Public Demonstrators and the Israeli Police: The Policy and Practice of Successful Protest Control[*]

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Abstract
Significant public protest has been a hallmark of Israel's political scene since the State's founding, with close to one-fourth of the total population participating in demonstrations at one time or another. This article examines police response to such demonstrations, using police files and archival material to document policy and practice in 1) the licensing of demonstrations, 2) pre-protest preparations, 3) use of intelligence, and 4) physical preparation, as well as actions at the scene.

Introduction

The State of Israel is the most protest-oriented country in the western world. Whereas studies done on the U.S., Great Britain, West Germany, and elsewhere, have found that a maximum 11% of the population participate in public demonstrations,[1] the latest figures for Israel are a staggering 21½%[2]—and this before the massive protests and counter-protests which surrounded the Lebanese incursion and its grisly aftermath. Nor has the phenomenon in Israel been of recent vintage. Virtually from the State's establishment, significant public protest was a hallmark of its domestic scene—69 such events in 1950, 56 in 1954, 76 in 1960, 134 in 1971, and 241 in 1979, to note but a few of the "highlights."[3]

Given this overall hyperactive extra-parliamentary situation, one would expect that the police have a problem. To begin with, while most of Israel's governmental apparatus was in place in 1948 and already operating for decades semi-autonomously (under the British Mandate), its police force had to be reconstituted upon the departure of the British who previously held almost all the key police positions. Thus, the new *Jewish* police force had little experience handling anti-(*Jewish*) government protest. And even when the police began to gain experience, it found itself caught between the hammer of principled popular disgruntlement (which Israel's newborn democracy legitimized) and the anvil of the need to protect those same democratic institutions and a still tenuous social order.

How, then, did Israel's police fare? To be sure, there were on occasion the inevitable charges of police "brutality," especially when religious zealots were involved in such protest manifestations.[4] Nevertheless, an in-depth statistical analysis of protest *intensity* in conjunction with police *reaction* supplies a picture of remarkable conformity. In 70.8% of all the protest events measured from 1950-1979, the level of police reaction was commensurate to the protest's intensity: peaceful demonstrations—no reaction; obstructive/disruptive—verbal or non-coercive intervention; violence vs. property—arrests; violence vs. people—use of physical force; general riot—guns fired. In addition, the minority cases of non-"correctness" displayed an almost exact split between police overreaction (14.3% of the time) and underreaction (14.9%). The only type of Israeli protest in which a significant imbalance could be found was in religious-issue demonstrations; but contrary to the public charges bandied about, here the police *under*-reacted far more (28.7%) than they overreacted (15.8%).[5]

In short, the overall situation in Israel can be characterized as one in which the police are doing a fine job (with regard to protests) under relatively difficult circumstances.

The question is why; what are the global strategy, the various tactics, and the sundry procedures which Israel's police force has developed to cope with the multifarious manifestations of public protest? Such an inquiry is not merely of academic interest or concern to Israelis alone. As the Age of Protest throughout the world shows no signs of abating, any success in tactical protest containment can serve as a model for emulation by other nations wishing to afford their people unfettered public expression without the by-product of social disorder. The following study will categorize and analyze those actions which Israel's police have used with a good measure of success.

Methodology

There exist a number of national studies whose focus is the police's handling of protest demonstrations.[6] Almost all are extrinsic in nature; i.e., they view and analyze police behavior as it unfolds during the actual protest. For the purposes of delineating "reality" this is the preferred method. However, it suffers from three drawbacks.

First, in order to establish a *pattern* of police behavior the researcher must follow up on a lengthy series of protests—obviously not a simple or easy matter. Second, actual police behavior may not be reflective of police *policy*; or, when faced with different police reactions to two similar demonstrations it is difficult to ascertain which was the "correct" one by the police's own light. Third, successful protest control in the field by the police sheds little light on their pre-protest strategy and preparations.

As a result, in order to fundamentally understand the reasons for the Israel police force's protest reaction "successes" in the field (as noted previously), a different line of research attack is necessary—an *internal* one. Access was graciously provided by the Israeli police to its internal records and files (relatively meticulously kept). Through a survey of internal memoranda, telegrams, letters, protest licenses, and assorted other documents, a clear—albeit partial—picture emerges as to the ways and means of its preparation for, and reaction to, public protest.

