Category Archives: Israelity

Israelity

Child Allowance and the Future of Zionism

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Between 1980 and 2000 there was only one population sector in the entire world whose birth rate actually increased: ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. The reason? The Likud government back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, headed by Menachem Begin, changed Israel’s Social Security (Bituakh Leumi) law and started increasing the amount of child allowance paid out for each child above a certain minimum. Simple economic logic dictates that costs for each successive child in a family should decrease per capita in the family — clothes can be hand-me-down, economies of scale in food purchases, etc. But the nationalist Likud government wished to provide strong incentives for Jewish birth as well as keeping the ultra-Orthodox happy within the coalition.

The results have been economically debilitating for the country as a whole and in particular for the ultra-Orthodox themselves. As most ultra-Orthodox (called “Haredim”) males do not work because they study Torah as their “livelihood” — in large part to enable the continuation of their army draft deferment — Israel has one of the lowest employees-to-population ratios in the industrialized world. The economy (production, tax base, etc.) suffers as a result. The Haredim have also found this to be a burden. In a country where newlyweds must immediately buy an apartment (1/3 wedding gift respectively from each family and 1/3 mortgage), having 8 children and within 20 years 64 grandchildren has proved an intolerable burden for non-working Haredim. Their house of cards (loans, overseas charity, etc.) has come crashing down.

But the macro and micro-economic ramifications are only  half the story. The longer term problem is that at present rates of fertility, the Haredim (today about 8 children per family) and the Israeli Arabs (4.5 per family) — the only two major anti-Zionist (or at least, non-Zionist) groups in Israel — will constitute in a few decades about half of the country’s entire population! Already today, 50% of all first grade pupils in Israel are either Haredim or Israeli-Arabs. 

This is a very touchy issue and when it is raised lots of people cry “racism”. But this has nothing to do with “ethnicity” or “race” — it has everything to do with retaining the underlying raison d’etre for establishing the Jewish State in the first place as a haven for displaced Jews around the world and as a place that Jews can express themselves culturally in a relatively free and democratic framework. Haredim, of course, are very Jewish but their definition of “Jewish State” is the antithesis of “democracy”; Israeli Arabs don’t even accept the concept of “Jewish State” in any form.

What is to be done? In 2002, then Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu drastically cut the Child Allowance for successive children. The Haredim cried foul (much louder than other poor Jewish sectors who were somewhat harmed by this), but he stuck to his guns — not only for economic reasons but (perhaps especially) for Zionist reasons. Recently, Tzippi Livni (no less a Zionist) also refused to bow to Haredi demands and because of this was unable to form a government which is why we are having elections in February 2009. 

With everything else on Israel’s plate — nuclearizing Iran, peace process with the Palestinians and perhaps also with Syria, dealing with the economic tidal wave sweeping the world — it might seem almost frivolous to have governments rise and fall on the issue of “Child Allowances”. But for Israel, it has become a matter of long-term Zionist life or death. Despite the fact that in most other religion and state matters the chasm between the Haredim and secular Israelis has actually narrowed over time, the real “battle” in the long term is demographic. It seems that Zionists across the board have placed a line in the sand. It will be interesting to see whether the Haredi demographic tidal wave will abate as a result.

Dec. 9, 2008

Israelity

After the Elections: A National Unity Government?

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

The term “national unity government” in Israel is generally considered to be an oxymoron for two reasons: Israeli society itself is far from even being close to united on almost any important issue; the current two main parties’ antipathy for each other (Likud and Kadima) goes well beyond the mutual dislike one normally finds in politics. And yet, this time it may actually happen for several good reasons.

           First, the next government will have to deal in real, practical terms with what is arguably the greatest existential threat that Israel has ever faced since its war of Independence: nuclear Iran. This is not a problem that lends itself to ideological infighting but rather demands a rally-round-the-flag, all-hands-on-deck approach. Given the stakes (military and political) in case of success and especially failure, Netanyahu and Livni would most probably prefer to cover their back(side) on this critical issue (see what happened to Defense Minister Peretz and ultimately PM Olmert as a result of the Second Lebanon War debacle).

           Second, both Livni and Netanyahu – and indeed almost every large party for the past two decades – very much want to change the election system once and for all. True, direct election of the prime minister was tried in the 1990s and canceled a decade later but the problem then was that the Knesset election system stayed the same. By almost all accounts what is needed is a system that reduces the number of parties, provides territorial (“district”) representation, and in general enables Israeli coalitions to govern in stable fashion. By forming a national unity government between the Likud and Kadima, and perhaps even constituting a majority by themselves (the latest polls give both together a bit more than the required 61 seats), election system reform could finally come to pass. That would reduce political “blackmail” by the smaller parties – especially the ultra-Orthodox – and enable policy to be set by truly Zionist parties.

