, you’ve just proven that you’re Jewish too…

Sept. 29, 2020

The divide between American Orthodox Jewry and their non-Orthodox compatriots is growing – not only religiously but politically as well. Conventional wisdom has it that at base this is about Israel, or rather whether Israel is even a salient issue at the American ballot box. For the Orthodox it seems very much so; for other Jews (increasingly) far less. Given the perception that President Trump is “good for Israel”, this would explain why the Orthodox would vote again for the president. For other Jews, relatively neutral and/or apathetic regarding Israel – some even antagonistic to Israel’s policies – it makes sense from their perspective to focus on domestic issues, where the president is sorely lacking (at least from a liberal standpoint).

All of this is largely true, but doesn’t address the more underlying fault line running through American Jewry. In two words: “nationalism” vs “universalism”. Parsing them, though, demands a bit lengthier explanation.

For almost all of its glorious history, Judaism has been a religion and culture of a specific nation. Indeed, it is the only one that (at least mythically) began its journey with all the people gathered together: Mount Sinai. But beyond that origin story (Abraham to Jacob were proto-monotheists, but not “Jewish” in any sense of the word; indeed, they could not have been, as the term “Jewish”/Yehudi stems from Jacob’s son Judah), and despite its monotheistic bent, Judaism didn’t and doesn’t see itself as a “world religion” of a purely theological nature. Indeed, proselytism was never an integral part of its credo.

It need not be stressed that “nationalism” is the foundation upon which Trumpism rests: Make America Great Again – not bettering the world, but rather the United States. This is the fundamental source of American Orthodox Jewry’s support of Israel (the Jewish nation-state) and in parallel, for Trump (“nation above world”). Orthodox Jews in the U.S., based on their profound attachment to the Jewish People (and its rejuvenated state), are naturally attracted to a politics that echoes such a nationalistic weltanschauung.

Non-Orthodox Jews, on the other hand, due to secular education, acculturation, and even assimilation, are drawn to the universalism of the American creed. Indeed, their Judaism is expressed quintessentially through the term “tikkun olam” – reforming the world. This has never been a cardinal principle in the Jewish tradition (although some minor aspects can be discerned here and there), but it has now become the guiding “light unto the nations” for the non-Orthodox. (Parenthetically, it should be noted that “or la’goyim” – a light unto the world – never meant that Jews should actively change the world but rather actively upgrade themselves morally in order to be a model for others.) Thus, non-Orthodox Jews in America by and large have now come around to a universalistic form of cultural Judaism, relatively bereft of ethnos. From there it is but a small jump to viewing Israel as somewhat aberrational, not only due to its particular policies (vis-à-vis the Palestinians etc), but intrinsically as out of step with contemporary, liberal values given its heightened nationalism and ethnos-driven creed of Zionism, i.e. first and foremost, a Jewish State.

All this also explains the great enthusiasm that recent right-wing Israeli governments have shown towards President Trump – and their antipathy to President Obama, a symbol of multiculturalism and a person deeply attuned to the world at large. Reinforcing this chauvinistic propensity are the ultra/Orthodox in Israel who have significantly gained in political power and demographic strength. Thus, there is a remarkable “politico-cultural” synchronization going on between the current nationalistic American government and nationalistic Israel society and politics – thereby feeding and reinforcing the Jewish-American divide discussed above.

In the final analysis, the Jewish “divide” in contemporary America is not merely a matter of Trump vs. Biden, but rather goes far deeper than that. We are probably witness to a seismic shift in Jewish voting patterns – from Blue to Red – that will only gain in strength as the Orthodox (most ultra-Orthodox among them as well) increase their demographic numbers while the rest of American Jewry decline proportionally as a result of rampant intermarriage and general assimilation. Whether all this is “good for the Jews” (or for Israel) is another matter altogether.

