Author Archives: admin

Isreality

In Memoriam of Prof. Samuel Huntington: Israel vs. Hamas

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Last week my PhD supervisor/mentor passed away. This would normally not be material for a blog post regarding Israel but the timing of his death is extremely interesting. Harvard’s Prof. Samuel Huntington – among other major studies he wrote – is famous as the author of what has come to be called the “Clash of Civilizations”. I can think of no better title for what is currently happening in Gaza!

His thesis runs like this: the world is currently divided into several “civilizations”, i.e. major groupings of peoples, each with a common world perspective and common values, goals etc. Thus, the Euro-American civilization is one such mega-grouping, the Sino-Asiatic another, and so on. Included among these contemporary civilizations is, of course, the Islamic one.

According to Prof. Huntington who wrote up this study in the early 1990s, well before Al-Qaida had become a household name, the Islamic and Euro-American civilizations are on a collision course – hence the clash of civilizations. When his book appeared, many scoffed and called his thesis overly simplistic. Certainly, it is somewhat over-generalized, but no one is scoffing anymore after Sept. 11, 2001 and subsequent mega-terror travesties – Mumbai being merely the latest one.

However, terrorism comes in many forms – sometimes even appearing as a “state apparatus”. Such is the case of Hamas that now rules Gaza. Despite massive economic and political pressure, it has consistently held to its stated ideology that the State of Israel is illegitimate and must be eliminated. Israel might have been able to swallow this bitter pill if Hamas’s actions had remained exclusively rhetorical, but this is a terrorist organization that puts its money (and guns) where its mouth is – firing missiles indiscriminately into civilian areas, the precise definition of “terrorism”.

Hamas is a microcosmic example of Huntington’s civilizational clash. He did not necessarily foresee a “world war” a la the 1940s but rather a decades-long war of attrition between the two politico-cultural adversaries from the (Middle) East and the West. And unfortunately Israel is caught in the middle. On the one hand, territorially it resides in the Islamic Middle East; culturally and religiously it is far more attuned to the (Judaeo)Christian West. Thus, Israel finds itself on the very front lines of the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations, doing what it has to do to protect itself well in advance of the day the rest of the West will have to do the same (Iranian inter-continental ballistic missiles anyone?).

A further irony can be found in earlier works of Huntington – dealing with the relationship of the military and the state. Here too the connection with current events is palpable. One of the major sources of Islamic fundamentalist resurgence stems precisely from the Middle East’s penchant to have the military control the state, thereby suppressing any nascent democracy and impoverishing the public that ultimately turned to Allah for succor. The examples are legion: the Shah led to Khomeini; Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak (all military men) have spawned a growing Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Arafat’s leadership by the gun barrel has spawned Hamas; Assad father and son have been hanging on but for how much longer before radical Islam takes over there too?

What Israel is doing today in Gaza is necessary but in reality it’s only a holding action. What needs to be done over the long term is precisely what President Bush (W.) sought to do but carried out so incompetently: start the process of democratization in the Middle East (yes, we all know that “Islam can’t be democratic”; neither could “Catholic Italy” etc…). It is only when the Islamic world begins to share some values with the West (which is not to say that the West couldn’t learn a thing or two from the East about family values, social cohesion etc.) that Huntington’s thesis can be put to rest. Meanwhile, Israel has to do the best it can to ensure that it is not squashed in the violent vise of this mega-cultural clash.

As for Prof. Huntington personally, I can say that beyond his intellectual brilliance and vast scholarship, he was a model mentor for young scholars. I would inevitably receive back within 48 hours any chapter I submitted to him from my evolving PhD dissertation – a remarkable feat for someone (already back then in the 1970s) so busy and famous.

May he rest in peace – and may the day come that his major thesis rests in peace too. For the time being, as we can see from recent events in Mumbai, Gaza and elsewhere, it is unfortunately only too alive and kicking.

Dec. 30, 2008

Isreality

 The Paradox of Israeli “Democracy”

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

The American tourist to Israel is immediately struck by how vociferous Israelis tend to be about their countries and the myriad issues that it has to deal with. “Opinionated” is probably too mild a word to describe Israelis’ penchant for mouthing off on any and all topics, large and small. And if that tourist were to dig a little deeper, s/he would be further impressed by Israel’s relatively high voting turnout – far higher than in the States (especially when one takes into account that Israeli voting percentages are artificially depressed by hundreds of thousands of Israeli emigrants living abroad who continue to appear on the voter register but are barred by Israeli law from voting while overseas). Israeli democracy, seemingly, is alive and kicking.

