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PUBLIC PROTEST AND SYSTEMIC STABILITY IN ISRAEL: 1960–1979

> "... if a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the People ... it's not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves. ..."
>
> John Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*

> "They are not nice boys."
>
> Golda Meir on the Black Panthers

On July 8, 1959 the State of Israel experienced its first large scale, violent social disturbance in the riots of Wadi Salib, a North African slum area of Haifa. While social and political unrest had manifested themselves almost from the inception of the state, Wadi Salib marked a significant escalation in the type and intensity of non-formal public protest. The disturbances caused a furor in the society at large, but while generaly condemned they did highlight the fact that extra-parliamentary pressure was becoming a recognized — if not yet legitimized — *modus operandi* of the political scene. Thus, as Israel entered the nineteen-sixties, its democratic norms of behavior (if not its institutional forms) were beginning to undergo a substantial transformation with potentially deleterious consequences.

 The purpose of this study was to empirically chart and heuristically analyze this process for the twenty-year period following Wadi Salib. In so doing, however, it was found that the data not only support the initial hypothesis of increasing citizen use of direct pressure (with the consequent weakening of formal political institutions[1]), but in addition: 1) call for

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1 This is a phenomenon noted by a number of students of the Israeli political system. See for example, Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Shituf Ve'konflikt Bain Makhanot Politiim: Hamakhaneh Hadati U'tnuat Ha'avodah U'mashbatr Hakhinukh Be'-Yisrael* [*Conflict and Cooperation Between Political Camps: The Religious Camp and Labor Movement and the Crisis of Education in Israel*], unpublished doctoral dissertation (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1977), pp. 153–158; 376–383; 775–778; *passim*.

a re-evaluation of certain theories which posit a relationship between a rise in "street democracy" and political instability; and 2) suggest certain possible refinements in other explanatory theories of political turmoil (e.g. relative deprivation).

The idea that non-institutionalized forms of political expression can have seriously negative consequences for the stability and continued viability of the formal political system is on its face a logical one. Both Ortega and Kornhauser who speak in terms of "hyperdemocracy" (direct governance of the multitude)[2] and "mass politics"[3] belabor the seemingly obvious point that such phenomena can undercut the foundations of the liberal-democratic political order. Yet the matter is not simple nor obvious at all, for their contention rests upon philosophically one-sided and empirically incomplete assumptions.

As Locke (and even Hobbes for that matter[4]) emphasized, liberal democracy is built upon the bedrock of popular sovereignty. Thus, if anything, "hyper-democracy" is the philosophical quintessence of liberal politics. Paul Goodman notes that various non-institutional, even "illegal" forms of political behavior are merely the people's "exercising their sovereignty, practicing direct democracy."[5] Indeed, as April Carter suggests: "Where direct action is a response to the usurpation of power from the elected representatives it may be seen primarily as an attempt to re-create a form of representative democracy."[6] The contemporary political demonstration, in other words, may be merely a third-generation offshoot of the English pubblic meetings called to petition the "King in Council."[7]

2 José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1957), p. 18.

3 "Mass politics occurs when large numbers of people engage in political activity outside of the procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action." William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 227.

4 While Hobbes concluded that the monarch was sovereign, his original (and revolutionary) contention that such sovereignty initially stemmed from a transfer of the people's power to their leader, effectively undercut his conclusions. If such monarchical sovereignty was a gift of the people, in practice (although Hobbes denied it in theory) there was little to stop the people from retransferring such sovereignty back into their possession.

5 April Carter, *Direct Action and Liberal Democracy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 139.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 157.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 31. To be sure, the philosophical debate is not as completely one-sided as is here sketchily outlined. For a more thorough review of both sides of the

When one moves from normative justification to objective verification of the disobedience-instability nexus the matter becomes even more complex. Gurr notes that "violence generally consumes men and goods, it seldom enhances them."[8] But even he admits that "when the time dimension is taken into account ... intense political violence, though it destroys much in the short run, may have the long-run payoff either of stimulating rulers to increase outputs or of restructuring society in such a way that total satisfactions are substantially increased."[9] All the more so when non-violent forms of direct action are taken into account.[10] Schattschneider attacks the issue from a different perspective, arguing that "the most powerful instrument for the control of conflict is conflict itself."[11] This is due to the fact that, as Prof. E.A. Ross suggested awhile back:

> Every species of social conflict interferes with every other species in society ... save only when lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another. ... A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence ... than one split along one line.[12]

issue see Hugo A. Bedau, ed., *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice* (New York: Pegasus, 1969). Especially noteworthy from the anti-disobedience perspective is Louis Waldman's "Civil Rights — Yes; Civil Disobedience — No," pp. 106-115. For a forceful pro-disobedience essay see Howard Zinn, *Disobedience and Democracy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).

8 Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 4.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. Another student of political turmoil devotes an entire essay to just this point: "The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence — which gives the threat credibility — are essential elements in peaceful social change ... [because] this induces flexibility and stability in democratic institutions." H.S. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LVI, No. 4 (December 1962), p. 865.

10 For a fuller discussion of this issue see Christian Bay, "Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society," in *Civil Disobedience and Violence*, ed. Jeffrie G. Murphy (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 73-92.

11 E.E. Schattschneider, "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LI, No. 4 (December 1957), p. 939.

12 *Ibid.* This precisely mirrors the reality in Israel as will be shortly seen.

As will be shown, the data on Israeli demonstrations and other forms of protest tend to support this general view,* while suggesting a number of other reasons for such an *a priori* "illogical" connection. But before such an analysis is presented a few words are in order as to the use of a neologism — *demoskraty* — in denoting this general phenomenon.

It was felt that all the other generally accepted terms for this mode of political behavior are either too restricted in their applicability and/or too loaded in their positive or negative connotations. "Direct action," for example, does not take into account such forms as refusal to pay taxes, to be drafted, etc. — political modes of direct *inaction*. "Civil disobedience," according to Martin Luther King is the violation of unjust laws which are "out of harmony with the moral law of the universe,"[13] whereas Gandhi defines it even more broadly as a revolt against the legitimacy of the state itself.[14] These definitions obviously do not cover demonstrations such as those urging the government to increase housing starts, for example, since neither an unjust law nor the authority of the state is under attack here. "Protest demonstrations" itself is too narrow a term, for it leaves out such activities as protest meetings, squatting, rioting, *et al.*[15] *Demoskraty* in contrast includes all forms of protest activity (e.g. sit-ins, draft refusal, street demonstrations, riots, etc.) in all their modes (e.g. non-violent and violent) with all their various goals (e.g. change in policy, law, government, or regime). In short, it is the attempted reversion of political power (*kratos*) back to the people (*demos*) for whatever purpose, in whatever manner, over whatever period of time.[16] Thus, however infelicitous a term it may be, it does have the singular advantage of being all-inclusive.

Additionally, the process of *demoskratisation* is a neutral term connot-

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* *Author's note:* Just as this article was being sent to the printer a recently published major work in this field came to my attention: Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, *et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage, 1979). Overall, it tends to support my general argument. For example, one of their conclusions is "that antigovernment demonstrations obviously cannot be readily interpreted as an ambiguous indicator of *system* instability" (p. 35 and *passim*).

13 William T. Taylor, "Civil Disobedience: Observations on the Strategies of Protest," in Bedau, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

14 *Ibid.*

15 For a summary of the sundry terminological problems in this area see Bedau, *op. cit.*, pp. 218–219.

16 For a relatively complete "Typology of Resistance Behavior" see David V. J. Bell, *Resistance and Revolution* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 63.

ing neither approval nor disapproval of such activity. True, it does remind us of where ultimate sovereignty resides and as such can be considered to have normatively legitimizing overtones, but the crucial questions here are what is done with this retransferred power and what are the consequences for the socio-political system. Just as any tool may be used for, and have, salutary or deleterious results (and no one credits or blames the tool for such an outcome), so too *demoskraty* may lead to either end result. In the case of Israel, no serious consequences have yet ensued as a result of the rapid *demoskratisation* process in the nineteen-seventies. An analysis of the data will illustrate why.

METHODOLOGY

In order to test the hypothesis that there has been an increase in *demoskraty* from 1960–1979, and that such a rise did not bring with it a concomitant increase in socio-political instability, it was necessary to ascertain the number and types of protest events each year. The counting and categorization of civil disturbances as a method has been used widely before. For example, Sorokin[17] studied twelve civilizations over a twenty-four century period while the Feierabends[18] covered eighty-four countries over a fifteen year period.[19] Yet they almost all have two things in common:

17 Pitrim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 3: *Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War and Revolutions* (New York: American Book Co., 1937), pp. 409–475. He tested for the proportion of the nation affected ("social area"), proportion of the population involved, duration, intensity, and severity of the effects of violence.

18 Ivo K. & Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962; A Cross National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. X (September 1966), pp. 249–271. They developed a scaling procedure which took into account both the number of events and *a priori* judgments about their severity.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 249, for a more comprehensive list of empirical work done in this field. C.L. Taylor and M.C. Hudson's *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), is an especially comprehensive empirical study, but its very comprehensiveness highlights its serious deficiencies. Israeli demonstrations are included among those of 136 countries, but while the authors register twenty-five political demonstrations from 1960–1967, the present study counted 228! The huge discrepancy stems from their data sources — *The New York Times* and *The Middle East Journal* — which report only the largest and/or most significant protests. See pp. 417–422 for their discussion of source problems.

they are cross-national rather than national, and they measure only the more easily identifiable violent (or at least socially disruptive) events. This is understandable given the almost insuperable effort it would take to include legal demonstrations, etc., in such a broad framework or even in the more limited framework of the larger countries alone. Israel, on the other hand, more easily lends itself to an analysis of all such events, being not only relatively small (geographically and in population) but also due to the national character of its newspaper reporting (there are no serious local papers). Thus, this study not only departs from the others in its more comprehensive use of the available data, but also in its developmental approach from the chronological standpoint. In short, whereas other studies compare the most pronounced phenomena between nations within a certain time frame, this study takes into account almost all the protest events within one nation and compares them between time periods.