Sept. 24, 2020

As a political scientist, I can vouch for one very common denominator underlying the American and Israeli electoral/political systems: they are both dysfunctional and efficient – for totally opposite reasons. With U.S. elections shortly taking place, and with serious noises coming out of the Israeli government about the need to call for another round of elections (that would be the fourth in less than two years!), it is worth considering their respective central weakness.

The U.S. has a “winner take all” system, on the Presidential and Congressional levels. That’s because each district, state or the country as a whole is considered to be a “district” with only one winner. That inevitably leads to a race between only two parties or candidates. On the opposite side of the spectrum lies the Israeli system that views the country as a whole as one district in which all parties compete for a proportional part of the entire Knesset. The result: many, many parties vie for seats in the legislature.

What’s the problem? The American system is seriously deficient in representativeness. This essentially means that each voter has a choice between only two candidates (we can ignore third-party candidates, who almost never win an election, although occasionally they can influence the outcome by drawing votes from one of the two main candidates). With such limited choice, it is rare indeed for any voter to find a candidate with whom s/he agrees on many issues. In short, the U.S. electoral system leaves little room for a result that truly reflects the wishes of many voters.

On the other hand, with around fifteen parties running in Knesset elections – and around ten passing the minimal voting threshold (3.25%) – Israeli voters have a virtual supermarket of parties for which they could vote. In such a rich electoral smorgasbord, the chances are great that each voter can find a party that represents his or her position on the most salient issues.

However, when one turns the picture around to look at governability, we arrive at a mirror image of the situation. Because America has only two parties, when it comes to running the ship of state there is one party that acts as the “captain” and only occasionally there’s one other that is involved in “navigation”. For much of American history that situation has enabled the leadership to govern in relatively efficient fashion. Quite the opposite state of affairs is the norm for Israel, what with the need to form a governing coalition of (usually) four to six parties. That’s not a ship of state but rather akin to a carriage with four/six horses pulling in different directions.

Adding to Israel’s governability misery is the fact that in its parliamentary system, new elections can – and usually do – take place well before the four-year term is completed. In other words, the threat of “toppling the government” from within is a constant worry for the prime minster. Compare that to the American Constitutional mandate of a four-year term no matter what (even the president’s death does not change that). Israeli governance instability is counterpointed by American governing constancy.

Which system is “better”? That depends on whether one considers representativeness or governance to be more important for democracy. As to the question of “better”, most political scientists will say “neither”. There are plenty of election systems in the democratic world that combine these two elements in far better fashion. To take but one example (without getting too bogged down in the details), the German “mixed” system is far more stable than Israel’s (governments almost never “fall” before their term is up) but it’s also significantly more representative (four major parties vying at the national level). The German “secret sauce”? Half the legislative seats are elected by district, with the other half being proportionally representative.

None of this is to say that the “election system” is the only factor determining how well a democracy can function. Political culture is important, e.g. the Weimar Republic collapsed in 1933 in large part because Germany didn’t have much of a democratic past; given traditional Jewish argumentativeness, Israel’s political system would be “boisterous” no matter what the system; in light of its territorial separation from most of the world, America did not have to worry about foreign wars or serious entanglements for at least its first 120 years, lending a level of democratic stability that European countries could only dream of.

So when Israelis look at the American election system, they are nonplussed by the lack of choice and almost complete dearth of ideological variety. Conversely, Americans viewing Israeli elections are appalled by its quasi-“anarchy” (Israelis call it “balagan”). Both would do well to heed Churchill’s immortal description: “democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

Oct. 21, 2020

My topic here is so fraught with emotion these days, that I need to declare this at the start: the following analysis is absolutely not a justification for, but rather only an explanation of, Haredi behavior during Corona (and in general), whether in Israel or abroad.