           However, when one looks at the whole picture, the scene changes drastically. Democracy is not merely the election campaign and Election Day – it is a matter of daily functioning throughout the year. Moreover, it is not only something that one “does” within the political realm; true democracy carries over into all fields of public life. From this dual (and wider) perspective, Israeli democracy has a long way to go in order to join the advanced democratic world.

           I shall start with an example from my own profession. As a visiting professor at Brown University this year, I too get mass e-mailings from the administration. Recently, I received a message that solicited faculty members’ input into Brown’s upcoming five-year policy and course structure reassessment – and several reminders followed urging the faculty to participate in this important process. I have been teaching at Bar-Ilan University for three decades and have never received such a request – not even when I was chairman of one of the university’s largest departments! My colleagues from other Israeli universities report exactly the same (non)experience. In other words, in Israeli academia the Rector and President decide what’s best for everyone, without asking their “public” – by all lights a most intelligent one – for educated input.

           This week the Israeli and American press offered another such example – from the world of journalism. The internet has upended many journalistic practices and dogmas, chief of which was that editorial content was to be written only by professionals; the public merely chose what to read from the menu offered. Today, however, the interactivity afforded by the internet (Web 2.0) has in theory empowered the reading public to become “prosumers”: producing and publishing what they and others will also read/consume. But when one compares Israeli journalistic practice with that of their American counterparts in the age Web 2.0, the difference is striking: 58% of all American newspapers on a regular basis publish editorial content (articles, op-ed pieces, news photos etc.) submitted by readers. In Israel, the percentage is close to zero – except for what Israelis call “Talkbacks”, i.e. on the papers’ websites, readers’ commenting on regular news items. In other words, the Israeli press is grudgingly willing to allow some semblance of reaction to its product, but does not countenance enabling readers to initiate news product.

           One could add example after example from all walks of Israeli life. Members of Knesset who almost never solicit their constituents’ opinions; planning commissions that consider public input to be a nuisance in the arduous process of approving projects; university professors who as a general rule view the teaching process as one of “I talk, you listen and write, then you regurgitate, and finally I grade”; and so on.

           How to explain this paradox of oral volubility and practical passivity? It strikes me that true Jewish behavioral culture is one of democratic participation, but in the early development of Zionism and then during the early years of the Jewish State itself, such natural activism became stymied as a result of what came to be called “mamlakhtiyut” – Statism, the idea that the government would provide for the (mostly uneducated and poor) populace that was immigrating to Israel in droves. At the time, such an approach may have even made sense given the very limited public resources that were stretched to the breaking point. But once the economic crisis passed, Israelis were ready to return to their more participatory culture – only to find an institutional structure that was built for top-to-bottom guidance and not bottom-to-top input.

           So Israelis continue to kvetch, and complain, and occasionally demonstrate in the streets, but it will be awhile yet until the “elites” in Israel begin to discover what has become conventional wisdom in the rest of the west: knowledge lies at the bottom of the pyramid, far more than at the top (see Wikipedia vs. Britannica); organizational hierarchy cannot compete with the efficiency of the network (the campaigns of McCain vs. Obama). May the Jewish State live a very long life, but may the ethos of Statism have a very fast demise…

Dec. 24, 2008

Isreality

 Israel and Chanukah: Then and Now

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Note: The sharp of eye may have noticed that I have slightly changed the spelling of this blog from “Israelity” to “Isreality”. The reason: it was pointed out to me that there already exists a blog called “Israelity” at Israel21: http://www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enPage=HomePage. So as not to confuse everyone, my blog’s name now has more “reality” and a bit less “Israel”.

Chanukah is upon us once again. Normally it is a time for reawakened national pride and spiritual uplift (not to mention gifts, games and jelly doughnuts). I would like to add some reflection to the proceedings.

It seems to me that Chanukah has much to offer the contemporary scene, for as Ecclesiastes opined: “there is nothing new under the sun”. I discern three separate but somewhat related themes in the original holiday that are relevant to present day politics and society in Israel.

First, the question of what precisely is “Jewish Heroism”: is this something military or spiritual? The Chanukah story itself seems to support the former but the Rabbis thought otherwise as can be seen in a key sentence from the Sabbath Haftorah reading that the rabbis decided to canonize on this holiday, of all possible holidays: “not by soldiers and not by power but rather by my spirit, sayeth the Lord of Hosts“.

Israeli society is also caught in the conundrum. On the one hand, it glorifies its generals (and soldiers); on the other hand, it is one of the few countries in the world (perhaps the only one!) that celebrates Independence Day with a Bible contest as well as handing out the Israel Prize to its leading intellectual lights. Indeed, the issue has become very prosaically political: to spend more on national defense or on education? The coming elections could well be decided by those who feel the latter needs more resources, after decades of feeding the former.