Israel itself has been the focus of some empirical work on this issue, but hardly of a comprehensive nature. Etzioni-Halevy examines "instances of protest in Israeli society,"[20] concentrating on only two issues: ethnic socio-economic inequality and the housing shortage problem. While she uses the same data source (newspaper), her time frame is also much more limited (the early nineteen-seventies). Sprinzak on the other hand focuses not on issues per se but rather on the protesting fringe groups themselves.[21] While more comprehensive in scope and analysis, it lacks any real data base upon which verifiable generalizations can be made. In addition, Sprinzak's underlying assumption that "political history and political events are primarily understandable through the explanation of the behavior of political groups rather than individuals,"[22] seriously distorts and skews the overall picture. Indeed, one of the surprising results of the present study was that more protest activity is carried out in Israel by ad hoc groups than by those that are organized! (Table D). Thus, this is the first attempt at comprehensively charting the Israeli *demoskratisation* process over a relatively long period of time.

The source for the data accumulated was *The Jerusalem Post*. Although not considered the pre-eminent paper in Israel (*Ha'aretz* is) nor totally

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20 Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Protest Politics in the Israeli Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 90, No. 3 ((Fall 1975), p. 499.

21 Ehud Sprinzak, "Nitzanei Politikah Shel DeLegitimiut B'Yisrael 1967–1972" ["The Budding of Political Delegitimacy in Israel, 1967–1972"], (Jerusalem: Levi Eshkol Institute, 1973).

22 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

objective in its reporting (it is mildly pro-Labor; *Ha'aretz* is quite liberal and anti-Establishment, hence not completely objective either), no apparent bias exists from the standpoint of its reporting on this general phenomenon. *The Jerusalem Post* continually covers the most trivial instances of such activity (e.g. if three couples sit-in at a local Housing Ministry branch office for four hours it invariably is reported). As a control, however, two months were randomly selected (one in each decade) for which *Ha'aretz* was reviewed for comparative purposes — not only from the standpoint of numbers of events but also with regard to the variables within each event. Virtually no difference could be ascertained. There is no doubt that the total number reported is slightly lower than in actuality but it is assumed that virtually all of these were of the small nuisance variety and as such make little difference to the total picture.[23] In any case, the data base is so large (1699 events) that a few missed reports here or there are statistically insignificant.

In general, almost all forms of *demoskratic* anti-authority behavior were included (see Table A, variable x6): outdoor demonstrations (22—rallies, marches, riots, etc.); indoor protest meetings (23); politically oriented strikes (24); and other miscellaneous forms (25—sit-ins, hunger strikes, etc.). Certain activities, however, were *not* counted: 1) Any event with less than ten participants;[24] 2) Economic strikes against a private or publicly owned corporation (or even government institution) on the issues of wages and/or working conditions;[25] 3) Arab *demoskraty* in the post-1967 administered territories (including East Jerusalem);[26] 4) Regular conferences, con-

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23 The underreporting of such small events tends to strengthen the central conclusion of this study — that a rise in number need not mean a rise in socio-political instability as defined by rising violence, size, and duration. Thus, if anything, the data here is slightly skewed toward the larger, more disruptive events since these are the ones most likely to be reported upon by the media.

24 While the number 10 was selected arbitrarily it may be worthwhile noting that Jewish tradition and law considers only a collection of at least ten male adults ("minyan") to be a group. For the purposes of this study the "male" requirement was dropped; the "adult" requirement was kept. Thus, one North African couple with their eleven children did not constitute a protest group. Five young couples did.

25 However, work stoppages versus the government on non-salary economic issues — e.g. rising prices, high taxes, etc. — were included.

26 East Jerusalem formally came under Israeli sovereignty only in 1980. Israeli Arab protests *within* the 1967 borders were included as were Israeli Jewish protest events in the territories. The criterion here, in short, was Israeli citizenship

ventions, etc., which issued protest resolutions as part of their proceedings;[27] 5) Election rallies and other events which are traditionally part of the formal political process;[28] 6) Political pressure which does not use the physical presence of a group of people, e.g. telephone and mail campaigns, petitions, press conferences, etc.[29]

As displayed in Table A, the values of each event were grouped into six general variables.[30] While most are self-explanatory, variable $x5$ (Duration) presented certain problems.[31] Chiefly, the relevant information could not be determined in approximately one-third of the events. The assump-

and not the locale. However, non-citizens' (temporary residents, visitors, etc.) protests within pre-1967 Israeli borders were also included.

27   But a special indoor meeting called by an organization for the express purpose of protesting was counted.

28   However, if such a rally degenerated into a riot or any other unauthorized activity, it was then included and measured from the time of such degeneration. The same criterion was applied to the aforementioned regular indoor meetings.

29   Two other points about categorizing the data should be noted. If the same group of protestors acted in the same way on the same issue at least two days consecutively, even though they went home overnight, it was considered a "long" event (No. 19) and not two or more short or medium events. Additionally, if a relatively large protest event was peaceful with only one or two rowdy of even violent participants, it was considered "peaceful" (No. 1) or at worst "disruptive/obstructive" (No. 2). But if such a peaceful event culminated in a smaller group leaving to become violent or otherwise change the nature of the event, it was then considered to be two different events, each categorized by values in the light of its different nature.

30   Three other categories were classified as well, but for various technical reasons have not been included in this study: a) reaction of the authorities (no reaction, reaction/persuasion, arrests, violence, guns fired);   b) legality (legal/authorized, unauthorized, illegal); c) receiving authority (local, central, other country). Future articles will deal with these categories after the necessary corrections have been made. Furthermore, two other categories will be added: location (city, town, rural), and nationality (Jewish, Arab, combined, other).

31   A seventh variable (above and beyond those mentioned in the previous footnote) was included in the original data but was found to be far too problematical. This was "Ideological Content"; i.e. was the protest based on some "higher" conception — ideological — or rather was it based on personal, more immediately gratifying and/or tangible goals — utilitarian. However, in many cases this proved to be a distinction without a difference. For example, how was one to categorize protests over the West Bank settlement? Such an issue involved both "utilitarian" considerations such as national security as well as "ideological" contentions about Israel's Biblical right to settle Judea and Samaria. The subjective nature of such an arbitrary classification in the final analysis undercut the reliability of the results and it was thus not included.

tion can be made that most of these fall in the "under-a-day" values (17 and 18) since lengthy events are invariably picked up by the media.[32]

TABLE A — Variables and Values

XI — INTENSITY
  1–Peaceful
  2–Disruptive/Obstructive
  3–Violence vs. property
  4–Violence vs. people
  5–General riot

X2 — SIZE
  6–Small (10–99)
  7–Medium (100–999)
  8–Large (1,000–9,999)
  9–Huge (10,000+)

X3 — ORGANIZATIONAL BASE
  10–Ad hoc
  11–Organization/Pressure group
  12–Political party

X4 — ISSUE
  13–Political (e.g. defense, foreign affairs, settlements, etc.)
  14–Economic
  15–Religious
  16–Social (e.g. housing, education, discrimination, etc.)

X5 — DURATION
  17–Short (under 3 hours)
  18–Medium (under a day)
  19–Long (over a day)
  20–Not available
  21–Dispersed by authorities

X6 — TYPE
  22–Outdoor rally
  23–Indoor meeting
  24–Strike
  25–Other (sit-in, hunger strike, etc.)

FINDINGS — ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR THE RISE
OF ISRAELI DEMOSKRATISATION

Figure 1 clearly shows an absolute rise in the number of protest events in the period under review. Even when the growth of the national population base is taken into account (Figure 2) the results are virtually the same, notwithstanding the general slope being slightly dampened.[33] There is, then,

32 Thus, again the results are slightly skewed to *over*estimating the duration of the events since dividing up No. 20 ("Not Available") and allotting an equal share to No. 17 ("Short") and No. 18 ("Medium") would enlarge the gap between the over-a-day and under-a-day events even more than it is now, thereby further reinforcing one of the central points of this study — that such *demoskratisation* is not of the type as to constitute a threat to the political system.

33 It is highly questionable whether the increase in population is all that relevant.

no doubt that Israel has become and continues to be an increasingly *demoskratised* nation, over five times as much so in 1979 as compared to 1960 (when the population base is taken into account; over nine times as much when it is not).

FIGURE 1 — Total Number of Israeli Demoskratic Events, 1960-1979

FIGURE 2 — Israeli Demoskratic Events per 100,000 Population 1960-1979

As the results of variable x2 ("Size") illustrate, the relative percentage of small demonstrations went up in the nineteen-seventies as compared to the sixties!

Of even greater significance perhaps are the fluctuations within the overall rise. 1966, 1971, 1974–75, and 1979 are of particular interest since these are all marked by the largest sharp increases. There are three general factors which could explain these perturbations: economic, political, and social, each with its supporting theoreticians.

The explanatory theory given the most scholarly attention in recent years has been "relative deprivation" (RD). Kornhauser already in the nineteen-fifties noted that "if economic conditions are changing then people are more likely to feel frustrated and insecure as they compare their lot with the one that has been held out to them as their legitimate condition."[34] How significant and under what conditions, however, was not made clear until Gurr began his pioneering work. His general conclusion was that "about twenty percent of the variation among contemporary nations in levels of strife is attributable to relative economic decline."[35] Davies refined the theory even more by attempting to discern the precise time when such strife is most likely to occur. Revolutions, he found, happen "when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."[36]

Davies' theory is an ingenious attempt at synthesizing the opposing theoretical views of De Tocqueville and Marx. De Tocqueville noted that prior to and during the French Revolution it was precisely in "those parts of France where there had been the most improvement that popular discontent ran highest."[37] Marx, on the other hand, felt that social turmoil and revolution occur as a result of increasing economic privation. Both were correct from Davies' standpoint since the initial rise in standard of living makes the subsequent drop that much harder to accept. But in subsequent empirical tests of this hypothesis, it was found that the theory was too neat. Miller *et al*, in their study of the Black urban riots, concluded that instead of the slow rise and sharp decline, "the data demonstrate that

34 Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

35 Gurr, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

36 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in *When Men Revolt and Why*, ed. J.C. Davies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 136.