The following analysis, however, is not (and could not be) based on the entire police archival material. For one, as a matter of policy most documents relating to public protests are destroyed after a three year period. In this study the author was able to trace records from 1977-1981, a five year period involving a couple of thousand items for the record.[7] Second, although Israel's police force is under the unified civilian control of the Minister of Police (during the 1977-1981 period covered here, Dr. Yosef Burg, also Minister of the Interior), the force is administratively split into four major districts (*m'hozot*)—each of which keeps separate records. The task of covering all is unduly burdensome. Thus, it was decided to concentrate on the Jerusalem District which, as the seat of government, is where more Israeli protest takes place than in any other district.[8]

Philosophical, Legal, and Political Background

Israel is an open democracy with a deep-rooted political culture supporting freedom of speech and assembly. Israel's police force shares those values. In an *internal* memorandum (which was not designed for public relations purposes), the southern district's Intelligence Unit reminded the rank and file that all protest demonstrations in Israel are a legitimate form of self-expression, on the condition that they are licensed.[9]

The latter point is a matter of law in Israel. All public demonstrations which involve fifty or more people must get a permit prior to such an event. To each permit the police attach certain conditions pertaining to *location* (specific street/s), *movement* (where parking is allowed; use of sidewalk or street), *order* (how many ushers must be provided by the sponsoring organizations; the event's duration), and the *manner of demonstration* (use of bullhorns, decibel levels; flags and/or banners; etc.). The purpose of the licensing procedure is not to filter out "undesirable" groups but rather to lay the ground rules prior to the emotion of the event itself, so that both protestors and police can judiciously prepare for the demonstration.

Denial of a permit is extremely rare. In the period under study here, there were only two such denials—in both cases against the extreme far-Right "Kach" group (they support the immediate expulsion of all Israeli Arabs from the Jewish State), and then only because they wished to demonstrate where visiting American dignitaries were staying. The denial

was based on "suspicion of disturbances to the public order."[10]

Due to the sensitivity of this particular problem, the Israeli police consult with other security branches before providing permits for demonstrations against visiting dignitaries. The idea here is not to receive a strengthened justification or an imprimatur for denial of such a protest permit, but rather to better outline and detail the specific (more stringent) conditions of locale and duration, taking into account *all* the information at the disposal of all who may be concerned with the dignitary. In short, even where increased security risks are in evidence, the Israeli authorities prefer to set up a complex, expensive, and time-consuming approvals process, rather than fetter freedom of assembly more than is absolutely necessary.

When politics does at all enter the picture, it is usually on the side of leniency. Thus, for example, in a letter to the Jerusalem police, Mayor Teddy Kollek suggests that the leaders of an unlicensed demonstration *not* be prosecuted because they tried to keep things as non-violent as possible, but he ends with the acknowledgment that "of course, the final decision is in the hands of the police."[11] Other instances of political "interference" are at most trivial.[12]

In general, then, the environment is one in which the police share the values of society, are given the legal means to shape the framework of the demonstration, and are almost completely independent of overt political pressure.[13] The solid foundation exists upon which the Israeli police can build an overall strategy to cope with the phenomenon.

Pre-Protest Preparations
Despite the licensing procedure, Israel's police force faces a number of difficulties in preparing for protest demonstrations. First and foremost, many such events occur without any permit request ever having been tendered. While some of these fall into the minor nuisance category (e.g., mothers protesting the lack of traffic lights near a school), most have the potential for causing a serious public disturbance because this is precisely the intent of the organizers (if it weren't, then they would have asked for a permit, which is virtually a pro forma request). Second, many good-willed organizers misjudge the number and/or character of their

public, leading to serious breaches of the original permit.

Israel's police force invests a great amount of time and energy in forestalling, or at least preparing for, the first eventuality. Of necessity, this takes the form of an intelligence network which serves as an early warning system for political "illegal" demonstrations. After the information is gathered and sent to the appropriate districts and/or units, the second stage of physical preparation commences.

Intelligence
It appears that the Israeli police keep track of fixed "anniversaries" which are potential protest days, e.g., May Day (which on occasion brings out anti-Socialist protesters against the paraders, or the celebrants themselves who might get carried away in their anti-government "capitalist economics" protest). The relevant police districts may even receive memo-telegrams days earlier reminding them of such upcoming dates. On occasion, when the police have a strong suspicion of possible major disturbances based on the experience of previous years, a formal memorandum (detailing the problems and outlining strategy and operational tactics) will be drawn up and disseminated to all relevant police units so that preparations can be made well in advance.[14] Accompanying this may be a supervisor's memo surveying the historical/political background of the issue in question, so that the force is educationally equipped with the "whys" as well as the "whats," "whos," and "hows."