           Third and related to the last point, both Netanyahu and Livni have shown that they are willing to pay a steep political price for not succumbing to ultra-Orthodox demands to return the high Child Allowances that Netanyahu lowered several years ago. This is an issue that Livni too would not concede, and paid the price of failing to form a new government, thus necessitating the current election campaign. “Child Allowance” might seem to the outside observer to be a very “peripheral” issue, but it strikes at the very heart of the continued future of the State of Israel as a Zionist enterprise. I shall devote my next blog post to this issue, but for now suffice it to say that Kadima and the Likud see eye to eye on the critical necessity of maintaining the current policy.

           To be sure, there are several good reasons against the establishment of such a government, not least of which is the enmity of the Likud Party to former Likud “defectors” who helped form Kadima under Ariel Sharon’s leadership. But that’s the past – and this election is about Israel’s future.

           Speaking of the past, does Israeli history offer any perspective? Absolutely yes! In 1984 the Israeli economy was on the verge of complete collapse, with hyper-inflation running at 400% (yes, four hundred percent, i.e. 1% a day!). The election outcome between Labor and the Likud was a virtually tie and a National Unity government was set up between Shamir and Peres with a rotation agreement of two years apiece as prime minister. With PM Peres at the helm along with Likud Finance Minister Moda’i the economy was brought back from the brink and set on a stable course that has lasted until this very day. True, the national unity arrangement continued for 6 years and towards the end it turned into a National Paralysis government, but the two-headed political hydra had accomplished the main goal.

           Political prognostication is a dangerous exercise, especially when dealing with the future. But this time around, the logic for a national unity is stronger than it has been for decades. I wouldn’t bet my last shekel that it will happen – but I also won’t be very surprised if it does. It certainly should.

 Dec. 1, 2008

Israelity

Political Bird Watching Towards the Coming Israeli Elections

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Israeli politics has always been characterized by the divide on the issue of peace talks and territorial concessions. The terms generally used are hawks and doves. However, this is too simplistic and overly general as most of the Israeli populace and the central parties fall somewhere in between these two purebred fowl. I suggest that two hybrids be added to Israel’s electoral ornithology: dawks and hoves.

           Pure hawks are against any territorial concessions due to their belief that the Arab world – and especially the Palestinians – are, and will forever be, against the continued existence of the Jewish State for ideological, theological and/or ethnic-national-historical reasons. Israel’s main two hawkish parties today are Yisrael Beitenu (Avidor Lieberman at the helm) and a constantly morphing amalgam of the former National Religious Party, Moledet Party, National Union, etc. (elections for party leader to be announced…).

           What then is a dawk? A “dawk” is a dovish hawk, one who doesn’t see much sense (even danger!) in trying to sue for peace with the other side at the present juncture (such a “present” can extend for years and decades) because either the Palestinians are too divided to be able to execute a peace treaty or are unwilling to consider serious concessions, e.g. giving up the dream of refugee return to Israel, sole possession of the Temple Mount etc. Dawks do not in principle rule out an ultimate peace treaty including some Israeli concessions but “at the moment” there is very little to negotiate given the situation and positions of the other side. In the dawk‘s eyes, in large part the problem is psychological: the Palestinians within their own society continue to demonize Israel and Jews, so that there is little “preparation” of the Palestinian people for any realistic peace compromise that would entail some painful concessions on their part as well.  The Likud Party leads the “dawk” camp in Israel today, and Binyamin Netanyahu certainly expresses the dawkish position in full regalia.

           On the other side of the divide are the doves and hoves. Pure doves believe that the Palestinians (and certainly Syria) are ready to sue for peace, not necessarily out of love of Zion but for realpolitik reasons of desperately wanting their own state. Doves believe that the sides are in fact not that far apart, and with some good will, a lot of “friendly pressure” (the Arab world on the Palestinians; the U.S. on Israel), and oodles of cash (ditto) to smooth over the mutual hurt born of painful concessions, a peace treaty is within our grasp. The Meretz Party (recently elected Haim Oron at the head) best exemplifies such a dovish stance.