Second, the issue of “Hellenism”, or as it is called today: “Westernization”, “secularization”, “modernization” – to separate from the “modern” world or to integrate into it? Here too it is not coincidental that the Sabbath Chanukah Torah reading includes the story of Joseph in Egypt who does precisely that – changes his name and appearance to the extent that his brothers cannot even recognize him, but who ultimately returns to his family traditions.

Israel is awash in matters from the West. Even Hebrew is becoming unrecognizable to old-timers brought up on the Hebraically rooted poetry of Bialik and the prose of Agnon. And yet, as I have noted in a previous post, non-religiously-observant Jews in Israel have begun a quest for their spiritual roots (e.g. “secular yeshivas”). Basic customs are held as strongly as ever: Passover Seder, mezuzahs on the door, etc. Most Israelis are not seeking to leave Judaism but rather to find the right synthesis between modernity and hoary tradition.

Third and finally, the original Chanukah story started a process that raised the most fundamental political issue of all: sovereign independence at any cost? How should a small country like Israel (then and now) deal with the Great Powers? Is it better to have peace and mere political autonomy or risk all for ultimate political sovereignty? The eventual destruction of the Second Temple and subsequent catastrophic Bar-Kochba revolt argue for the former approach, but as the Holocaust clearly showed, a lack of political sovereignty can also be disastrous for the Jewish people. (Here too the Chanukah Torah portion shows what can happen when Jews leave their homeland: slavery in Egypt.)

Most interesting of all is the fact that Chanukah is the only significant Jewish national holiday that does not have its “story” canonized somewhere in the Bible – despite the fact that there are at least two extant versions of the “Book of the Maccabees” (in the Apocrypha). Of course, this does not mean that we today can’t or shouldn’t learn lessons from the Chanukah story; it just means that we have to be very careful (as were the Rabbis) what particular lesson we want to learn.

Dec. 18, 2008

Israelity

Child Allowance and the Future of Zionism

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Between 1980 and 2000 there was only one population sector in the entire world whose birth rate actually increased: ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. The reason? The Likud government back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, headed by Menachem Begin, changed Israel’s Social Security (Bituakh Leumi) law and started increasing the amount of child allowance paid out for each child above a certain minimum. Simple economic logic dictates that costs for each successive child in a family should decrease per capita in the family — clothes can be hand-me-down, economies of scale in food purchases, etc. But the nationalist Likud government wished to provide strong incentives for Jewish birth as well as keeping the ultra-Orthodox happy within the coalition.

The results have been economically debilitating for the country as a whole and in particular for the ultra-Orthodox themselves. As most ultra-Orthodox (called “Haredim”) males do not work because they study Torah as their “livelihood” — in large part to enable the continuation of their army draft deferment — Israel has one of the lowest employees-to-population ratios in the industrialized world. The economy (production, tax base, etc.) suffers as a result. The Haredim have also found this to be a burden. In a country where newlyweds must immediately buy an apartment (1/3 wedding gift respectively from each family and 1/3 mortgage), having 8 children and within 20 years 64 grandchildren has proved an intolerable burden for non-working Haredim. Their house of cards (loans, overseas charity, etc.) has come crashing down.

But the macro and micro-economic ramifications are only  half the story. The longer term problem is that at present rates of fertility, the Haredim (today about 8 children per family) and the Israeli Arabs (4.5 per family) — the only two major anti-Zionist (or at least, non-Zionist) groups in Israel — will constitute in a few decades about half of the country’s entire population! Already today, 50% of all first grade pupils in Israel are either Haredim or Israeli-Arabs. 

This is a very touchy issue and when it is raised lots of people cry “racism”. But this has nothing to do with “ethnicity” or “race” — it has everything to do with retaining the underlying raison d’etre for establishing the Jewish State in the first place as a haven for displaced Jews around the world and as a place that Jews can express themselves culturally in a relatively free and democratic framework. Haredim, of course, are very Jewish but their definition of “Jewish State” is the antithesis of “democracy”; Israeli Arabs don’t even accept the concept of “Jewish State” in any form.

What is to be done? In 2002, then Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu drastically cut the Child Allowance for successive children. The Haredim cried foul (much louder than other poor Jewish sectors who were somewhat harmed by this), but he stuck to his guns — not only for economic reasons but (perhaps especially) for Zionist reasons. Recently, Tzippi Livni (no less a Zionist) also refused to bow to Haredi demands and because of this was unable to form a government which is why we are having elections in February 2009. 