Specific "troublemaking" groups are also given special attention. One such group is the *Neturei Karta,* an ultra-fanatic community of Orthodox Jews who do not recognize the sovereignty of the State of Israel, and who indulge in sporadic outbursts of Sabbath rock throwing at all "transgressors." Here, for example, the *Neturei Karta*'s newspaper itself issues the calls for protest,[15] and the Israeli police make use of such easily available material. In addition, it has been occasionaly noted that units covering these protests (plus the aforementioned major disturbances) include an individual who takes no active part in controlling the crowds but rather collects data, presumably as an analytical tool in order to learn from any mistakes (or successful tactics).[16]

Many demonstrations, of course, are not a product of historical events but rather of pres-

ent headlines. Here, even more, police intelligence must resort to non-traditional means in order to be fully aware and prepared for the unexpected. Local branches are expected to report on anticipated unusual political or social events. Central headquarters will analyze the information and suggest courses of local police preparatory action.

An example of this occurred in 1977. The local Arad office sent a telegram to central headquarters warning of rumors which had a delegation of Negev Beduin coming to protest in front of the Knesset. In this case, the Jerusalem District police asked for immediate information as to the number of buses being used. As the buses left Beersheva (the central Negev city) the police there telegrammed that thirteen buses and thirty private cars (800 people) were on their way.[17] The Jerusalem police had the requisite manpower at the Knesset when the demonstration started.

On the other hand, when the newly elected Likud Government announced its New Economic Program in late October 1977 (effectively abolishing the foreign currency restrictions which had been in effect for 29 years), central police headquarters immediately sent out notices to the districts suggesting greater police vigilance since protests could be expected.[18] Nor is such sensitivity to the political environment limited to the domestic plane. Among other sources of information, the radio stations of contiguous enemy countries can easily be picked up in Israel and it would seem that these too are used for intelligence regarding possible unrest among certain sectors of the Israeli population. This is especially germane in light of the fact that Damascus, for example, has no compunctions about trying to stir up trouble among those beyond its immediate control, and it is only prudent that the Israeli police authorities prepare themselves accordingly.[19]

Similarly, much useful intelligence exists in the internal public domain: pamphlets, posters, flyers, etc., which call for public demonstrations are within easy reach for the police. In Israel, especially, much less of a logistical problem exists given the public announcement "columns" which abound in the street for just such purposes. On the other hand, however, there are additional problems—especially in a multilingual society such as Israel's where English and Arabic (among others) are used by large segments of the population. Thus, when necessary Israel's police force may even go so far as to translate protest flyers into Hebrew for its own internal use.[20]

Physical Preparation
Intelligence gathering is but the first preparatory step to getting ready for the demonstration. Once the information about potential protests is in hand, the Israeli police begin to physically prepare for the event itself. If the demonstration has been licensed and the police expect no untoward activity, their preparations are minor and routine: police barricades may be brought to the site, personnel are assigned, and a quick review of the conditions and courses of action will usually be undertaken by the commanding officer and his men. It is to the larger, non-licensed, and/or potentially disruptive protests that greater care is given.

In such cases, all personnel who are assigned to the scene(s) of the demonstration(s) may undergo dress rehearsal practice which takes into account all possible eventualities.[21] The commanding officers themselves will instruct the forces taking part in the operation, instructions which may range from the specific to the more general: means of communication, courses of action, overall administration, supervisory level policy, and other topics related to anticipated events.[22]

Communication, however, may not necessarily be limited to the internal plane. On occasion, the police will discuss the upcoming event with the leadership of those groups which are involved in the demonstrations.[23] This takes place up to a week before the event in question, so that there be no misunderstanding on the part of the demonstrators as to police readiness. In cases of strong suspicion ("clear information") that certain individuals intend to foment public disorder through the protest, they may be called in for questioning as a precautionary and cautionary measure.[24] However, in the event, it seems that prior detention and arrest is rarely effectuated; the few cases which the media have picked up on suggest that, if they do occur, such measures are effected as close in time to the protest event as possible.

As a further precaution, when deemed advisable the police will show a high profile well *before* the protest to make it clear that they are ready for all eventualities. However, such action clearly is intended not to have an inflam-

matory character about it.[26] Indeed, when the police suspect that such may be the result, the policy is reversed.[27] A low profile, though, does not mean none at all; a few police may be stationed some hours before the scheduled event as a low-key, but unmistakable, signal to the protesters.[28]

Finally, the police are well aware of the necessity for proper equipment. Water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, etc., are *hardly ever* used in Israel; the police force's policy is that of a firm hand in a velvet glove: "It is important that the police be equipped with the proper equipment for the dispersal of [illegal] demonstrations, so that they *not* need to use force."[29] (Emphasis theirs.)