           Hoves, on the other hand, are willing to continue negotiating for peace with serious Israeli concessions, but are willing to sign the dotted line only with ironclad security guarantees and the successful resolution of other issues that do not threaten the Jewish State. What does this entail? Roughly speaking: perhaps NATO membership for Israel; a 25 year land lease of the Golan Heights by Israel to maintain a presence and buffer while the peace treaty is carried out and relations are “normalized” with Syria; enabling only a very small number of Palestinian refugees to return to their ancestral home within Israel’s final borders, so that Israel does not have to fear the demographic dilution of its underlying Jewish character; demilitarization of the Palestine State; some joint sovereignty over the Temple Mount; a peace treaty as well with the entire Arab world (Iran is not Arab); etc. In other words, peace is possible but only when both sides are convinced that Israel is a permanent part of the Middle East – precisely as a result of the peace treaty’s parameters.

           Which Israeli parties are hoves? Here the matter becomes interesting. At present both the governing Kadima Party and its coalition partner the Labor Party are clearly hoves. This explains why they can sit relatively easily in the same government, but also why there is no love lost between them as they are essentially competing for the same birds of a feather among the Israeli electorate (not to mention that part of Kadima is populated by former Labor MK defectors).

           What is probably of greatest interest in this ornithological taxonomy is the fact that both dawks and hoves are dependent in their policy and stance on the behavior of the other side! In other words, if by some miracle the Palestinians would get their act together (Fatah defeats Hamas; a new forceful but moderate leader is elected President of the PLA; etc.) then both dawks and hoves would move “Leftwards”; obviously the opposite occurs when the Palestinians show less inclination to clean their own house.

The bottom line? Israeli elections – and the one coming up no less than others in the recent past – are more dependent on the behavior of the other side than on practices and policies of the Israeli parties themselves. Thus, at the moment it is not at all surprising that the dawks have an advantage over the hoves in the polls. With Fatah literally fighting Hamas, with Abbas as weak a President as one can imagine, and with continued anti-Zionist education and international anti-Zionist political activity on the part of many Palestinian intellectuals, the dawkish position at this point in time seems to make the most sense from the Israeli standpoint.

Nov. 26, 2008

Israelity

Obama and the Middle East: Not all Black or White

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

In Israel, Barack Obama’s victory has once again raised the ever-present question: “Is it good for the Jews?” (or for Israelis in general). The answer: just like his racial lineage, there is no unambiguous answer – and not only because of the new President himself. The following is a list of considerations, not necessarily in order of importance, regarding the new Administration and the Middle East peace process.

1) Who will win the elections in Israel? As previous American administrations have learned to their chagrin or joy, without Israeli cooperation there is just so much that can be done to push the peace process forward. If Tzippi Livni manages to form a coalition after Feb. 10 then Obama’s election could be a watershed for the peace process (the reason: see paragraph 3 below) as he will have a very willing Israeli government that wants to continue the process already begun. On the other hand, if Netanyahu proves victorious it is very hard to see significant movement – and given the very serious domestic and foreign policy challenges that face Obama in the foreseeable future, he will certainly not waste political energy on a (temporarily) lost cause. One final point: Obama’s victory might – just might – influence the outcome of the Israeli election in Livni’s favor for two reasons. First, if America can vote for a Black President who has promised “to do things differently”, then Israelis may feel that they should do no less. Second, Israelis perceive America as their greatest friend and ally – and many do not wish to have serious tension between their country and Uncle Sam, something that will occur with Netanyahu at the helm (remember Bibi and Bill?).

2) Who will be the next Palestinian President? In case anyone has forgotten, it takes two to tango (in this case, perhaps three!). The identity of the next Palestinian leader (elections are scheduled for next year here too) will also be important. If it is the present Chairman Abbas, then the situation would be the mirror image of Netanyahu – someone who wants to sue for peace but is too weak to make any significant concessions. President Obama might be willing to offer several economic carrots to Abbas; however, the problem is not economic but rather of political courage and persuasiveness – would he be able to tell and persuade his people that true peace can only come if they give up the “Dream of Refugee Return”? The answer by all accounts is no. Other younger and more determined Palestinian leaders might be able – if they are willing. Here too Obama has to wait for the election outcome.

3) Does Obama have street credibility with the Arab world? The answer is obvious: more than any other entering President in recent memory. With a middle name of Hussein and his paternal connection to Islam (he is not  a Moslem by any stretch), he surely will be viewed as a more honest broker than any previous President. But won’t that cause him problems with the Israelis? Until Nov. 4 perhaps that was the case, but the minute he appointed the son of an Irgun fighter to be his White House Chief of Staff (the Israelis are truly agog at Rahm Benjamin), it will be hard for anyone in Israel to suspect Obama’s “motives” or believe in a “pro-Arab bias”. Thus, for the first time ever (yes, ever) all sides to the Israeli-Arab conflict can feel a measure of confidence that the American President is not out to “screw” this side or the other.