With everything else on Israel’s plate — nuclearizing Iran, peace process with the Palestinians and perhaps also with Syria, dealing with the economic tidal wave sweeping the world — it might seem almost frivolous to have governments rise and fall on the issue of “Child Allowances”. But for Israel, it has become a matter of long-term Zionist life or death. Despite the fact that in most other religion and state matters the chasm between the Haredim and secular Israelis has actually narrowed over time, the real “battle” in the long term is demographic. It seems that Zionists across the board have placed a line in the sand. It will be interesting to see whether the Haredi demographic tidal wave will abate as a result.

Dec. 9, 2008

Israelity

After the Elections: A National Unity Government?

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

The term “national unity government” in Israel is generally considered to be an oxymoron for two reasons: Israeli society itself is far from even being close to united on almost any important issue; the current two main parties’ antipathy for each other (Likud and Kadima) goes well beyond the mutual dislike one normally finds in politics. And yet, this time it may actually happen for several good reasons.

           First, the next government will have to deal in real, practical terms with what is arguably the greatest existential threat that Israel has ever faced since its war of Independence: nuclear Iran. This is not a problem that lends itself to ideological infighting but rather demands a rally-round-the-flag, all-hands-on-deck approach. Given the stakes (military and political) in case of success and especially failure, Netanyahu and Livni would most probably prefer to cover their back(side) on this critical issue (see what happened to Defense Minister Peretz and ultimately PM Olmert as a result of the Second Lebanon War debacle).

           Second, both Livni and Netanyahu – and indeed almost every large party for the past two decades – very much want to change the election system once and for all. True, direct election of the prime minister was tried in the 1990s and canceled a decade later but the problem then was that the Knesset election system stayed the same. By almost all accounts what is needed is a system that reduces the number of parties, provides territorial (“district”) representation, and in general enables Israeli coalitions to govern in stable fashion. By forming a national unity government between the Likud and Kadima, and perhaps even constituting a majority by themselves (the latest polls give both together a bit more than the required 61 seats), election system reform could finally come to pass. That would reduce political “blackmail” by the smaller parties – especially the ultra-Orthodox – and enable policy to be set by truly Zionist parties.

           Third and related to the last point, both Netanyahu and Livni have shown that they are willing to pay a steep political price for not succumbing to ultra-Orthodox demands to return the high Child Allowances that Netanyahu lowered several years ago. This is an issue that Livni too would not concede, and paid the price of failing to form a new government, thus necessitating the current election campaign. “Child Allowance” might seem to the outside observer to be a very “peripheral” issue, but it strikes at the very heart of the continued future of the State of Israel as a Zionist enterprise. I shall devote my next blog post to this issue, but for now suffice it to say that Kadima and the Likud see eye to eye on the critical necessity of maintaining the current policy.

           To be sure, there are several good reasons against the establishment of such a government, not least of which is the enmity of the Likud Party to former Likud “defectors” who helped form Kadima under Ariel Sharon’s leadership. But that’s the past – and this election is about Israel’s future.

           Speaking of the past, does Israeli history offer any perspective? Absolutely yes! In 1984 the Israeli economy was on the verge of complete collapse, with hyper-inflation running at 400% (yes, four hundred percent, i.e. 1% a day!). The election outcome between Labor and the Likud was a virtually tie and a National Unity government was set up between Shamir and Peres with a rotation agreement of two years apiece as prime minister. With PM Peres at the helm along with Likud Finance Minister Moda’i the economy was brought back from the brink and set on a stable course that has lasted until this very day. True, the national unity arrangement continued for 6 years and towards the end it turned into a National Paralysis government, but the two-headed political hydra had accomplished the main goal.

           Political prognostication is a dangerous exercise, especially when dealing with the future. But this time around, the logic for a national unity is stronger than it has been for decades. I wouldn’t bet my last shekel that it will happen – but I also won’t be very surprised if it does. It certainly should.

 Dec. 1, 2008

Israelity

Political Bird Watching Towards the Coming Israeli Elections

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Israeli politics has always been characterized by the divide on the issue of peace talks and territorial concessions. The terms generally used are hawks and doves. However, this is too simplistic and overly general as most of the Israeli populace and the central parties fall somewhere in between these two purebred fowl. I suggest that two hybrids be added to Israel’s electoral ornithology: dawks and hoves.

           Pure hawks are against any territorial concessions due to their belief that the Arab world – and especially the Palestinians – are, and will forever be, against the continued existence of the Jewish State for ideological, theological and/or ethnic-national-historical reasons. Israel’s main two hawkish parties today are Yisrael Beitenu (Avidor Lieberman at the helm) and a constantly morphing amalgam of the former National Religious Party, Moledet Party, National Union, etc. (elections for party leader to be announced…).