37 Alexis De Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955), p. 176. Davies makes somewhat the same observations for our period: "It has been repeatedly noted that the most actively rebellious black people in America in the nineteen-sixties have been among those who are socio-economically the most advanced and who therefore are caught between the lower status of their black brethren and the higher status of the white community." *op. cit.*, p. 57.

the black community ... experienced extreme fluctuation and ambiguity in its perceptions of the trend of its finances, its financial satisfaction, and its expectations of financial improvements. These ... might have led to the urban riots of the nineteen-sixties."[38]

The Israeli data suggest still other difficulties and another possible explanation. The first problem inherent in all the aforementioned analyses (including Tocqueville and Marx) is the assumption that "economic decline" is a monolithic variable. However, as the recent reevaluation of Keynesian theory demonstrates (especially with regard to such a phenomenon as "stagflation"), *different economic indices may be going in different directions at the same time* and so the task is to determine which economic indicator has the greatest causal relationship to the turmoil under scrutiny. When the *demoskratic* data (using the population-controlled figures of Figure 2) are correlated with inflation (CPI), a very high Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .78 is attained;[39] GNP, however, provides non-significant results; unemployment percent changes result in a *negative* .40 coefficient! [40] This means, in short, that the Israeli society is most sensitive to inflationary pressures while highly insensitive to unemployment (at least insofar as its leading to public protest is concerned), for there were far fewer such events in the nineteen-sixties when unemployment ran high by Israeli standards than in the increasingly *demoskratised* nineteen-seventies in an *under*employed economy.[41]

38 Abraham H. Miller *et al*, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXXI, No. 3 (September 1977), p. 980.

39 Significance .000.

40 Significance .041. The data base is taken from the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem: Sivan Press, 1978) and from its *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (November, 1979) for estimates of the last two years' population, GNP, and unemployment. The CPI is exact, as announced by the Central Bureau in January 1980.

41 Kornhauser, who includes unemployment as an important factor leading to the unstable mass society, does inject a caveat — that only a rise in unemployment which can be considered a "marked discontinuity" from the past would suffice (*op. cit.*, pp. 159–167). And indeed, only in 1966 do we find such a quantum leap, as Israel's unemployment rate jumped from 3.6% to 7.4% (a 105% relative increase), the same year that it reached the apex of *demoskratic* events in that decade — with by far the largest increase coming among economic-issue events (from two in 1965 to twenty-seven in 1966), whereas political, religious, and social-issue events held virtually steady with increases of three, one, and zero respectively. However, unemployment by itself is far from sufficient to explain the overall picture as the general negative correlation suggests. The two years

Nor can it be assumed that the lower class itself is monolithic. As mentioned, De Tocqueville centered on the more mobile sectors of working France as the hotbed of revolutionary fervor. But the Israeli data suggest that in a way *different* from Davies and Miller it is possible to synthesize Marx and De Tocqueville: *turmoil may erupt when things are getting better for the lower class in general while at the same time getting worse for the lumpen sub-group within that broader lower class.*

This is especially evident in the Black Panther eruption of 1971, a year which set the tone for the far greater *demoskratised* nineteen-seventies. By almost all indicators, it was a relatively good year for the Israeli economy in general[42] and the lower class in particular. As a high level commission noted after the riots:

> In the period under review (1963–1970), the standard of living of families of Asian and African origin improved relative to the standard of living of all families. This improvement found expression in higher income levels, in better housing, in a higher rate of ownership of consumer durables, in a decline in the proportion of Asian-African immigrants among lower-income families, and in an increase in the proportion of these families in the higher income brackets.[43]

But this was precisely the point. The RD was felt not by the whole lower class vis-a-vis the middle class, but rather by the lowest stratum of that class compared to their upwardly mobile brethren. Differentiating between sub-strata is crucial to understanding the nature of such protest. As one commentator noted at the time, "the ecology of the Jerusalem Black Panthers is of extreme significance. They did not come from the... relatively decent though crowded housing projects.... Their breeding ground was the Musrara Quarter, an erstwhile abandoned lower-class Arab neighborhood... [with] some of the poorest families who somehow got left at the margin of Israel's social and economic development."[44]

of the highest increase in *demoskratic* behavior — 1971 and 1979 (respectively, 139% and 111% relative increases from the previous years)   were years of *declining* unemployment rates!

42 Declining unemployment (3.8% in 1970 to 3.5% in 1971), rising GNP (7.6% increase), and moderate inflation (12%).

43 *Report of the Committee on Income Distribution and Social Inequality* (Tel Aviv: 1971), pp. 4–5.

44 Shlomo Avineri, "Israel: Two Nations?" in *Israel: Social Structure and Change,* M. Curtis & M. Chertoff, eds. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1973), p. 299.

Reinforcing this sense of RD was the distinct ethnic character of the lower class itself — in the early nineteen-seventies over ninety percent of the lowest twenty percent income group were of "Oriental" extraction.[45] Thus, while throughout the first two decades of Israel's existence the Oriental lumpenproletariat could "console" themselves with the thought that "we" as a group were being oppressed by "them" (the Ashkenazim of European origin), by the early seventies it was becoming clear that much of the "we" were joining "them," at least from an economic standpoint,[46] thereby even more acutely raising the lumpenproletariat's feelings of RD. In fact, this approach to the problem perhaps also explains the *seemingly* strange negative unemployment correlation. It is likely that in times of more widespread unemployment the perpetually unemployed lumpenproletariat less acutely feel their depressed situation than when it is obvious that their position is unique.[47] This would, in addition, explain the great shock of the Israeli governing elite to (and initial harsh appraisal of) the Black Panthers, for if things are getting palpably better for the Oriental bloc why start protesting now? The answer, paradoxically, may have been: *because now things were getting better for that sector as a group —* but not for all those within it.[48]

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45 Henry Toledano, "Time to Stir the Melting Pot," in Curtis, *ibid.*, pp. 333–347.

46 For data showing the increasingly moderate use of political power by the Moroccan leadership in the early nineteen-seventies see David Nachmias, "Status Inconsistency and Political Opposition: A Case Study of an Israeli Minority Group," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn 1973), pp. 456–470. For example, when asked "What is the best strategy for influencing the Government?" only 7.1% of the Moroccan elite answered: "Take some violent action;" 20% replied: "Organize an informal group." (p. 469).

47 All this assumes, of course, that the ones participating in these *demoskratic* events belong to this lowest class group. In the case of the Black Panthers there is no doubt of that. They held seventeen such events in 1971 alone. However, it was impossible to determine the ethnic and socio-economic makeup of most of the others; nevertheless a more indirect indicator seems to support this interpretation. The number of "social" *demoskratic* events (housing, education, etc.) as a percentage of all such events rose from 30.5% in the nineteen-sixties to 44% a decade later.

48 There is another general explanation as to why the Israeli data do not fit some of the aforementioned theorists' conclusions: they refer in most cases to the problem of "Revolution" whereas the Israeli situation is of a much milder "Turmoil" level. Douglas Bwy, for one, concluded that in the case of Latin America, "domestic conflict... empirically distributes itself into two basic clusters of activities: Turmoil and Internal War, which are generally independent of each other." Douglas Bwy, "Dimensions of Social Conflict in Latin Amer-

Obviously, unless one accepts a strict so-called Marxian interpretation of economic determinism such factors alone will not suffice to explain the entire *demoskratic* phenomenon. For example, if matters were steadily getting better for the society at large and for most of the Oriental community throughout the nineteen-sixties, why did this phenomenon take off in 1971 and not 1970 or 1972? Here the political/security climate is crucial, for although the post-1967 prosperity commenced already in 1968, it was only after the War of Attrition ceased in 1970 that the garrison state mentality was finally eased. Arian found that already in 1969 fifty-six percent of the sampled population ranked the post-1967 political and security situations better than in the past.[49] But while objectively the new cease-fire lines provided greater security for the bulk of Israel's population, such potentially reduced external pressure could not be transferred into increased internal unrest until the firing actually died down in 1970. As Lissak argues: "There is no doubt that a situation of political and military siege ... helped greatly in the neutralisation and freezing of feelings of frustration among certain groups."[50] Consequently, the internal social frustrations which had been simmering from 1966 (the previous apex) burst forth with all the more vehemence in 1971 as a result of being kept on low boil for so long. Whereas there were only fifty-four social-issue events in 1967–1970 inclusive, 1971 alone had sixty-five! This only reinforces the hackneyed truism of Israeli politics: external pressure reduces internal unrest. But, one must add, at an eventual price.

The security situation is not the only relevant political factor involved here. The decline of the dominant party (Mapai) and its Socialist coalition must be taken into account as well. As MacFarlane has noted: "An important feature bearing on the future of political disobedience in liberal democracies is the eclipse of old-style radical reform politics. The tradi-

ica," in Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 290. Rummel comes to the same conclusion in his study: "The findings indicate, for example, that the correlation between *turmoil* and *revolution* dimensions is near zero." R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946–59," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. X, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 71. Nevertheless, Gurr does feel that a relationship exists and develops a "process model" for the development of political violence to revolution. *Why Men Rebel, op. cit.*, p. 348.

49 Alan Arian, *et al, The Israel Election: 1969* (Tel-Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1972), p. 82.

50 Moshe Lissak, "Continuity and Change in the Voting Patterns of Oriental Jews," in Alan Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel, 1973* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1975), p. 274.

tional social democratic parties have moved from parties of evolutionary socialism to become status quo parties. ... In consequence there is lacking in most countries a vehicle through which those who want to bring about major changes in the structure of society by constitutional means can hope to act."[51] By the late nineteen-sixties the ideological enervation (if not ossification) of the Labor coalition had become widely recognized, dealing a further blow to the hopes of the most downtrodden socio-economic groups. Perhaps the final nail in the coffin from this perspective was that part of the traditional Labor leadership itself began to question the cultural validity and social possibility of implementing the egalitarian melting pot ideology.[52]

The political system can dampen or stimulate the *demoskratisation* process in other ways as well. Piven notes that the "electoral political institutions channel protest into voter activity,"[53] so that one should expect a drop in the number of protest events during an election year. Here the Israeli data is inconclusive as there were significant increases in 1961 and 1965, a slight rise in 1969, and substantial drops in 1977. Should the trend of the last two elections continue, Piven's argument could then be given greater weight, at least for the Israeli polity. However, a clearer relationship is obtained when analyzing the data *subsequent* to election campaigns.