Imagine this: a baby is brought up as a slave; then is freed as a tweenager but has to deal with neighborhood bullies constantly pushing him around, as well as family members constantly telling him that he’s got to “blend in”; later as a teenager his home is burned down (twice!), forcing him to roam around for many years trying to find a safe place to reside in the way that he wishes to conduct his life. As an adult, he does occasionally find some such haven – only to be attacked again every so often, and then having to start the “roam” once more; later in life, some of his siblings decide to disown him completely, whereas others start behaving in a way totally different than what their parents taught; finally, approaching old age, a large part of his extended family is killed by a mass murderer – and the old man once again has to escape to start life anew.

Substitute the word “Jews” for this person and you have the narrative that today’s ultra-Orthodox Haredim tell themselves about their past (distant and near) – not altogether incorrectly. Their narrative has two main themes: the goyim are always out to harm the Jews; many fellow Jews are a big threat to the “true” Jewish way of life. In some Haredi circles, it’s not even clear which of these two threats is perceived as being the greater one.

What did Jews do to survive this horrendous history? Among other things, everything possible to circumvent gentile government restrictions and harsh edicts. Part of this involved a paradox of sorts: the foreign governments would force Jews to live among themselves, at some point even building “ghetto” walls to keep them in place. This led to a harsh, territorially restricted life; but it also enabled Jews to produce “autonomous” institutions of self-help, when governments refused to provide them with any services (other than collecting their taxes). With some variation, this “alternative system” way of communal (kehilla) life continued for 2000 years.

In the modern age (19^th century onwards), another threat appeared from a different direction, inside the Jewish world: Reform and Conservative Judaism, as well as rampant assimilation into the secular world. This reinforced the ultra-Orthodox need to keep apart from anything modern, including non-Haredi, Jewish compatriots. Indeed, a new theological “principle” arose: חדש אסור מן התורה (“the Torah forbids novelty”). That not only included novel halakha but scientific wisdom as well – essentially relegating the Haredi world to socio-economic stagnation, if not worse.

Political psychology is hard to change – especially when it’s as deep-seated and long-lasting as it has been for the Jewish Diaspora. This is especially true when, as just described, the perceived threat comes from without and from within. “Without”: non-Jewish government and society; “within”: non-Orthodox Jewish movements. In such a case (again: as perceived by the Haredim), there is only one strategic choice: build your own ghetto walls – literal (municipal, e.g. Bnei Brak, Mea She’arim, Borough Park, New Square NY) and figurative (banning the internet, eliminating core education subjects in school).

Such an approach stems from a deep-seated distrust of almost any non-Haredi authority: political, scientific, social, educational etc. Among other things these days, it explains not only Haredi suspicion regarding external political leaders (e.g. Gov. Cuomo) but also of medical professionals (Dr. Fauci in the U.S. and Prof. Gamzo in Israel). Paradoxically, it can also explain why the one gentile politician the haredim support is President Trump – the paragon of anti–establishment verbiage and behavior from within the establishment!

Moreover, their distrust is the basis for establishing a “pirate”, at-home, Corona treatment system in Israel for Haredim (https://www.timesofisrael.com/secret-haredi-program-treating-thousands-of-covid-patients-at-home-report/). And of course, it is the underlying source for flouting governmental health regulations and guidelines promulgated to prevent Corona infection (e.g. synagogues open despite official lockdowns; demonstrably burning masks). Indeed, this “political culture” is so ingrained in the Haredi psyche that it even overrides the single most important value in Judaism: pikuach nefesh (preserving human life). Seemingly, indirect “martyrdom” as a result of maintaining cultural and quasi-political autonomy takes preference over saving lives!

The bottom line: the greatest threat to a healthy Jewish future for the ultra-Orthodox is not antisemitism or assimilation; it is the stranglehold of galut (Diaspora) mentality that overwhelms all other forms of accommodation with modernity – even at the price of sacrificing Jewish life on the altar of socio-political and theological separatism.

Oct. 18, 2020

As is well known, Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu is in trouble – his tzores coming from numerous directions. First, three different, serious indictments, with the consolidated trials starting this coming January. Second, complete mismanagement of the Corona outbreak (“leading” the world today in per capita, daily infections) after the initial success in the first wave during March. And third, massive, ongoing protest demonstrations around the country – not just opposite the PM’s residence in Jerusalem – on both these issues.