           What then is a dawk? A “dawk” is a dovish hawk, one who doesn’t see much sense (even danger!) in trying to sue for peace with the other side at the present juncture (such a “present” can extend for years and decades) because either the Palestinians are too divided to be able to execute a peace treaty or are unwilling to consider serious concessions, e.g. giving up the dream of refugee return to Israel, sole possession of the Temple Mount etc. Dawks do not in principle rule out an ultimate peace treaty including some Israeli concessions but “at the moment” there is very little to negotiate given the situation and positions of the other side. In the dawk‘s eyes, in large part the problem is psychological: the Palestinians within their own society continue to demonize Israel and Jews, so that there is little “preparation” of the Palestinian people for any realistic peace compromise that would entail some painful concessions on their part as well.  The Likud Party leads the “dawk” camp in Israel today, and Binyamin Netanyahu certainly expresses the dawkish position in full regalia.

           On the other side of the divide are the doves and hoves. Pure doves believe that the Palestinians (and certainly Syria) are ready to sue for peace, not necessarily out of love of Zion but for realpolitik reasons of desperately wanting their own state. Doves believe that the sides are in fact not that far apart, and with some good will, a lot of “friendly pressure” (the Arab world on the Palestinians; the U.S. on Israel), and oodles of cash (ditto) to smooth over the mutual hurt born of painful concessions, a peace treaty is within our grasp. The Meretz Party (recently elected Haim Oron at the head) best exemplifies such a dovish stance.

           Hoves, on the other hand, are willing to continue negotiating for peace with serious Israeli concessions, but are willing to sign the dotted line only with ironclad security guarantees and the successful resolution of other issues that do not threaten the Jewish State. What does this entail? Roughly speaking: perhaps NATO membership for Israel; a 25 year land lease of the Golan Heights by Israel to maintain a presence and buffer while the peace treaty is carried out and relations are “normalized” with Syria; enabling only a very small number of Palestinian refugees to return to their ancestral home within Israel’s final borders, so that Israel does not have to fear the demographic dilution of its underlying Jewish character; demilitarization of the Palestine State; some joint sovereignty over the Temple Mount; a peace treaty as well with the entire Arab world (Iran is not Arab); etc. In other words, peace is possible but only when both sides are convinced that Israel is a permanent part of the Middle East – precisely as a result of the peace treaty’s parameters.

           Which Israeli parties are hoves? Here the matter becomes interesting. At present both the governing Kadima Party and its coalition partner the Labor Party are clearly hoves. This explains why they can sit relatively easily in the same government, but also why there is no love lost between them as they are essentially competing for the same birds of a feather among the Israeli electorate (not to mention that part of Kadima is populated by former Labor MK defectors).

           What is probably of greatest interest in this ornithological taxonomy is the fact that both dawks and hoves are dependent in their policy and stance on the behavior of the other side! In other words, if by some miracle the Palestinians would get their act together (Fatah defeats Hamas; a new forceful but moderate leader is elected President of the PLA; etc.) then both dawks and hoves would move “Leftwards”; obviously the opposite occurs when the Palestinians show less inclination to clean their own house.

The bottom line? Israeli elections – and the one coming up no less than others in the recent past – are more dependent on the behavior of the other side than on practices and policies of the Israeli parties themselves. Thus, at the moment it is not at all surprising that the dawks have an advantage over the hoves in the polls. With Fatah literally fighting Hamas, with Abbas as weak a President as one can imagine, and with continued anti-Zionist education and international anti-Zionist political activity on the part of many Palestinian intellectuals, the dawkish position at this point in time seems to make the most sense from the Israeli standpoint.

Nov. 26, 2008

Israelity

Obama and the Middle East: Not all Black or White

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

In Israel, Barack Obama’s victory has once again raised the ever-present question: “Is it good for the Jews?” (or for Israelis in general). The answer: just like his racial lineage, there is no unambiguous answer – and not only because of the new President himself. The following is a list of considerations, not necessarily in order of importance, regarding the new Administration and the Middle East peace process.