Aside from the 1961 elections, every one of the other four election campaigns in the last two decades has been followed by a rise in public protest a year later. The year 1965 was followed by a large increase in 1966 (Figures 1 & 2); 1969 by a small rise in 1970 leading to a huge jump in 1971; 1973 by a significant rise for two consecutive years, 1974 and 1975; and 1977 by a small increase in 1978 leading to a virtual explosion in 1979. Why? It may very well be that while the election campaign provides an outlet for socio-political frustrations, thereby dampening protest activity in the very short run, the expectations aroused as a result of the campaign promises lead to further increased frustration. Indeed, whether a year or two later, *each post-election peak always marked a new unprecedented demoskratic high for the Israeli polity.*

This is most interesting because it seems to contradict the widespread belief that *lack* of voter participation leads to mass society and political

51 Leslie J. MacFarlane, *Political Disobedience* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1971), p. 66.

52 Nachmias, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

53 Frances F. Piven, "The Social Structuring of Political Protest," *Politics and Society*, vol. 6, No. 3, p. 311.

instability. As Kornhauser, V. O. Key and Janowitz noted: "Several studies show that non-voters constitute a 'more or less socially isolated segment of the population'," leading to the conclusion that " 'nonreliance on the electoral process by substantial social groups increases their availability to the appeals of the demagogue'."[54] Israel, on the other hand, has consistently maintained a high voter participation rate of around 80%.[55] And yet, it continues to become increasingly *demoskratised*.

But as Etzioni-Halevy points out (using Arian's data), it is "precisely this disparity between high political involvement and low sense of political efficacy which would lead one to expect large-scale protest in Israel".[56] The emphasis here is on protest and not political structural instability or widespread social turmoil. For the fact that so many do vote means that they consider the *system* legitimate, even while the system's *output* is disappointing. From this perspective one can well argue that the *demoskratisation* process is a structurally *stabilizing* phenomenon, as it undercuts not the polity itself but rather the political policies of those temporarily in power. This is obviously borne out by the continued high voting rates — despite (perhaps even because of) the policy disillusionment the Israeli citizen continues to return to the formal democratic polls every four years and to the informal *demoskratic* "polls" when necessary in the interim. In short, both are interrelated manifestations of regime legitimacy and policy disapproval.

This argument does not presuppose uniform voting participation rates among all sectors of society. Indeed, a closer analysis of such a breakdown only further supports the above contention. Avner's statistics show that the rate of non-voting among those of Asian-African origin is relatively 27% higher than that of native Israelis.[57] It was precisely from this sector of the population that the most threatening and destabilizing protests occurred (e.g. the Black Panthers). In short, while all groups had a part in raising the amount of *demoskraty* it was among those least prone to partake in the formal political process that the greatest threat to the established order was to be found.

54 Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 66.
55 In actuality the figure is closer to 90% since the registered voters list includes the 10% who have left the country and are thus technically unable to vote (there are no absentee ballots under Israeli law). For a fuller analysis of the Israeli voter participation data see Uri Avner, "Voter Participation in the 1973 Elections," in Arian, *Elections 1973, op. cit.*, pp. 203–218.
56 Etzioni-Halevy, *op. cit.*, p. 515. See Alan Arian, *The Choosing People* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973), pp. 23–29.
57 Avner, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

In this vein, it should be further noted that the prognosis for the future is even better since Avner's data also show a steady rise in the political socialization of the Asian-African group: those who immigrated after 1965 had a high non-voting rate of 19.6% compared to their pre-1965 immigrant brethren whose rate of 10.9% almost exactly mirrored that of the population at large.[58] From a slightly different perspective Arian reinforces this impression. When polled for their interest in the election 15% of Asian-African origin answered "not at all" and 20% retorted "hardly." However, of those born in Israel of Asian-African parents, only 11% and 14% answered in similar fashion respectively, again illustrating the increasing political involvement (at least nominally) of those socialized in Israel over a longer period of time. It comes as no surprise then that after only two years the Black Panthers themselves joined the established political process — too many of their potential supporters had already accepted the legitimacy of the system if not its output.[59] One may conclude, then, that as more and more of the Oriental immigrants come of age politically, i.e. move from a parochial or subjective political culture to a participatory one, the polity has less to worry about from the standpoint of regime legitimacy but more to handle from the standpoint of *demoskratic* political behavior.

The generational split among the Oriental segment of the population suggests that yet another theory of political instability may need to be modified. The Feierabends, among others, argue that "the faster (the slower) the rate of change in the modernization process within any given society, the higher, (the lower) the level of political instability."[60] But again a differentiation must be made between certain population groups, especially in such an immigrant-heavy country as Israel. For the native-born Israelis, the pace of modernization, while quick by general world standards, was at least steady and evolutionary, with few sharp economic or cultural discontinuities. For the Asian-African immigrant, on the other hand, the same objective pace was subjectively felt to be sharply discontinuous with their country of origin, a revolutionary break with the past. This then is not so much a matter of relative economic deprivation as it is relative social disconcertion.

Does this mean that one should expect the greatest instability to occur at the time of greatest dislocation, the period of entry into the new society?

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58   *Ibid.*
59   For a fuller treatment of the legitimization process through which the Black Panthers travelled, see Sprinzak, *op. cit.,* pp. 16–21.
60   Feierabends, *op. cit.,* p. 263.

Not at all. As the *demoskratic* data (and the appearance of such groups as the Black Panthers in the 1970's) suggest, there is a time lag here. According to the Feierabends, the greatest unrest occurs when "awareness of modernity and exposure to modern patterns [is] complete ... whereas achievement levels would still be lagging far behind."[61] In other words, such unrest occurs not at the point of greatest *objective* RD but at the point of greatest *subjective* RD.

Viewed from this standpoint it again comes as no surprise that 1971 should have seen such a massive rise in protest activity, coming only a few years after the advent of television in Israel. Gurr considers this medium to be a part of the "facilitation" necessary to enhance RD, a general factor which is even more significant than the objective deprivation itself.[62] In the case of Israel there is no doubt of television's facilitative "contribution" to the 1971 *demoskratic* explosion. As was noted at the time:

> With Israel at the stage of often vulgar conspicuous consumption, in which Westerners and Orientals share alike, the small minority which is left outside consumerism feels very harshly hit. The introduction of television [in 1968] ... has been instrumental in heightening consumption expectations among all sectors of the population, and those who couldn't keep up with the Cohens became much more frustrated than they would have been without the goading influences of the TV set.[63]

Indeed, as Gurevitch illustrates, the TV phenomenon not only had socioeconomic ramifications, but political ones as well, especially in the elections held near the end of 1969, "intensively exposing to the campaign a larger percentage of the electorate than would normally be exposed."[64] This obviously further strengthened the aforementioned post-election disillusionment, explaining in part the quantum leap in *demoskratic* events during 1971. Refining the picture somewhat is the percentage breakdown by ethnic group. Whereas native Israelis born of Israeli parents and of European-American parents averaged 52% and 53% viewership respectively (the European-American born had 56%), native Israelis of Asian-African parentage and

61 *Ibid.*, p. 257.
62 Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXII, No. 4 (December 1968), p. 1121.
63 Avineri, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
64 Michael Gurevitch, "Television in the Election Campaign: Its Audience and Functions," in Arian, *Elections, 1969, op. cit.*, p. 235.

Asian-African immigrants averaged 63% and 60% respectively, so that any post-electoral disillusionment would likely be more widespread among the latter, as the Black Panthers *et al* attest.[65] In short, the economic, political, and social conditions that existed in the early seventies for a *demoskratic* eruption received added reinforcement from the Great Facilitator — television. The powderkeg was ready; TV added the fuse.

While the novelty of television greatly increased citizen interest in the 1969 election campaign as well as heightening the lower class' sense of RD in that early period, the medium continued to influence protest behavior throughout the seventies and in great part explains the consistently much higher level of protest events in that decade. The reference here is to television being used as a tool by the protesters themselves to publicize and magnify their activities and demands. As Cantor notes: "The rising effectiveness of protest movements runs parallel with the steady improvement in the means of mass communication. Television has been a big help, for protest feeds on publicity.[66] The Israeli authorities themselves are aware of the the connection. As *The Jerusalem Post* reported in 1975, for example: Mr. Shmueli [Deputy Director-General of the Education Ministry] blames the radio and television ... for making it too easy for parent groups to gain publicity, thus encouraging unrealistic demands."[67]

Television has also occasionally influenced the mode and intensity of *demoskratic* behavior. Two examples will suffice:

> Burning tires ... one resident told *The Jerusalem Post*, were 'a demonstration ingredient we picked up from the Arab riots we watched on television.'[68]
>
> According to several eye-witnesses, these vocal, but still more or less peaceful activities, went on till about 12:30 — when two television crews appeared on the scene. Then violence broke out.[69]

65 *Ibid.*, p. 223. Obviously, the 10% ethnic viewership differential by itself hardly accounts for the Black Panthers phenomenon, but at the least it illustrates that the poor were not underexposed to TV relative to the other sectors of the population.

66 Norman F. Cantor, *The Age of Protest* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1970), p. 326.

67 Ernie Meyer, "Parents Can Be Unreasonable At Times," *The Jerusalem Post* (September 10, 1975), p. 2.

68 Sarah Honig, "T.A. Slum Dwellers Use TV Tactics in Protest," *ibid.* (Monday, May 17, 1976), p. 2.

69 Ernie Meyer, "Arab, Jewish Students Fight at HU," *ibid.* (Thursday, May 20, 1976), p. 2.

In short, as Rosenberg concluded at the end of the decade, "political groups learn from each other, they learn from television and from experience."[70] All these social factors reinforced the economic and political ones, inevitably leading to the same result — the quantitative enlargement and development of *demoskraty* in Israel.

FINDINGS — DEMOSKRATISATION BY VARIABLES: TURMOIL OR STABILIZATION?

A quantitative increase, however, need not mean a qualitative "hardening" of the general phenomenon. And indeed, when the overall picture is broken down by variables, a qualitatively different picture emerges.