4) What about the Arab hot spots connected to Israel? Here the news is good again, but not for reasons of “ethnic solidarity”. Rather, it is a matter of Obama’s approach to international relations: first talk and then we’ll see… Without a doubt he will encourage Israel to continue negotiations with Syria, and the Syrians too will be less wary of dealing with Israel and an American administration that does not (publicly) call it part of the “axis of evil”. And if by some chance Israel can get a deal with Syria, they will get Lebanon in the bargain too. That leaves the Palestinians (see above), and most important of all: Iran…

5) Whither Iran? Once again, the answer is to be partly found in the election tea leaves – this time, the Iranian elections! If the present administration retakes office (including an ideological clone of the incumbent, if not the incumbent himself) then Obama’s promised discussions with the Iranians will be short. If somehow a more “moderate” President were to be chosen (and perhaps that may occur precisely because Obama is far less threatening of Iranian sovereignty), then there is an outside chance (repeat, outside chance) that Obama can diffuse the crisis. Moreover, if the world (read: Russia and China) concluded that Obama made a real effort to talk to the Iranians without condescension and came up empty, greater U.N. sanctions would be in the offing – and perhaps at that point the new administration might be willing to countenance even “sterner” measures.

In addition, indirectly Israel’s negotiations with Syria could also be influential here, for if by some half-miracle a peace treaty can be signed with Syria – one of whose conditions will be Syria’s real break with terrorist regimes (read: Iran) – then the Iranians might feel the diplomatic noose tightening and perhaps for the first time might seriously consider a negotiated settlement.

6) What will be the price of oil? If oil prices stay significantly depressed, and especially if they drop even more, Iran’s economy will be deeply in trouble (it’s already halfway there) – another incentive for possible serious negotiations regarding its nuclear program. What does Obama have to do with this? Any serious alternative energy program initiated by the Americans would have repercussions in the oil market, even if the actual impact on production and prices won’t be felt for years. The perception of eventual Middle East power decline cannot but move the Middle East power brokers to try and clear up their political and economic muddles.

           In short, Obama is a huge “Joker” thrown into a complex game of Middle East poker. It is his hand to play, but he will need a few other good cards to actually succeed.

Nov. 9, 2008

Israelity

ISRAELI SOCIAL CLEAVAGES: THE BAD NEWS (AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT)

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

If my previous post on Israeli (internal Jewish) social cleavages was decidedly upbeat, this one will provide ample counterpoint. The tensions between Israeli Jews and their Arab counterparts have steadily worsened over time. The recent Acre riots were merely an exclamation point on the thickening exclamation itself. True, there have been a few symbolic advances (Israel’s first ever Arab Minister in this government) but overall the news is unremittingly bad. Two questions need to be addressed: who is at fault? and what is to be done?

The first question is relatively easy to answer: EVERYONE has been at fault to a smaller or larger extent. Perhaps it would be best to start with the general situation: the State of Israel has been beset for 60 years by surrounding Arab enemy states, only some of whom have made peace (at least formally) with her. One would be hard put to come up with any world example of a similar situation in which the nation did not view their enemies’ local compatriots with at least suspicion if not outright hostility. Just consider what America did with its West Coast Japanese citizens during World War II to understand the problem.

Having said that, Israeli policy vis-a-vis its Arab citizens has been quite shortsighted — from the Jewish/Israeli standpoint. For if Israel has major defense problems with its external neighbors, the last thing it needs to do is increase the hostility of its internal Arab population! This is not to say that Israel should bend over backwards in some sort of “affirmative action” towards local Arabs, but at the least it should try to guarantee equal resource distribution among its Jewish and Arab citizenry, something that has been far from the case since the establishment of the state. Even when taking into account extra-governmental largesse (Jewish National Fund disbursements from world Jewry), the amount of government money budgeted for education, sewage, etc., in the local Arab municipalities is extremely low by any standard — not to mention the fact that the state has not seen fit to create and nurture even one new Arab-Israeli city for decades.