1) Who will win the elections in Israel? As previous American administrations have learned to their chagrin or joy, without Israeli cooperation there is just so much that can be done to push the peace process forward. If Tzippi Livni manages to form a coalition after Feb. 10 then Obama’s election could be a watershed for the peace process (the reason: see paragraph 3 below) as he will have a very willing Israeli government that wants to continue the process already begun. On the other hand, if Netanyahu proves victorious it is very hard to see significant movement – and given the very serious domestic and foreign policy challenges that face Obama in the foreseeable future, he will certainly not waste political energy on a (temporarily) lost cause. One final point: Obama’s victory might – just might – influence the outcome of the Israeli election in Livni’s favor for two reasons. First, if America can vote for a Black President who has promised “to do things differently”, then Israelis may feel that they should do no less. Second, Israelis perceive America as their greatest friend and ally – and many do not wish to have serious tension between their country and Uncle Sam, something that will occur with Netanyahu at the helm (remember Bibi and Bill?).

2) Who will be the next Palestinian President? In case anyone has forgotten, it takes two to tango (in this case, perhaps three!). The identity of the next Palestinian leader (elections are scheduled for next year here too) will also be important. If it is the present Chairman Abbas, then the situation would be the mirror image of Netanyahu – someone who wants to sue for peace but is too weak to make any significant concessions. President Obama might be willing to offer several economic carrots to Abbas; however, the problem is not economic but rather of political courage and persuasiveness – would he be able to tell and persuade his people that true peace can only come if they give up the “Dream of Refugee Return”? The answer by all accounts is no. Other younger and more determined Palestinian leaders might be able – if they are willing. Here too Obama has to wait for the election outcome.

3) Does Obama have street credibility with the Arab world? The answer is obvious: more than any other entering President in recent memory. With a middle name of Hussein and his paternal connection to Islam (he is not  a Moslem by any stretch), he surely will be viewed as a more honest broker than any previous President. But won’t that cause him problems with the Israelis? Until Nov. 4 perhaps that was the case, but the minute he appointed the son of an Irgun fighter to be his White House Chief of Staff (the Israelis are truly agog at Rahm Benjamin), it will be hard for anyone in Israel to suspect Obama’s “motives” or believe in a “pro-Arab bias”. Thus, for the first time ever (yes, ever) all sides to the Israeli-Arab conflict can feel a measure of confidence that the American President is not out to “screw” this side or the other.

4) What about the Arab hot spots connected to Israel? Here the news is good again, but not for reasons of “ethnic solidarity”. Rather, it is a matter of Obama’s approach to international relations: first talk and then we’ll see… Without a doubt he will encourage Israel to continue negotiations with Syria, and the Syrians too will be less wary of dealing with Israel and an American administration that does not (publicly) call it part of the “axis of evil”. And if by some chance Israel can get a deal with Syria, they will get Lebanon in the bargain too. That leaves the Palestinians (see above), and most important of all: Iran…

5) Whither Iran? Once again, the answer is to be partly found in the election tea leaves – this time, the Iranian elections! If the present administration retakes office (including an ideological clone of the incumbent, if not the incumbent himself) then Obama’s promised discussions with the Iranians will be short. If somehow a more “moderate” President were to be chosen (and perhaps that may occur precisely because Obama is far less threatening of Iranian sovereignty), then there is an outside chance (repeat, outside chance) that Obama can diffuse the crisis. Moreover, if the world (read: Russia and China) concluded that Obama made a real effort to talk to the Iranians without condescension and came up empty, greater U.N. sanctions would be in the offing – and perhaps at that point the new administration might be willing to countenance even “sterner” measures.

In addition, indirectly Israel’s negotiations with Syria could also be influential here, for if by some half-miracle a peace treaty can be signed with Syria – one of whose conditions will be Syria’s real break with terrorist regimes (read: Iran) – then the Iranians might feel the diplomatic noose tightening and perhaps for the first time might seriously consider a negotiated settlement.

6) What will be the price of oil? If oil prices stay significantly depressed, and especially if they drop even more, Iran’s economy will be deeply in trouble (it’s already halfway there) – another incentive for possible serious negotiations regarding its nuclear program. What does Obama have to do with this? Any serious alternative energy program initiated by the Americans would have repercussions in the oil market, even if the actual impact on production and prices won’t be felt for years. The perception of eventual Middle East power decline cannot but move the Middle East power brokers to try and clear up their political and economic muddles.

           In short, Obama is a huge “Joker” thrown into a complex game of Middle East poker. It is his hand to play, but he will need a few other good cards to actually succeed.

Nov. 9, 2008

Israelity

ISRAELI SOCIAL CLEAVAGES: THE BAD NEWS (AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT)

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

If my previous post on Israeli (internal Jewish) social cleavages was decidedly upbeat, this one will provide ample counterpoint. The tensions between Israeli Jews and their Arab counterparts have steadily worsened over time. The recent Acre riots were merely an exclamation point on the thickening exclamation itself. True, there have been a few symbolic advances (Israel’s first ever Arab Minister in this government) but overall the news is unremittingly bad. Two questions need to be addressed: who is at fault? and what is to be done?