Protest Action or Reaction
The actions of the Israeli police force *during* the protest events can be divided into two separate categories: preventing unruly demonstrations from deteriorating into serious breaches of the public order; containing and ending such public disorder when it does occur.

Deterioration Prevention
As has already been noted, the policy of Israel's police establishment is not to be tough or soft per se, but rather to use those tactics which will yield the desired results of maximum freedom and a minimum of violence—protester and police. To that end the police have certain policies and measures for the demonstration period itself.

When possible, Israel's police tend to come down on the side of "softness." In fact, at times this is considered by them to be somewhat of a problem! Various reports indicate that the zealots make fun of the police's handling of their protests, and are convinced that the constant weekly barrages take a mental toll of their uniformed adversaries. In short, they seem to interpret the non-arrest policy as a sign of weakness.[30] As a result, the police sporadically change their tactics to a harder line. The results are usually not long in coming —a drop in the frequency and especially the intensity of their protest. As a police officer summed it up at the end of one such protest/ reaction cycle: "there is now no doubt that overrestraint merely encourages the zealots."[31] Nevertheless, it would seem that overall the police in Israel are quite restrained in the matter of unlicensed demonstrations.[32]

At times, preventing a deterioration of the situation entails restraining or warning the *protestee.* When the zealots on the Sabbath block the roads leading to their neighborhood, the police will remove the illegal obstruction but will also place a patrolman at the site to urge drivers not to use that particular street— for their own good as well as the maintenance of public order.[33] Similarly, protests occurring near the residence of public personages elicit (among other things) an immediate communication from the police to the household (or individual) so that the person need not become unnecessarily entangled in the demonstration which may then get out of hand.[34]

Once matters do begin to get out of hand, the police do not usually hesitate in arresting the "troublemakers." Often, however, the arrests are tactical—bargaining chips to be used in the "negotiations" for dispersal of the unruly protest. Through this expedient the police send the clearest of signals ("arrest") that the protest must come to an end, while leaving the door ajar for a resolution where everyone is happy—negative *and* positive reinforcement together. At times the Israeli police will take the matter even one step further by making the leader of the group responsible for any further disturbances at the site. This is a tactic especially useful when such leadership is acknowledged by all, e.g., the ultra-religious zealots' rabbi.[35]

Most illegal protest demonstrations are not violent, but do try to disrupt the public order in order to gain maximum visibility. It is these types of "borderline" cases—where normal order must be restored but violent force is not advisable nor acceptable—which cause the Israeli (or any) police force the most tactical headaches. The predominant situation is a serious blockage of traffic. The police response is usually quite finely nuanced:

The first step is generally dialogue and persuasion, the speed and intensity of which is dependent on the importance and centrality of the traffic artery. If this does not achieve results, a large number of police are brought in quickly—including policewomen to deal with women protesters and their children—as well as police vehicles to carry off the arrested, police photographers to collect evidence, etc. Once these are in place, an "illegal protest" is declared out loud by the commanding officer or at his behest, and a limited but sufficient

amount of time is afforded the protesters so that they can disperse. At the end of such allotted time for voluntary dispersal, the police will use force to disperse those who remain, and this may include arrests and the opening of a criminal file.[36] In short, an overall policy of "measured escalation" is used by Israeli police —again, to allow for a peaceful conclusion or a tougher end for those who refuse to abide by the law.

Riot Containment

Once a full scale public disturbance erupts the police have no problem determining that something must be done; the problem of "what," however, remains.

While it is understood that no hard and fast policy can be promulgated for a phenomenon which by its very nature is out of control and changing rapidly, the Israeli police over time have had "unfortunately" enough experience of this type to develop an overall guiding plan of action. This too is grounded in the general policy of "measured escalation."