It’s also no secret that Bibi is angling for new elections sometime in the coming months, because of (or despite) the above headaches. However, there’s a fourth problem that he will have to face, a highly paradoxical one that almost no one is talking about: the disappearance of the Likud’s traditional nemesis – Israel’s Labor Party (ILP).

The ILP was the dominant party that founded the newborn state in 1948 and ran the country (with smaller coalition partners) until 1977, when the Likud took over and has been in charge ever since, with a very few “interregnums”, not all led by the ILP. By the turn of the century, the ILP started a precipitous decline in strength (2015 being a one-off exception). Today, it is completely on the way out as a viable party, as reported in this newspaper back in April (https://www.timesofisrael.com/meanwhile-in-other-news-israels-labor-party-is-finished/). Given all the polls since then showing Labor with less support than necessary to pass the vote threshold (3.25%), it is almost certain that the two ILP ministers – Amir Peretz and Itzik Shmuli – will coalesce with Blue & White towards the next election, or risk an embarrassing electoral wipeout.

While this is sad news for the moderate Left – indeed, for Israel it’s an historic ending – it is also very bad news for Bibi and the Likud. To see why, we have to return to the heyday of ILP hegemony. Israel’s first years were extremely difficult, what with the War of Independence, immediately followed by a doubling of its population within four years due to massive Jewish immigration, and then several years of rationed semi-famine (the tzenah). Without laying blame (if anyone at all was to “blame”), the Jews that arrived from the Arab countries – Edot Ha’mizrakh, ethno-national groups from the East – lived through extremely difficult conditions for the ensuing decades. Their next generation erupted in protest in 1971, ultimately leading to the Likud’s electoral takeover in 1977. Since then, their sense of discrimination against ILP’s “Asheknazi hegemony” has been the foundation of the Likud’s hold on power. From Begin to Bibi (with ultra-Orthdodox, Edot Ha’mizrakh SHAS in key support since the mid-1980s), memories and continued feelings of ethnic discrimination have been a central force underlying the Likud’s victories.

With the disappearance of the ILP, that core factor will no longer be available. To paraphrase Richard Nixon’s famous line after his 1962 California Gubernatorial defeat: “the Likud won’t have Labor to kick around anymore”. The only vestige of Israel’s traditional Left that’s left is Meretz, but it has never been a threat to capture any real governing power. True, Bibi has tried to paint the Blue & White party as “smolanim” (Leftists), but that simply doesn’t stick given that its two leaders are former IDF Chiefs of Staff (and a third – Yaalon, ostensibly even more to the Right – left the party because his two compatriots joined the government with Bibi!).

In short, Bibi no longer has the ILP voodoo doll/piñata to stick pins into; anti-Left emotionalism will be enfeebled, perhaps even completely dissolved. Which leaves Bibi and the Likud to run “on the record” – and that domestic record has lately been catastrophic: the highest unemployment rate in Israel’s history; one of the world’s worst Corona rates; and rampant corruption in his party and among some right-wing coalition partners (others are under advanced investigation and pre-indictment).

This does not mean that the Likud will “lose” the next election. It does mean that the Likud will lose seats (the latest polls show a significant decline); that internal disaffection vis-à-vis Bibi will continue to fester and grow; and that we are probably witness to the beginning of Israel’s next tectonic shift in electoral politics. Perhaps not right away, but the writing is on the wall; after all, it took four years for the ILP’s disastrous handling in the 1973 Yom Kippur War to be translated into electoral defeat by the Likud in 1977 (ironically, with the anti-ILP campaign slogan “mush’khatim, nim’astem”: “we’re disgusted at your corruption”).

So along with – and in part because of – Israel’s R.I.P. for the Labor Party, the country is probably witnessing as well the death knell of longstanding Likud hegemony.

Oct. 11, 2020