In general, *demoskraty* in Israel is not of a violent nature, and this lack of violence is becoming more pronounced as time goes on (Table B). While only 15.3% of all protest events in the sixties were violent (Variable X 1; 3, 4, or 5), in the seventies this rate dropped relatively by almost one-third to 10.7%. In essence, only one of every nine or ten such events had violent overtones to them in the latter decade, hardly a manifestation of increasing social turmoil.[71]

TABLE B — Demoskratic Violence, 1960–1979

	1960s			1970s		
	%	No.	(Total Events)	%	No.	(Total Events)
Violence vs. property	5.4	23	(429)	4.6	58	(1270)
Violence vs. people	5.8	25	(429)	3.2	41	(1270)
General riots	4.2	18	(429)	2.4	31	(1270)

One possible explanation for such a low rate of protest violence lies in the nature of Israel as a Jewish State and the historical character of its people.

70 Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
71 Interesting results are obtained when correlating overall protest activity with violent crime in the Israeli society. Over the entire two decade period there was a −.69 Pearson correlation between the number of protest events as against violent crimes against the authorities, and a −.67 correlation as against crimes versus the person. I am indebted to Ms. Naomi Gross Pugatsch for bringing this phenomenon to my attention. The two correlations had .000 and .001 significance, respectively.

While a combative nation in its first fifteen hundred years of existence, the Jews were forced to sublimate such traits in the dispersion of the last two millenia.[72] Their relationship with the secular authorities was almost always politically accommodationist,[73] to the extent that it became a tenet of Jewish religious law: *Dina d'malkhuta dina* ("the law of the land is the law;" the law that the Jewish resident must obey).

The establishment of the State of Israel with its primary purpose of *Kibbutz Galuyot* (the ingathering of the exiles) added an extra dimension to this, as Etzioni-Halevy notes:

> An additional explanation for the limitation of protest may be furnished in terms of Israel's dominant ideology of national unity ... Jews all over the world, by virtue of their common past, religious culture ... constitute one nation. ... Hence the stress on the ingathering of the exiles and the fusion of various subgroups into one closely knit community ... basic differences and inequalities among its various subgroups, segments or sectors are entirely negated, or else considered to be temporary. At the same time no basic conflicts of interests are recognized.[74]

In short, *Koll Yisrael Chaverim Hem*, as the cliche goes — all Jews are brothers. Thus, sibling rivalry, *demoskratic* tantrums for the attention of the authorities — yes; violence — no. And if violence should occur it is almost always a result of spontaneous action and not of pre-planned conspiracy.

The only major exception to this rule reinforces the generality itself. The Neturei Karta (a group of ultra-religious zealots) on a number of occasions and on a number of issues over extended periods of time have indulged in organized violence (mainly rock throwing[75]) against other citizens and the

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72 For an analysis of this phenomenon see my "Can the People of the Book Live By the Sword?" *Response* (Fall 1975), pp. 49-66.

73 The nineteen-forties saw the culmination of this in the tragic Holocaust, when most *Judenraten* — Jewish ghetto councils — facilitated the Nazis' execution of the Final Solution. That decade (in part as a reaction to such complicity but more so as a reaction to the Nazi horror itself) also saw the first significant manifestations of civil disobedience (since the Bar-Kochba rebellion of 125 C.E.) in such events as the Warsaw ghetto uprising and later the underground war versus the British Mandate. But these were distinct exceptions to the rule, exceptions forced upon the Jews as a result of their backs literally being up against the wall.

74 Etzioni-Halevy, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

75 That the Neturei Karta are extraordinarily reactionary can be seen in this mode of violence. As Edwards notes, whereas various ancient civilizations had their

authorities, precisely because they are the only Jewish group in Israel which does not accept the authority of any secular Jewish government nor the legitimacy of the State of Israel. For them the veil is not any one bad governmental policy but the very existence of a Jewish government,[76] and as such must be undermined with all means possible.[77] But for the vast majority of Israeli protesters who accept the existence of the State, the political culture limits their anti-Establishment activity to non-violent forms of protest. And as the percentages show, this *non-violent* political culture is gaining strength lately and not vice versa.

Another indicator of the potential destabilizing effect of *demoskraty* is the size of each event (X2). Here again one finds a small reduction in the seventies as compared to the previous decade (Table C). The percentage of "small" events rose from 32.6% to 35.7% (a relative increase of 9.5%), while that of "medium" ones decreased from 49.9% to 46.4% (a relative drop of 9.3%); the "large" and "huge" ones remaining virtually constant at just under 18% for both decades. This certainly does not indicate any groundswell of social unrest; it does reflect an increase in the number of small groups feeling themselves unaddressed by the formal political system and more willing to make their alienation known.

TABLE C — Size of Demoskratic Event, 1960–1979

| | 1960s | | | 1970s | | |
	%	No.	(Total Events)	%	No.	(Total Events)
Small	32.6	140	(429)	35.8	455	(1270)
Medium	49.9	214	(429)	46.4	589	(1270)
Large	14.9	64	(429)	14.4	183	(1270)
Huge	2.6	11	(429)	3.4	43	(1270)

own approaches to society's pariahs, "ancient Jewish mobs always stoned their victims to death." Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 99. For an in-depth discussion of Neturei Karta anti-authoritarian behavior see Menachem Friedman, "Religious Zealotry in Israeli Society," in *On Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Israel*, Solomon Poll & Ernest Krausz, eds. (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1975) pp. 91-111.

76 They still recognize only Jordanian authority, even over East Jerusalem, and on a number of occasions have encouraged the PLO in its ostensible efforts to establish a bi-national Palestinian State.

77 There are some self-regulating mechanisms limiting their revolutionary anti-Establishment activities. See Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–107.

TABLE D — Demoskratic Organizational Support, 1960–1979

| | 1960s | | | 1970s | | |
	%	No.	(Total Events)	%	No.	(Total Events)
Ad hoc	55.7	239	(429)	52.6	668	(1270)
Organization	34.0	146	(429)	43.6	551	(1270)
Political Party	10.3	44	(429)	3.8	48	(1270)

TABLE E — Duration of Demoskratic Events, 1960–1979

| | 1960s | | | 1970s | | |
	%	No.	(Total Events)	%	No.	(Total Events)
Short	14.9	64	(429)	14.8	188	(1270)
Medium	15.4	66	(429)	22.0	279	(1270)
Long	14.7	63	(429)	18.1	230	(1270)
Not available	37.3	160	(429)	30.9	393	(1270)
Dispersed by Authorities	17.7	76	(429)	14.2	180	(1270)

This is reinforced by the data of variable X 3; organizational support. The most striking drop in the seventies (Table D) occurred among those events organized by the formal actors in the political arena — the parties (from 10.3% of all events to 3.8%; in 1978 and 1979 this dropped still further to .9% and .8% respectively). Nor was this loss translated into gains by the ad hoc sector, which also weakened (albeit in only a small way — from 55.5% to 52.6%). Rather, the Israeli *demoskratisation* process has increasingly taken on a non-party organized coloration, i.e. interest group politics as more increasingly found in the American polity today.

On the face of it, such a countervailing force to the formal political system might seen destabilizing. But as Kornhauser among others notes, the structure of an easily destabilized mass society is "one in which intermediate relations of community, occupation, and association are more or less inoperative, and therefore one in which the individual and primary group are directly related to the state and to nation-wide organizations."[78] This leads to anomie and a feeling of helplessness against the power of the state apparatus, a condition which can only lead either to revolution, totalitarianism, or both.

78 Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–75.

However, if anything the Israeli polity is moving in precisely the opposite direction. Whereas in the early years the Government, through its constituent political parties (the same being the case of Opposition parties as well), had direct ownership or at least control over sundry party-based schools, newspapers, health facilities, athletic teams, etc., the trend more recently has been towards the depoliticization and/or independence of these social institutions, and the formation of other non-party associations and movements with which to raise the standard of life through self-effort as well as pressure on the powers-that-be. Seen in this light, the data in variable x3 can only be encouraging for the future social viability and political stability of the Israeli system.

Finally, the element of "duration" was measured. Here one finds a moderate *increase* in the length of all protest events in the Seventies (Table E). Of all events, those of "medium" duration jumped from 15.4% to 22% while those which were "long" rose from 14.7% to 18.1%.[79] One could perhaps argue that here at least the danger to society is increasing given the greater perseverance of the protestors, but since both the size and violence of such protests are going down it is unlikely that this is the case.[80] However, should this trend continue, especially with regard to those events over a day long, it could have a marked destabilizing effect on the society and the system as a whole. Anyone willing to protest for more than twenty-four consecutive hours is not likely to accept a simple governmental "no" for an answer.

As a comprehensive way to sum up the most salient features of this general destabilization question, it was decided to borrow Gurr's "Magnitude of Civil Strife"[81] scale with one modification. Gurr scored the "pervasiveness" (extent of participation), "duration," and "intensity" (the human cost

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79 The nineteen-seventies percentages in this category are suspect given a significance of .10.

80 One possible explanation for increasing duration may be that it is related to the rise in the number of protest events in the seventies. The more such events the harder it is to gain the attention of the media or the authorities. Such publicity "competition" would force an intensification in at least one of the variables. That such an intensification occurred in "duration" rather than "violence" again suggests the unwillingness of the protesters to use the most socially disruptive means available to them. However, there may be a threshhold of competition above which lengthy duration may not suffice, deflecting the activists to violence as a means towards greater publicity. 1979 may have been such a year. With two events occurring on average every three days, one finds the rate of violence (15.8%) to be higher than for any year in the decade, and far higher than the decade's average (10.1%).

81 Gurr, "A Causal Model . . . ," *op. cit.*

in casualties) of his events and combined each to form an overall magnitude score. The *kratos* score used here differs only in the measurement of intensity, utililing the values of variable X 1 instead of Gurr's far less precise "body count." As Table F demonstrates there was no increase whatsoever in the seventies; in fact, a small albeit hardly significant decrease in the overall *kratos* score was registered — from 1.774 in the sixties to 1.769 a decade later. Even more important than this consistency is the fact that this general score (indeed the score for each category individually) remained *under* a score of 2 (disruptive, medium size, and/or medium duration), again a sign that *demoskraty* in Israel has not been of a nature to seriously disrupt or distort the formal political process.