However, Israeli Arabs have been blameworthy too. For starters, they have only themselves to blame for their political powerlessness. Despite their constituting close to 20% of Israel’s population, their voting record in national elections has been abysmal from two perspectives: voting turnout is significantly lower than among the Jewish population; too many Arab parties split the vote, and as many tiny parties do not overcome the minimal voting threshhold (today 2% in Israel) large numbers of votes are wasted. In addition, the Israeli-Arab leadership seems to be hell-bent on outdoing one another in blasting the government (and worse; some delegitimize the state and even call for its destruction or at least de-Judaization). Little wonder, therefore, that no Israeli government has been willing to incorporate an Arab party within its governing coalition — continuing the vicioius cycle of political powerlessness.

What is to be done? The first step must come from the government: a willingness to build new Arab cities and enable legal building by expanding the zoning within Arab municipalities; an automatic indexing of equal resources disbursed to Jewish and Arab institutions alike. Such a policy must be carried out consistently over several years, at which point the Israeli-Arab sector must make its own conciliatory moves. One such might be the acceptance of an Arab “national (civil) service” whereby all Arab young adults would serve for two or three years in some form of non-military civic institution (e.g. hospital, fire department, local civil guard, schools etc.) in parallel to army service that most Israeli Jews undertake as a matter of civic obligation. At some point, one would also begin to find political pressure building from within the Arab sector for a “non-Zionist” (instead of anti-Zionist) party willing to cooperate with, and be part of, the ruling government. Finally, perhaps the most critical of all: the Arab sector would have to vociferously denounce any and all “secessionist” or otherwise anti-Jewish political activity on the part of individual citizens (who do not represent the broad Arab population) and certainly on the part of its leadership (see: Dr. Azmi Bashara…).

Of course, a final peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would go a long way to ameliorating the mutual distrust of these two largest national population groups within Israel. But we need not wait for the Messiah to arrive. Plenty can be done without connection to what occurs outside of Israel’s borders.

Oct. 22, 2008

Israelity

Israeli Social Cleavages: The Good News

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

This topic might seem to be downright perverse. The social news from Israel the past few days has not been sanguine. Arab-Jewish riots in the traditionally co-existing, mixed city of Acre (Akko in Hebrew), set off by an Israeli-Arab driving through a Jewish neighborhood with car radio blaring. So what’s the good news?

           It is hard to focus on what does not make the news – especially if years and years go by and the topic supplies no “news”. But that is highly newsworthy in itself – especially when the subject used to make the papers on a daily basis.

           Israeli political scientists (of which I am one), have been teaching their students for decades that Israel is an over-burdened polity as a result of the large number of serious social cleavages between groups, any one of which would be enough to destroy another democracy. The main ones: 1- Ashkenazi (Jews of Western origin) vs. Mizrakhim (Jews of Arab country provenance); 2- Religious (ultra and national) vs. Secular; 3- Israeli Arab (“Palestinian”) vs. Israeli Jews. To these one can add the central political cleavage of Left (pro-peace process) vs. Right (Greater Land of Israel).

           But most of these no longer exist as deep-rooted splits in Israel. Mizrakhim have made it to the highest echelons of society and politics (several Israeli Presidents and Army Chiefs of Staff; the present Speaker of the Knesset; many of the richest tycoons). Partly as a result, there are no more virulent campaigns like that addressed to Shimon Peres in 1981 with rotten vegetables and curses slung at him during election stops. The ultra-Orthodox are slowly entering Israeli society with nascent Haredi units existing in the Army and even a few (secular studies) colleges for the ultra-Orthodox population that has come to realize that it has to work in order to make a living. Moreover, Israel no longer suffers from massive religious demonstrations like the stone throwing on the Ramot Road in Jerusalem that went on for years every Sabbath back in the 1970s. And as to the political Left-Right split, while some animosity still exists, most of Israeli society has moved to the Center as the last election results illustrated and as constant polls show regardless of which politician is up and which down.

           In short, Israeli society has decidedly come of age. This is not to say that there are no tensions in these areas and that an unusual outburst could not still occur. But it is to say that these topics no longer have the political resonance that they once had, in part because Israelis have found the way to finesse the problems, in part because they have solved the most egregious aspects of these cleavages, and in part out of pure social exhaustion.

           So the social “non-news” is actually quite good. That leaves the major societal area of bad news that is reported on by the media. And here – completely against the grain of the other domains of Israeli life – the news is indeed bad. In fact, the split between Israeli Arabs (not just Moslems; Bedouin too) and the Jewish majority is getting palpably worse. Why this is so – and what Israel could (and should) do about it, I’ll discuss in next week’s post. Meanwhile, it would behoove Israelis and their supporters alike to bask just a little in the significant progress that has been made – the lack of “news” on this score notwithstanding.