The first question is relatively easy to answer: EVERYONE has been at fault to a smaller or larger extent. Perhaps it would be best to start with the general situation: the State of Israel has been beset for 60 years by surrounding Arab enemy states, only some of whom have made peace (at least formally) with her. One would be hard put to come up with any world example of a similar situation in which the nation did not view their enemies’ local compatriots with at least suspicion if not outright hostility. Just consider what America did with its West Coast Japanese citizens during World War II to understand the problem.

Having said that, Israeli policy vis-a-vis its Arab citizens has been quite shortsighted — from the Jewish/Israeli standpoint. For if Israel has major defense problems with its external neighbors, the last thing it needs to do is increase the hostility of its internal Arab population! This is not to say that Israel should bend over backwards in some sort of “affirmative action” towards local Arabs, but at the least it should try to guarantee equal resource distribution among its Jewish and Arab citizenry, something that has been far from the case since the establishment of the state. Even when taking into account extra-governmental largesse (Jewish National Fund disbursements from world Jewry), the amount of government money budgeted for education, sewage, etc., in the local Arab municipalities is extremely low by any standard — not to mention the fact that the state has not seen fit to create and nurture even one new Arab-Israeli city for decades.

However, Israeli Arabs have been blameworthy too. For starters, they have only themselves to blame for their political powerlessness. Despite their constituting close to 20% of Israel’s population, their voting record in national elections has been abysmal from two perspectives: voting turnout is significantly lower than among the Jewish population; too many Arab parties split the vote, and as many tiny parties do not overcome the minimal voting threshhold (today 2% in Israel) large numbers of votes are wasted. In addition, the Israeli-Arab leadership seems to be hell-bent on outdoing one another in blasting the government (and worse; some delegitimize the state and even call for its destruction or at least de-Judaization). Little wonder, therefore, that no Israeli government has been willing to incorporate an Arab party within its governing coalition — continuing the vicioius cycle of political powerlessness.

What is to be done? The first step must come from the government: a willingness to build new Arab cities and enable legal building by expanding the zoning within Arab municipalities; an automatic indexing of equal resources disbursed to Jewish and Arab institutions alike. Such a policy must be carried out consistently over several years, at which point the Israeli-Arab sector must make its own conciliatory moves. One such might be the acceptance of an Arab “national (civil) service” whereby all Arab young adults would serve for two or three years in some form of non-military civic institution (e.g. hospital, fire department, local civil guard, schools etc.) in parallel to army service that most Israeli Jews undertake as a matter of civic obligation. At some point, one would also begin to find political pressure building from within the Arab sector for a “non-Zionist” (instead of anti-Zionist) party willing to cooperate with, and be part of, the ruling government. Finally, perhaps the most critical of all: the Arab sector would have to vociferously denounce any and all “secessionist” or otherwise anti-Jewish political activity on the part of individual citizens (who do not represent the broad Arab population) and certainly on the part of its leadership (see: Dr. Azmi Bashara…).

Of course, a final peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would go a long way to ameliorating the mutual distrust of these two largest national population groups within Israel. But we need not wait for the Messiah to arrive. Plenty can be done without connection to what occurs outside of Israel’s borders.

Oct. 22, 2008

Israelity

Israeli Social Cleavages: The Good News

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

This topic might seem to be downright perverse. The social news from Israel the past few days has not been sanguine. Arab-Jewish riots in the traditionally co-existing, mixed city of Acre (Akko in Hebrew), set off by an Israeli-Arab driving through a Jewish neighborhood with car radio blaring. So what’s the good news?

           It is hard to focus on what does not make the news – especially if years and years go by and the topic supplies no “news”. But that is highly newsworthy in itself – especially when the subject used to make the papers on a daily basis.

           Israeli political scientists (of which I am one), have been teaching their students for decades that Israel is an over-burdened polity as a result of the large number of serious social cleavages between groups, any one of which would be enough to destroy another democracy. The main ones: 1- Ashkenazi (Jews of Western origin) vs. Mizrakhim (Jews of Arab country provenance); 2- Religious (ultra and national) vs. Secular; 3- Israeli Arab (“Palestinian”) vs. Israeli Jews. To these one can add the central political cleavage of Left (pro-peace process) vs. Right (Greater Land of Israel).