TABLE F — The Kratos Factor — Magnitude of Demoskratic Events, 1960s & 1970s

			Variable		Kratos Factor
Variable X1 (Violence):	1	(Peaceful)		=	1
	2	(Disruptive)		=	2
	3	(Violence vs. Property)		=	3
	4	(Violence vs. People)		=	4
	5	(General Riot)		=	5
Variable X2 (Size):	6	(Small)		=	1
	7	(Medium)		=	2
	8	(Large)		=	3
	9	(Huge)		=	4
Variable X5 (Duration):	17	(Short)		=	1
	18	(Medium)		=	2
	19	(Long)		=	3
	20	(Not available)		=	Not included
	21	(Dispersed by authorities)		=	1.5

	Variable — "K." Factor		Variable — "K" Factor		Variable — "K" Factor	
1960s	X1	1.592	X2	1.874	X5	1.855
1970s	X1	1.510	X2	1.853	X5	1.945

Overall "K" Factor
1960s — 1.114 (1.762)[1]
1970s — 1.769 (1.746)[1]

[1] — Whereas the overall "K" factor was arrived at by adding up the three individual factors and dividing by three, the parenthesized one is the sum of each individual events' score divided by the overall number of events. The discrepancy results from there being fewer events in Variable X5 as a result of value 20.

TABLE G — Crosstabulation of "Intensity" and "Size"

1960–1969

X1	X2	Small No. 6	Medium No. 7	Large No. 8	Huge No. 9
PEACE-FUL	No. 1	92 (a)	148	51	11
		30.5(b)	49.0	16.9	3.6
		65.7(c)	69.2	79.7	100.0
		21.4(d)	34.5	11.9	2.6
DIS./OBI.	No. 2	29	27	5	0
		47.5	44.3	8.2	0.0
		20.7	12.6	7.8	0.0
		6.8	6.3	1.2	0.0
VIOL./PROP.	No. 3	8	14	1	0
		34.8	60.9	4.3	0.0
		5.7	6.5	1.6	0.0
		1.9	6.3	0.2	0.0
VIOL./PEOP.	No. 4	9	14	2	0
		36.0	56.0	8.0	0.0
		6.4	6.5	3.1	0.0
		2.1	3.3	0.5	0.0
RIOT	No. 5	2	11	5	0
		11.1	61.1	27.8	0.0
		1.4	5.1	7.8	0.0
		0.5	2.6	1.2	0.0

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0554

1970–1979

X1	X2	Small No. 6	Medium No. 7	Large No. 8	Huge No. 9
PEACE-FUL	No. 1	278	380	155	42
		32.5	44.4	18.1	4.9
		61.2	64.5	84.7	97.7
		21.9	29.9	12.2	3.3
DIS./OBI.	No. 2	147	123	15	0
		51.6	43.2	5.3	0.0
		32.4	20.9	8.2	0.0
		11.6	9.7	1.2	0.0
VIOL./PROP.	No. 3	16	39	3	0
		27.6	67.2	5.2	0.0
		3.5	6.6	1.6	0.0
		1.3	3.1	0.2	0.0
VIOL./PEOP.	No. 4	11	23	7	0
		26.8	56.1	17.1	0.0
		2.4	3.9	3.8	0.0
		0.9	1.8	0.6	0.0
RIOT	No. 5	3	24	3	1
		9.7	77.4	9.7	3.2
		0.7	4.1	1.6	2.3
		0.2	1.9	0.2	0.1

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

(a) Actual number.
(b) Percentage of horizontal value.
(c) Percentage of vertical value.
(d) Percentage of all horizontal/vertical values.

TABLE H — Crosstabulation of "Intensity" and "Duration"

1960–1969

X1	X6	Short No. 20	Medium No. 21	Long No. 22	N.A. No. 23	Disp. No. 24
PEACE-FUL	No. 1	48 / 15.9 / 75.0 / 11.2	37 / 12.3 / 56.1 / 8.6	52 / 17.2 / 82.5 / 12.1	143 / 47.4 / 89.4 / 33.3	22 / 7.3 / 28.9 / 5.1
DIS./OBS.	No. 2	7 / 11.5 / 10.9 / 1.6	10 / 16.4 / 15.2 / 2.3	9 / 14.8 / 14.3 / 2.1	10 / 16.4 / 6.3 / 2.3	25 / 41.0 / 32.9 / 5.8
VIOL./PROP.	No. 3	3 / 13.0 / 4.7 / 0.7	10 / 43.5 / 15.2 / 2.3	0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0	3 / 13.0 / 1.9 / 0.7	7 / 30.4 / 9.2 / 1.6
VIOL./PEOP.	No. 4	5 / 20.0 / 7.8 / 1.2	5 / 20.0 / 7.6 / 1.2	2 / 8.0 / 3.2 / 0.5	1 / 4.0 / 0.6 / 0.2	12 / 48.0 / 15.8 / 2.8
RIOT	No. 5	1 / 5.6 / 1.6 / 0.2	4 / 22.2 / 6.1 / 0.9	0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0	3 / 16.7 / 1.9 / 0.7	10 / 55.6 / 13.2 / 2.3

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

1970–1979

X1	X6	Short No. 20	Medium No. 21	Long No. 22	N.A. No. 23	Disp. No. 24
PEACE-FUL	No. 1	137 / 16.0 / 72.9 / 10.8	148 / 17.3 / 53.0 / 11.7	168 / 19.6 / 73.0 / 13.2	360 / 42.1 / 91.6 / 28.3	42 / 4.9 / 23.3 / 3.3
DIS./OBS.	No. 2	41 / 14.4 / 21.8 / 3.2	72 / 25.3 / 25.8 / 5.7	53 / 18.6 / 23.0 / 4.2	24 / 8.4 / 6.1 / 1.9	95 / 33.3 / 52.8 / 7.5
VIOL./PROP.	No. 3	5 / 8.6 / 2.7 / 0.4	26 / 44.8 / 9.3 / 2.0	6 / 10.3 / 2.6 / 0.5	5 / 8.6 / 1.3 / 0.4	16 / 27.6 / 8.9 / 1.3
VIOL./PEOP.	No. 4	5 / 12.2 / 2.7 / 0.4	16 / 39.0 / 5.7 / 1.3	2 / 4.9 / 0.9 / 0.2	3 / 7.3 / 0.8 / 0.2	15 / 36.6 / 8.3 / 1.2
RIOT	No. 5	0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0	17 / 54.8 / 6.1 / 1.3	1 / 3.2 / 0.4 / 0.1	1 / 3.2 / 0.3 / 0.1	12 / 38.7 / 6.7 / 0.9

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

TABLE I — Crosstabulation of "Size" and "Duration"

TABLE I — Crosstabulation of "Size" and "Duration"

1960-1969

		Short No. 20	Medium No. 21	Long No. 22	N.A. No. 23	Disp. No. 24
	X6					
SMALL	X2 No. 6	19 / 13.6 / 29.7 / 3.3	13 / 9.3 / 19.7 / 3.0	31 / 22.1 / 49.2 / 7.2	41 / 29.3 / 25.6 / 9.6	36 / 25.7 / 47.4 / 8.4
MEDIUM	No. 7	26 / 12.1 / 40.6 / 6.1	35 / 16.4 / 53.0 / 8.2	28 / 13.1 / 44.4 / 6.5	86 / 40.2 / 53.8 / 20.0	39 / 18.2 / 51.3 / 9.9
LARGE	No. 8	15 / 23.4 / 23.3 / 3.5	16 / 25.0 / 24.4 / 3.7	3 / 4.7 / 4.8 / 0.7	29 / 45.3 / 18.1 / 6.8	1 / 1.6 / 1.3 / 0.2
HUGE	No. 9	4 / 36.4 / 6.3 / 0.9	2 / 18.2 / 3.0 / 0.5	1 / 9.1 / 1.6 / 0.2	4 / 36.4 / 2.5 / 0.9	0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

1970-1979

		Short No. 20	Medium No. 21	Long No. 22	N.A. No. 23	Disp. No. 24
	X6					
SMALL	X2 No. 6	61 / 13.4 / 32.4 / 4.8	74 / 16.3 / 26.5 / 5.8	87 / 19.2 / 37.8 / 6.9	130 / 28.5 / 33.1 / 10.3	103 / 22.7 / 57.2 / 8.1
MEDIUM	No. 7	88 / 14.9 / 46.8 / 6.9	135 / 22.9 / 48.4 / 10.6	110 / 18.7 / 47.8 / 8.7	187 / 31.7 / 47.6 / 14.7	69 / 11.7 / 38.3 / 5.4
LARGE	No. 8	29 / 15.8 / 15.4 / 2.3	55 / 30.1 / 19.7 / 4.3	27 / 14.8 / 11.7 / 2.1	64 / 35.0 / 16.3 / 5.0	8 / 4.4 / 4.4 / 0.6
HUGE	No. 9	10 / 23.3 / 5.3 / 0.8	15 / 34.9 / 5.4 / 1.2	6 / 14.0 / 2.6 / 0.5	12 / 27.9 / 3.1 / 0.9	0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

TABLE 1 — Crosstabulation of "Size" and "Organization"

		1960–1969			1970–1979		
	X3	Ad Hoc No. 10	Organ'z'l No. 11	Pol. Party No. 12	Ad Hoc No. 10	Organ'z'l No. 11	Pol. Party No. 12
	X2						
SMALL	No. 6	112	16	12	305	136	14
		80.0	11.4	8.6	67.1	29.9	3.0
		47.0	11.0	27.3	45.7	24.6	29.2
		25.9	3.7	2.8	24.0	10.7	1.1
MEDIUM	No. 7	113	78	23	312	256	21
		52.8	36.4	10.7	53.0	43.5	3.6
		47.3	53.4	52.3	46.7	46.2	43.8
		26.3	18.2	5.4	24.6	20.2	1.7
LARGE	No. 8	14	43	7	46	127	10
		21.9	67.2	10.9	25.1	69.4	5.5
		5.8	29.5	15.9	6.9	22.9	20.8
		3.3	10.0	1.6	3.6	10.0	0.8
HUGE	No. 9	0	9	2	5	35	3
		0.0	81.8	18.2	11.6	81.4	7.0
		0.0	6.2	4.5	0.7	6.3	6.3
		0.0	2.1	0.5	0.4	2.8	0.2