Oct. 12, 2008

Israelity

Leadership in Uncertainty

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Over the past year, Americans are getting a lesson in what Israelis have been living for six decades: public life in an environment of great uncertainty. Both in economics and in politics, the U.S. has recently undergone (and continues to go through) a wild roller coaster ride with unforeseen stomach wrenching twists and turns.

           In such a period of turmoil, election campaigns tend to focus more on “personality” than on “policy” because while the latter cannot be a prescription for what to do when the unexpected occurs, the former does offer a pretty good indication of how the leader will make decisions under stress.

           In that regard, the two leading candidates to be Israel’s next prime minister could not be more different. Bibi Netanyahu is easier to parse, as he already was a prime minister and later finance minister in times of great tension and pressure. In both cases he proved to be the same individual with strikingly different outcomes. Netanyahu is a man of clear principles and overall ideology, but tends to be somewhat of a loner when making important policy decisions. Without getting into too many details, these traits were disastrous for him as prime minister but enabled him to function heroically as finance minister. Ideological consistency is fine as far as it goes but when you have to lead a motley crew of disparate parties within a coalition it turns into a recipe for paralysis or unnecessary antagonism. However, when running one’s own bailiwick (Finance Ministry), there is not that great a need for consultation – and Netanyahu’s “inflexibility” vis-à-vis other parties’ demands and warnings served the country in good stead as his budget-cutting policies enabled Israel to survive a very deep recession and go on to produce several years of excellent economic results.

           Tzippi Livni is more of a question mark, if only because she has not yet been prime minister and of the other two major ministries (defense and finance), the foreign ministry has the least “crisis management” to deal with. Yet, what we do know about her decision-making is quite the reverse of Netanyahu’s: she tends to ask for lots of advice and is a very good listener. On the other hand, the most serious criticism of her on the part of those who have seen her in action, is that she does not like to make tough decisions – precisely the opposite of Netanyahu whose self-confidence leaves no doubt (in his own eyes) as to the wisdom of whatever he decides to do.

           Livni’s approach is not surprising, given that it matches well with what the latest research has found regarding the different management styles between men and women (as a generalization, of course – for every 5 Livnis there’s one Margaret Thatcher type too). In Israel, the differences are even more pronounced, given that most prime ministers come from the Israeli Army where “gung-ho!” is the operative term.

           The parallels in the current American election campaign are striking: McCain is a Netanyahu type of leader; Obama a clone of Livni. Thus, the outcome of the American elections and Israel’s coalition formation – or Spring elections if a new Israeli government can’t be formed – will go a long way in determining what sort of relationship the two allies will have, depending on the clash or match of leadership styles in both nations.

And if you can’t wait, try this: Ha’aretz, Israel’s elite newspaper, has just introduced a “simulation game” that enables you to “play leader” in Israel based on your knowledge of the news and the political environment (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1025853.html). Do you have what it takes? We’re all asking the same question regarding McCain, Obama, Biden, Palin, Livni and Netanyahu…

Oct. 5, 2008

Israelity

The American Bailout Plan: Lessons from Israeli History

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Comparisons between a whale of an economy and a minnow are always problematic. And what worked once may not work two decades later. Having offered those caveats, I still think that the Israeli experience may have an important lesson for what promises to be the biggest transfer of power in the history of the United States. The present $700 billion bailout plan will move a huge chunk of authority from Congressional political oversight to Executive (i.e. Treasury) technocratic governance. Is that healthy for democracy?

           The Israeli case suggests that it can be. From the time of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the politicians ran the nation’s economy and finances. Indeed, during Finance Minister Sapir’s tenure in the 1960s and 70s, the economy was run by “paper slips” that he kept in his pocket – mostly requests by citizens, companies and other groups for financial succor. By the early 1980s Israel was suffering from hyper-inflation (400% a year!) as a result of the amateurish way the economy was run. The country stood at the abyss – sound familiar?

           The solution they hit upon: let the academics devise a master economic plan and then let the professional technocrats in the Finance Ministry administer it in consistent fashion, with a minimum of political input. The short term result: hyperinflation was stopped in its tracks without large scale unemployment. The long term result: despite ups and downs in its security situation and other external problems, the Israeli economy over the past 20 years has gone from strength to strength; indeed, Israelis today are lamenting the fact that the shekel is so strong vis-à-vis the dollar!