           But most of these no longer exist as deep-rooted splits in Israel. Mizrakhim have made it to the highest echelons of society and politics (several Israeli Presidents and Army Chiefs of Staff; the present Speaker of the Knesset; many of the richest tycoons). Partly as a result, there are no more virulent campaigns like that addressed to Shimon Peres in 1981 with rotten vegetables and curses slung at him during election stops. The ultra-Orthodox are slowly entering Israeli society with nascent Haredi units existing in the Army and even a few (secular studies) colleges for the ultra-Orthodox population that has come to realize that it has to work in order to make a living. Moreover, Israel no longer suffers from massive religious demonstrations like the stone throwing on the Ramot Road in Jerusalem that went on for years every Sabbath back in the 1970s. And as to the political Left-Right split, while some animosity still exists, most of Israeli society has moved to the Center as the last election results illustrated and as constant polls show regardless of which politician is up and which down.

           In short, Israeli society has decidedly come of age. This is not to say that there are no tensions in these areas and that an unusual outburst could not still occur. But it is to say that these topics no longer have the political resonance that they once had, in part because Israelis have found the way to finesse the problems, in part because they have solved the most egregious aspects of these cleavages, and in part out of pure social exhaustion.

           So the social “non-news” is actually quite good. That leaves the major societal area of bad news that is reported on by the media. And here – completely against the grain of the other domains of Israeli life – the news is indeed bad. In fact, the split between Israeli Arabs (not just Moslems; Bedouin too) and the Jewish majority is getting palpably worse. Why this is so – and what Israel could (and should) do about it, I’ll discuss in next week’s post. Meanwhile, it would behoove Israelis and their supporters alike to bask just a little in the significant progress that has been made – the lack of “news” on this score notwithstanding.

Oct. 12, 2008

Israelity

Leadership in Uncertainty

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Schusterman Visiting Israeli Scholar, Brown University

Over the past year, Americans are getting a lesson in what Israelis have been living for six decades: public life in an environment of great uncertainty. Both in economics and in politics, the U.S. has recently undergone (and continues to go through) a wild roller coaster ride with unforeseen stomach wrenching twists and turns.

           In such a period of turmoil, election campaigns tend to focus more on “personality” than on “policy” because while the latter cannot be a prescription for what to do when the unexpected occurs, the former does offer a pretty good indication of how the leader will make decisions under stress.

           In that regard, the two leading candidates to be Israel’s next prime minister could not be more different. Bibi Netanyahu is easier to parse, as he already was a prime minister and later finance minister in times of great tension and pressure. In both cases he proved to be the same individual with strikingly different outcomes. Netanyahu is a man of clear principles and overall ideology, but tends to be somewhat of a loner when making important policy decisions. Without getting into too many details, these traits were disastrous for him as prime minister but enabled him to function heroically as finance minister. Ideological consistency is fine as far as it goes but when you have to lead a motley crew of disparate parties within a coalition it turns into a recipe for paralysis or unnecessary antagonism. However, when running one’s own bailiwick (Finance Ministry), there is not that great a need for consultation – and Netanyahu’s “inflexibility” vis-à-vis other parties’ demands and warnings served the country in good stead as his budget-cutting policies enabled Israel to survive a very deep recession and go on to produce several years of excellent economic results.

           Tzippi Livni is more of a question mark, if only because she has not yet been prime minister and of the other two major ministries (defense and finance), the foreign ministry has the least “crisis management” to deal with. Yet, what we do know about her decision-making is quite the reverse of Netanyahu’s: she tends to ask for lots of advice and is a very good listener. On the other hand, the most serious criticism of her on the part of those who have seen her in action, is that she does not like to make tough decisions – precisely the opposite of Netanyahu whose self-confidence leaves no doubt (in his own eyes) as to the wisdom of whatever he decides to do.

           Livni’s approach is not surprising, given that it matches well with what the latest research has found regarding the different management styles between men and women (as a generalization, of course – for every 5 Livnis there’s one Margaret Thatcher type too). In Israel, the differences are even more pronounced, given that most prime ministers come from the Israeli Army where “gung-ho!” is the operative term.

           The parallels in the current American election campaign are striking: McCain is a Netanyahu type of leader; Obama a clone of Livni. Thus, the outcome of the American elections and Israel’s coalition formation – or Spring elections if a new Israeli government can’t be formed – will go a long way in determining what sort of relationship the two allies will have, depending on the clash or match of leadership styles in both nations.

And if you can’t wait, try this: Ha’aretz, Israel’s elite newspaper, has just introduced a “simulation game” that enables you to “play leader” in Israel based on your knowledge of the news and the political environment (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1025853.html). Do you have what it takes? We’re all asking the same question regarding McCain, Obama, Biden, Palin, Livni and Netanyahu…

Oct. 5, 2008