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

TABLE K — Crosstabulation of "Organization" and "Duration"

1960–1969

		Short No. 20	Medium No. 21	Long No. 22	N.A. No. 23	Disp. No. 24
AD HOC	X3 No. 10	26 10.8 40.6 6.1	29 12.1 43.9 6.8	53 22.2 84.1 12.4	74 31.0 46.3 17.2	57 23.9 75.0 13.3
ORGANI- ZATIONAL	No. 11	31 21.2 48.4 7.2	35 24.0 53.0 8.2	9 6.2 14.3 2.1	60 41.1 37.5 14.0	11 7.5 14.5 2.6
POL. PARTY	No. 12	7 15.9 10.9 1.6	2 4.5 3.0 0.5	1 2.3 1.6 0.2	26 59.1 16.3 6.1	8 18.2 10.5 1.9

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

1970–1979

		Short No. 20	Medium No. 21	Long No. 22	N.A. No. 23	Disp. No. 24
AD HOC	X3 No. 10	91 13.6 48.4 7.2	151 22.6 54.1 11.9	134 20.1 58.3 10.6	185 27.7 47.1 14.6	107 16.0 59.4 8.4
ORGANI- ZATIONAL	No. 11	88 15.9 46.8 6.9	126 22.7 45.2 9.9	94 17.0 40.9 7.4	178 32.1 45.3 14.0	68 12.3 37.8 5.4
POL. PARTY	No. 12	9 18.8 4.8 0.7	2 4.2 0.7 0.2	2 4.2 0.9 0.2	30 62.5 7.6 2.4	5 10.4 2.8 0.4

SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

From a straightforward statistical review, then, a generally clear picture emerges as to the non-destabilizing nature and trend of the various protest variables. However, the matter is a bit more involved than that as a more refined analysis of the relationships between variables and their values illustrates. While it would be impossible to report here on all the relationships, the results of several such crosstabulations do tend to fill in the picture while giving some idea of its complexities.

Crosstabulating the variables dealing with "tensity" (X1) and "size" (X2) tends to further reinforce this study's central thesis. While there was a general 30% relative drop in violent events during the seventies as compared to the sixties, the relative drop of "large" (value 8) violent protests was 44% (from 12.5% to 7%). In addition, in the seventies "large" protests were only half as likely to be violent (7%) as "medium" ones (14.6%). Thus, while protest violence is going down in general, it is going down even faster in those events which by nature of their size are potentially the most destabilizing.

However, when "intensity" and "duration" (X5) are combined a reverse trend unfolds. Within the same overall 30% relative drop in violent events, those which were "long" (value 23) showed a relative 22% increase in violence for the seventies. On the face of it this would not augur well for future general stability except for the fact that the number of events involved here is so small as to be virtually insignificant — two events in all of the sixties, nine in all of the seventies (less than one a year). In addition, while only 3.9% of all "longs" were violent, 21.1% of all "mediums" (a 27% relative drop) and 5.4% of all "shorts" (a 62% relative drop) had violent overtones in the seventies. In short, if Israeli protest events do end in violence (itself increasingly unlikely in the seventies) the chances that they will continue for over a day are still close to nil.[82]

The crosstabulation trend of "size" and "duration" initially seems to be even more troubling. As we have seen, there has been a 23% relative rise in "long" events between decades. But while small-long events *dropped* by a relative 13%, medium (sized)-long events rose relatively by 43% and large-long events relatively increased by a dramatic 215%, so that in the seventies of all large events 14.8% were violent compared to only 4.7% in the six-

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82 These statistics obviously leave aside value No. 21 (dispersed by authorities) and No. 20 (not available). Of all violent protest events in the seventies the former constitute 33% of the sample while the latter only 7%.

ties.[83] This certainly is of concern and potential danger. At the present, though, the large-longs still constitute only 2.1% of all events compared to 8.7% for the medium-longs and 6.9% for the short-longs. Troubling — yes; dominant — definitely not.[84]

Variable X2–X3 also measure "turnout power," this time by organizational affiliation. But here we find another countertendency. While overall the political parties (value 12) have had sharp relative reductions in the number of events they have called, their power to attract adherents has paradoxically increased! Whereas in the sixties they were able to draw large or huge crowds 20.4% of the time, in the seventies this kind of drawing power manifested itself 27.1% of the time (a 33% relative increase). Such a turnout power on the part of non-party organizations dropped from 35.7% to 29.2%, while for ad hoc groups it rose slightly from 5.9% to 7.3%.

There are two probable explanations for this party trend. First, most of the political parties who called for such events in the sixties were of the far left variety, with little broad support. The mainstream parties began selectively using this mode in the seventies[85] and so raised the rate of large turnouts.[86] Second, the mere fact of a significant reduction (relative to other organized and ad hoc groups) in party-based events might have increased the novelty factor for their potential *demoskratising* supporters. With five ad hoc events occurring on average every month in the seventies, and four organizational events every month, when any one political party calls a protest relatively only once every two and a half months (obviously each party's adherents having to wait a lot longer than that between intervals of his own party's events) its attractiveness may be all the greater precisely because of the relative hiatus involved.

Insofar as the destabilization issue is concerned the picture here is unclear. On the one hand, the fact that political parties increasingly draw well suggests that an unhealthy recentralization of political focus is occurring (espe-

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83 Again, these percentages are underestimations given the non-inclusion of value No. 20.
84 The huge-longs constitute so small a part of the overall picture — 0.5% — that any trend data would be meaningless.
85 This was due in large part to the increasing strength of the Opposition coalition — the Likud. In the latter part of the decade the Labor coalition found itself in the Opposition for the first time ever, and began resorting to this mode of protest.
86 By so doing they also further legitimized *demoskraty* in the eyes of the Israeli population. See the concluding remarks of this essay with regard to this point.

cially in light of the relative drop among pressure group attractiveness; yet the organizational groups are still ahead of the parties and the anomic ad hoc sector in their ability to command large turnouts). On the other hand, the decreasing drawing power of the less manageable (more violence-prone[87]) organizational events (discounting the almost negligible drawing power rise among ad hoc groups which in any case account for far fewer large turnouts) supports the thesis that in the short run Israel *demoskraty* is moving away from "mass society" tendencies.

Somewhat the same ambiguous picture emerges when crosstabulating organizational support with duration (X3–X5). However, here the ad hoc groups show a slight loss over time in their ability to sustain long protests (from 22.3% to 20.1%), whereas organizational events exhibit a dramatic increase in their ability to do the same (from 6.3% to 17% in the seventies). The parties also show a rise, but from a piddling 2.3% to a mere 4.2% of their events. Thus, organized groups in the seventies were four times as able or willing as political parties to sustain long protests whereas they were less than three times as likely in the sixties — another manifestation of reduced party potency as compared to pressure groups. Yet it must be noted that the more "dangerous" ad hoc groups are still the most likely to persevere over lengthy periods in their protest activities.

Overall, then, most of the data — both among and between the sundry values and variables — support the contention that a rise in the absolute number of events does not necessarily entail a concomitant increase in the destabilizing potential of such *demoskratising*. Indeed, the data leads to the opposite conclusion, notwithstanding some exceptions (almost all of which are related to "duration"). In sum, even while the Israeli *demoskratisation* process continues apace, its internal dynamics[88] are moving in a less threatening direction from the standpoint of destabilizing the established system it ostensibly is threatening.

87 In the seventies, only 2.1% of all political party events were violent, whereas 8.3% of the organized and 12.3% of the ad hoc ones were (crosstabulation of X1–X3).

88 What did the "average" Israeli protest event look like in the seventies? It was peaceful (67%), of medium size (46%), on an ad hoc basis (53%), over a social issue (44%), of medium duration (22%), taking the form of an outdoor rally (64%).

CONCLUSIONS

The most basic finding of this quantitative study, then, supports what other earlier students of Israeli protest have concluded from their more impressionistic work. Thus, for example, Etzioni-Halevy found that

> the fears of some observers that direct action as expressed by protest might be conducive to irresponsible extremism, and hence to totalitarianism, are not vindicated in Israel; here, protest has shown no signs of endangering established democratic procedures. It seems, on the contrary, that Israel-style protest has even contributed to the vitality and hence to the viability of these procedures by making it necessary for members of the political elites to remain open to currents of claims and opinions from below.[89]

The central question, of course, is why such activity has not endangered the established system. Broadly speaking, two overall reasons can be adduced: the lack of social conditions which are conducive to such a collapse, and the non-destructive purposes and goals of the protestors themselves.

This essay has already touched upon a number of the necessary conditions for a general structural collapse of the political system, *conditions which Israel lacks*: a widening of the standard of living gap between the middle/upper classes and the broad lower class; large-scale unemployment; the non-existence or destruction of intermediary social groups and institutions; and increasing centralization of political power within the hands of the central authority; low voter participation; and overly rapid socioeconomic modernization. To these might be added a number of others.

Kornhauser argued that "certain tendencies in modern society must be checked if democracy is to remain strong. These tendencies are the loss of autonomy on the part of elites and the loss of independent group life on the part of non-elites."[90] In a sense, these two aspects are by definition in constant tension for "independent group life" may entail *demoskraty* which in turn attempts to control or limit the autonomy of the political elite. All the available data, as we have seen, point to a healthy increase in Israeli

89 Etzioni-Halevy, *op. cit.*, p. 518.
90 Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

group activity.[91] The question of elite autonomy, however, is more problematic, for while it can be argued that increasing protest pressure must have some effect on the governing elite[92] it also in many ways is a result of the increasing insularity ("autonomy") of that same elite. In other words, the *demoskratisation* phenomenon has arisen in Israel precisely because of the elite's formal insulation from the masses as a result of the great difficulty encountered by any citizen in gaining entrance to positions of power (due to the electoral system of party lists). Kornhauser, of course, does not disapprove of such insularity: "A system in which there is high access to elites generates popular pressures on the elites that prevent them from performing their creative and value-sustaining functions."[93] Thus, the problem ("insularity") also serves as the main bulwark against its product (*demoskraty*). By allowing the masses to express themselves and in some ways (and times) responding to that expression of protest, the Israeli elite resolves the dilemma without endangering its own internal cohesion.[94]

91 By this it is meant formal, non-party related group activity. There is at the same time a general decline of the collectivist group spirit in Israel manifesting itself in greater individualism. However, this too bodes well from the standpoint of the Israeli population being less psychologically amenable to totalitarian blandishment, as long as the individualism itself does not degenerate into anomic, rootless behavior.