           Not everyone has been satisfied with this new state of affairs (or shall we say, affairs of state). During budget negotiations in the mid-1990s, Prime Minister Rabin exploded in the Knesset when part of his political program for resource redistribution was being stymied by the Treasury, asking out loud, literally pounding his fist on the podium: “who do these Fogels [then Director General of the Ministry] think they are?” Moreover, in order to maintain a low budget deficit, the Finance Ministry has occasionally made deep cutbacks, highly unpopular among large sectors of the public and their parliamentary representatives. And yet, the Finance Ministry “boys” continue to hold sway – and the economy continues to proudly withstand the buffeting winds of international recession and other blows.

           All democracies have to make tradeoffs between political representation and governance efficiency. Having faced the abyss in the 1980s, Israel has made its pact with the “technocratic devil”. The American citizenry might well look at the Israeli case when judging the present revolutionary transformation that is being proposed. It may be less “democratic”, but enabling the professionals (not the politicians) in government to run the show at times of crisis and thereafter might well be the lesser (d)evil.

Shana tova to all!

Sept. 29, 2008

Hamas in Gaza: Do Sanctions Work?

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

This past week I attended a guest lecture at Brown U on the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. To my surprise (given the general anti-Israel atmosphere at most elite American universities) it was a very balanced presentation regarding the general situation, with emphasis on what is happening within the Palestinian camp – Hamas vs. Fatah etc. The lecturer’s bottom line: the sanctions against Hamas are not working and indeed might even be strengthening it – precisely the opposite of what Israel and the West want to see. Thus, argued the speaker, we should commence indirect talks with Hamas and try to get them back into the negotiation process.

           Just two related things were missing from his comprehensive analysis. First, any mention of the reason for the world’s sanctions against Hamas; second, can sanctions be successful and if so, how long does one have to wait?

           Several questions from the audience suggested that many Americans are not at all clear what Hamas wants and why almost the entire world has placed sanctions on its Gaza regime. So here in a nutshell are clauses from the Hamas official platform:

Israel will exist until Islam will obliterate it… [Hamas] strives to
raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine (Article 6). The
Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the links in the chain of the
struggle against the Zionist invaders. It goes back to 1930’s, and it
includes the struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1948 war and all
Jihad operations… The Day of Judgment will not come about until Muslims
fight and kill the Jews (Article 7).

The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf (endowment) until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be
given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries… neither any
organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the
right to deny that. Palestine in its entirety belongs only to the
Palestinians. This is the law governing the Islamic Shari`ah (article 11).
Nothing is more significant or deeper than Jihad against the Zionist enemy. Resisting and quelling the enemy become the individual duty of every Muslim, male or female. Abusing any part of Palestine is tantamount to
abusing part of the religion [which means death]. There is no solution for
the Palestinian question except through Jihad to eliminate the Zionist
invasion. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a
waste of time and vain endeavors (Article 13). Jihad is the path, and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of all wishes… [my emphases: SLW]

I could stop here and, as in the movies, merely add: “I rest my case”. But that would be too glib, for one occasionally hears the counter-argument: “well, that’s their initial position, but with power and governance comes responsibility and compromise”. My response to that: one should respect Hamas enough to take it at its word – especially because we are not talking about a “political” matter but rather a fundamental theological principle from their perspective. There is no arguing with Allah; they haven’t changed their tune in many decades and never will.

           So what should Israel and the West do? Are sanctions the best path? One answer to that question is typically Jewish – another question: what other options are there? Any discussion with Hamas on the core issues merely lends it legitimacy and undercuts the more moderate Fatah that at least rhetorically accepts Israel’s right to exist and has been engaged in serious peace negotiations with Israel this past year or so.

           A second answer is that sanctions do, indeed, work! But they are not, as we say in Israel: “Z’bang ve’gamarnu!” [one shot and it’s over]. It’s a relatively long term process. And there are several recent examples to prove it: North Korea eventually came around to agreeing to dismantle its nuclear program; the South African apartheid regime ultimately collapsed under international sanctions; and even “crazy” Qaddafi has led his country away from terrorism back to civilized international relations as a result of heavy international pressure!

           These were bona fide countries with their own resources. Gaza has no natural resources whatsoever, no territorial link to anyone that are not part of the sanctions, and no real ongoing source of financial support. Its regime has been in existence only two years and is already showing signs of internal stress – its popularity is dropping among the Gazan population, tensions are rising between Hamas in Gaza and its “diaspora” leadership (in Syria), there is a large net emigration from Gaza of the middle and educated classes, the economy is almost moribund, and perhaps worst of all (from its perspective) it has had to put its “jihad” against Israel on hold due to Israel’s successful “targeted killing” of those involved in the Kassam rocketry over the border. Hamas is now left with dealing with sewage and concrete – not quite what a politico-theological “revolutionary” movement wants to be involved in!

           Do sanctions work in general? Under the right conditions and with enough staying power – certainly. Will they work against Hamas? The conditions here are definitely more propitious than they were with North Korea and Libya. Israel and the West are trying to “give peace a chance” with the Palestinian Authority. They would do well to continue to “give sanctions a chance” on the other side of the Palestinian divide.

Sept. 21, 2008

Israelity

Perspectives on Israeli Political Corruption

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

These days, one can’t get through a week of news on (and in) Israel without the word corruption popping up. Indeed, we are about to witness the passing of the nation’s leadership baton from PM Olmert to his elected successor, as a result of public and coalition pressure on him to resign. Under investigation in no less than five or six scandals (depending how you wish to combine or separate some cases), Olmert has set the Israeli record which heretofore was owned by the previous prime minister Ariel Sharon. Thus, the critical question has to be asked: exactly how corrupt is Israeli politics?

           Like the proverbial blind men, each of whom is trying to define an elephant when touching a different part, the reply to our question depends on one’s perspective. Indeed, it is also a function of time frame. Thus, in typical Jewish fashion the bottom line answer is a resounding “it depends”. Here are several ways of looking at the issue.

           1- It used to be worse: Awhile back when doing some research, I went into the library to read a few of the early State Comptroller annual reports. This central functionary (appointed by the Knesset and not the Government) has as its major role ferreting out, and reporting on, bureaucratic inefficiency, malfeasance and outright corruption. It made for sobering, albeit “laughable”, reading. I shall offer but one recurring example (in the 1950s): public clerks who would take home the day’s payments by the public (for licenses, registration fees etc.) and deposit them in their own personal bank account for “safekeeping”! Such endemically corrupt practices, back then widespread throughout the system, simply do not exist today. Instead we get the “major” stories of prime ministers and other political bigwigs caught with their hands in the till or involved in illegal “give and take”. Which brings us to the next perspective on the phenomenon.

           2- Investigative journalism: In the first few decades of the State, there were more than a dozen daily newspapers, and none had the “gall” to look too carefully into leadership practices. It was the era of “national development” and the Israeli media saw their role largely as Zionist cheerleaders. Moving forward 50-60 years and we find today a radically different situation: growing economic competition between the press and commercial television (not to mention within each medium too) has led them to sensationalize each police investigation and elicit leaks from the prosecutor’s office, the police and the defense lawyers in what has become a bona fide three-ring circus. Thus, not only are the media in Israel today far more willing (and even eager) to “scoop” corruption, but once brought to light the ensuing frenzy tends to reinforce the impression regarding the phenomenon well beyond its natural parameters. (Parenthetically, this occurs in other fields as well; to go by the Israeli media coverage of traffic fatalities one gets the distinct impression that the country’s drivers are the most reckless in the world, when the data show them to be situated somewhere in the middle.)

           3- It’s a young country: As we all know, Israel is 60. So where were other countries on the corruption scale at around their 60^th birthday? The U.S. provides a good example: President Grant’s Administration’s numerous scandals (80 years after 1790); Boss Tweed who ran New York City like a personal fiefdom (ditto); and many others. The point is not that if it happened in America it’s not so bad, but rather that corruption seems to be a “natural” part of democratic nation-building. If Rome wasn’t built in a day, neither is clean democracy built in half a century.

           4- The system fights back: A major part of this struggle to build a clean system is the establishment of strong corruption-fighting institutions within the overall polity. I mentioned earlier the State Comptroller. With all due respect, the first ones were extremely wishy-washy; the latest are no-holds-barred corruption fighters. As with the media, here too the positive leads to a negative impression: the more they are successful, i.e. the better they are in uncovering illegitimate behavior, the greater the public perception that the situation is getting worse when what’s happening is that the institutions designed to protect the public’s interest are actually getting more effective!

           None of this is to say that Israel is about to join Switzerland or Norway on the Clean Government scale. Israel, as a member of the Middle East (with a modicum of baksheesh culture imported from the Arab world) certainly has its work cut out regarding this issue. But the cup is not only half full with corruption; it is also half empty of far worse corruption that existed beforehand but no one knew. If a corrupt prime minister has to step down from office because of public and political pressure, that’s a sign that things are moving in the right direction.

Sept. 15, 2008