92 This is especially true for the Black Panthers' and the Young Couples' Housing protests, as Etzioni-Halevy points out, as well as more recently the pro-settlement pressure tactics of Gush Emunim. The whole issue of the *success* of Israeli *demoskraty* is beyond the purview of this study, but will be taken up in future articles. For a general theoretical analysis of the problems encountered by poor and/or powerless protest groups especially, see Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXII, No. 4 (December, 1968), p. 1157. Piven, too, notes that "the occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms it must take, and the impact it can have, are all delineated by social structure in ways that usually diminish its extent and diminish its force," (*op. cit.*, p. 299).

93 Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

94 One might parenthetically suggest here that given this present equilibrious situation, the movement in Israel to switch from a purely proportional electoral system to a predominantly territorial one, is fraught with danger. At a time of high informal *demoskratic* pressure, opening up the formal democratic system could lead to input overload and overdiffusion of the governing elite. Of course, such a democratization of the system may in turn lead to reduced protest activity, but this would take some time given the by now entrenched *demoskratic* political culture. Thus, either Israel waits for a return to a period of relatively quiescent *demoskraty*, or the electoral changeover should be done in gradual stages over a long period of time.

Another symptom of "mass society" tendencies is the emergence of xeno-phobic "nativist" groups who perceive the new immigrants as endangering their economic wealth, social status, or political control. This condition is a virtual impossibility in Israel due to its unique Law of Return which not only guarantees automatic citizenship to any immigrant Jew upon request but also symbolically embodies the very *raison d'etre* of the Jewish State. True, there has been on occasion some resentment felt towards these "olim" but it is directed at the attractive benefits and rights accorded to them and not at their presence or right to settle.

Finally, Kornhauser points to war as an important condition of mass society and behavior. At least here it would seem that beleaguered Israel could encounter difficulties. But as Kornhauser himself admits, "paramount among these dangers is military defeat,"[95] something which Israel has not experienced. One might add, however, that this factor is apparently salient even in Israel, as the large post-Yom Kippur War *demoskratic* increases (resulting from Israel's initial battle setbacks) suggests.[96] The reason for such saliency is obvious — military defeat for Israel is tantamount to the destruction of the State itself.

If the general societal conditions, then, do not lend themselves to "mass" socially disruptive tendencies, neither do the goals of most Israeli protesters. Basically, *demoskratic* activity in all societies is a result of either: a) the non-acceptance of the regime's (i.e. constitutional framework's) legitimacy — leading to revolution; b) acceptance of the system's legitimacy but not the Government's authority — leading to a vote of no confidence, impeach-ment, or a coup; c) acceptance of governmental authority but not the legi-timacy of some laws — leading to new legislation; d) acceptance of the laws' legitimacy but not the unequal execution of certain laws — leading to court or federally-enforced fairer implementation; or e) acceptance of all these but not of certain *policies* of the Government — resulting in a reevaluation of those policies and a redistribution of resources. Obviously, each succeed-ing type is of a lesser degree and constitutes a smaller threat to the system as a whole.

Except for a few very marginal groups,[97] almost all Israeli protest move-

95 Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
96 Twenty-four of the additional twenty-nine events registered in 1974 (compared to 1973) were *political*-issue protests. Seen another way, while political-issue protests accounted for 31.3% of all protests in the seventies, in 1974 they ac-counted for 44.6% (59 out of 132).
97 The Neturei Karta is the most consistent group in its non-acceptance of the

ments and events are of the latter variety. While Etzioni-Halevy comments upon the similarities of the Black Panthers' and the Young Couples' goals, the same can be said of the vast majority of Israeli protesters: "The two aggrieved parties further resemble each other in that they both present well-demarcated, rather mild demands, centering on the redistribution of some well-defined rewards *rather than on any major restructuring of Israeli society or of its political center.*"[98] In fact, as Sprinzak illustrates, those groups which start out relatively higher up the aforementioned scale soon become coopted into the system, if not the Establishment.[99] Even the radical New Israel Left (Si'akh) declared in 1972 that "Si'akh does not in principle condemn participation in local or national elections . . . because democratic parliamentarism is an historic and human achievement of great value, and it is imperative to struggle for its continued existence and expansion."[100] Thus, even most of the Israeli extremists see themselves as working within the system, or when working outside it (i.e. *demoskratising*) doing so only to strengthen it (by their lights). Given such a situation — lacking both the social conditions and the political will — there is little danger at present that protest activity in Israel will undermine its democratic system, even as such activity continues to grow and expand.*

Indeed, one could perhaps speculatively suggest that this mode of activity is rooted in the very character of the Jew himself. The noted Jewish historian Cecil Roth once described the Jew as the "Eternal Protestant," one "who

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* *Editor's note*: This phenomenon of institutional growth as a result of pressure from those not in the Establishment is not unique, of course, to Israeli Jewry. For a similar process see Cohen's "Communal Change and Institutional Resilience: Anglo-Jewry, 1900–1920".

State and its regime. Sprinzak entitles his chapter on this group: "Status Quo of Delegitimacy," *op. cit.*, pp. 10–12. In the sixties, the far-Left "Matzpen" movement also had delegitimizing aspirations (*ibid.*, p. 42). Some Israeli Arab demonstrations take on this character as well, but most do not.

98 Emphasis mine. *Op. cit.*, p. 504. For a more in-depth general discussion of the contrast between revolutionary protest and the milder sorts see Peter Bockman, *The Limits of Protest* (New York: Panther Books, 1970).

99 This further highlights the complex nature of Israel's elite "insularity." While few of these groups end up as partners in the coalition government, their access to positions of high political visibility is facilitated by the proportonal system of (party list) representation. Again, the "problem" and "solution" stem from the same system structure.

100 Translation mine. Sprinzak, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

always refuses to be satisfied with the present condition of affairs."[101] Protest for the Jew is a reflex action, conditioned by a millenia-old struggle with the conventional wisdoms and their proponents in each era. "Jews are still protestants," Roth argued, "protestants against the modern deification of the State as they were against the deification of the Church four centuries ago, and against the Juggernaut of Hellenism before the Christian era began."[102] This psycho-national-cultural trait is one too deeply ingrained to be expunged in a matter of decades despite the Israeli Jews' living within their own State.[103] It could even account for an anomaly that Gurr discovered — Israel has seven percent more *demoskratic* "strife" than his sophisticated indicators predict it should have. But political-cultural typology ("national character") is not an indicator that he included (nor could it quantitatively have been).[104]

On a more generalized level, the results and conclusions presented here suggest that the whole *demoskratisation* phenomenon may need to be re-evaluated. It is just possible that it has become an entrenched and salutary[105] component of the liberal-democratic order without our being aware of it. Most democratic nations think nothing of changing governments every few years through such "unsettling" practices as universal elections; most

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101 Cecil Roth, *Personalities and Events in Jewish History* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1953), p. 77.

102 *Ibid.* Roth could have continued even farther back to the Prophets and their anti-pagan diatribes. Nor was such protest directed solely at the foreign authorities. As Friedman suggests, "Pinchas' deed [executing an Israelite man together with his Midianite mistress] was somewhat a challenge to Moses' leadership ('teaching the law in front of his rabbi')," and so constituted the model for future Jewish protest. *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

103 The Protestant Jew idea does not contradict the earlier point that for the Jew political disobedience was religiously impermissible. Roth's point is that the Jews (over the last two millenia at least) indirectly protested against the status quo by their refusal to culturally adapt, and not by any direct refusal to accept the political authority of the gentile sovereign. One could perhaps speculate that the inability to politically protest directly for such a long time has led to the *demoskratic* explosion Israel is undergoing today.

104 Gurr, "A Causal Model . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 1120. He tries to explain this anomaly by speculating that it is "the result of a questionable coding judgment about the extent and duration of extremist Orthodox religious conflict."

105 The argument that riots, violent demonstrations, etc. can hardly be considered salutary is a disingenuous one. Neither can political graft, nepotism, ballot stuffing, etc., be considered healthful to the formal political system, but no one negates the system because of its less savory practices.

accept formalized group pressure (lobbying) as a necessary and even beneficial form of political behavior. Both would have been inconceivable three hundred years ago. Perhaps it is now time to reassess this "new"[106] form of political expression, especially in light of the fact that politics has entered the Media Age and *demoskraty* is but the most natural product of such a changed political environment.

In the final analysis, then, *demoskratic* "protest *per se* is neither good nor bad; it is a common[107] and often effective means of achieving change in modern society. Most of the important political and social changes of the twentieth century have been accelerated, if not caused by protest movements."[108] If the Israeli case is any indication, this "politics of creative disorder"[109] is here to stay and Western liberal democracy may be the better for it. At the least, the *demoskratisation* process has infused it with new vigor, if only by repeatedly reminding both ruler and ruled as to the philosophical basis of their system of government. At its best, it can provide an added means for the facilitation of such governance.

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106 Of course, it is hardly unique to our century. As Cantor, among others, notes: "In the long perspective of history, twentieth-century protest movements are revealed as the continuation of a pattern that began in the twelfth century." *Op. cit.*, p. 327.

107 Carter notes that it is especially common to "democracies in formation," e.g. the U.S. and Britain in their earlier years. Israel would be merely carrying on that tradition with a very salutary outcome probable judging by the experience of her predecessors. *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

108 Cantor, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

109 Arthur Waskow's phrase as cited in Bedau, *op. cit.*, p. 51.