At first, the area surrounding the disturbance is cut off from other areas with the help of secondary forces (in Israel, these may include the Border Patrol, the Army, the Civil Defense, or even backup police units). Loudspeakers are brought in to aid in calming down the rioters. If unsuccessful, the police may form a spearhead to wedge into the mass, using physical force and arresting transgressors. Such a wedge may even include armoured personnel carriers. In particularly serious cases, tear gas is brought into play.[37]

It should be noted that the firing of guns, as the ultimate resort to force, is very rarely used by the Israeli police (only 59 out of the total 2102 cases in the 1950-1979 period). This is a direct result of its official severe circumscription which itself flows from the Jewish ethic of life as an ultimate value. The Israeli Army has from its pre-State days held fast to the notion of *Tohar Ha'neshek* ("purity of arms"), and this has obviously filtered down (and sideways) to the police force itself. The procedure for gaining permission to fire guns involves the very highest echelons (the District Chief of Police must give his OK, itself dependent on the imprimatur of Israel's Police Commissioner. The only exception to this is the immediate threat to, or saving of, a life.[38]

It would seem that the absolute minimum use of deadly weapons has served its purpose in Israel. Only one Jew has died in Israel's long and intense history of protest;[39] *no* police fatalities have been recorded.

Conclusions

Does the Israeli case fit into some wider pattern of police behavior? Undoubtedly yes. In his informative comparative essay on the Japanese and American police forces' response to public protest, Harold Holzman drew attention to a number of key factors which influenced such police behavior.[40] As can be readily seen, Israel's police force fits somewhere in between those two countries, albeit closer to the Japanese.

Holzman noted first that the Japanese culture is anti-violence, and this pertains to expectations regarding demonstrators and the police. Only a number of small left-wing groups condone violence as a protest tactic. The U.S., on the other hand, has a long history of violent demonstrations; violence is rooted in the American cultural fabric. For its part, Israel is similar to the Japanese. In the 1970s only 10.2% of the 1270 protests involved demonstrator violence.[41]

From an organizational standpoint, the Japanese police force is highly centralized, with a special elite unit (*Kidotai*) trained and used only for demonstrations and riots. The emphasis is on *Gaman* (self-control), professional discipline, and minimum discretion accorded to the individual officer by his superiors. Teamwork of the whole unit is stressed. The entire philosophy is *defensive*—never striking the first blow—even to the extent that counterviolence is rejected as a police tactic in riot situations.

The organization of America's police forces is quite different—total decentralization is the rule of thumb. Except for a few metropolises, no specially trained "anti-riot" forces exist. Jurisdictions are fragmented; reactions of the police tend to be random and on a contingency basis. There is, therefore, much unnecessary police violence and it is not unusual to find protester fatalities and/or injuries.

Israel's police organization, as we have seen, is a mixture of decentralization and centralization. Administratively the districts are semi-autonomous, but several strong links to central headquarters are to be found, chief of which is the authority of the Police Commissioner (not to mention Minister of Police) who

ensure a standardization and homogenization of police policy in the several districts. In addition, while no specific "demonstration/riot unit" exists in Israel, short training exercises for middle level officers (e.g., detectives) are given on a routine basis, and these individuals are called upon in especially problematic protests and/or disturbances.[42] Furthermore, as has been already noted, specific instructions are given to all policemen before the scheduled (or even unscheduled/unlicensed) event, with self-discipline, limited use of force, and non-provocation stressed at every turn. Thus, at least in Israel there does not seem to be pressure or the need for a special riot unit precisely because the regular units heretofore have been quite successful.

The Israeli police force's "success," then, in dealing with public protest is not a matter of luck. It is axiomatic that violence begets violence (no matter who starts it),[43] and the efforts to reduce police violence in Israel bear fruit in the relative circumspection of the other side.

It would be useful, therefore, to sum up in brief those policies and tactics which Israel's constabulary have in effect with regard to protest control. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does provide a wide range of actions which others could emulate and adapt to their own circumstances.

1. Licensing of protests, enabling the police to set the ground-rules before the event, and "forcing" the protest leadership to police themselves.
2. Acceptance and inculcation by the police of the relevant democratic norms: freedom of speech, assembly, etc.
3. As little political interference as possible—both from a legal, as well as actual/political standpoint.
4. Pre-protest intelligence gathering of a routinized nature, i.e., keeping track of "anniversaries," acquiring fringe group newspapers, etc.
5. Systematic learning from actual field experience. Getting reports from the scene which describe, analyze, and report on problems and/or successful tactics.
6. Keeping track of political intrigues and policy changes, through the political

"grapevine," or more mundanely, through public posters, flyers, etc. (even if the latter require translation or interpretation.)
7. Heightened sensitivity to external developments which might foment internal public unrest.
8. Physical preparations prior to the protest event, e.g., dress rehearsal accompanied by specific instructions.
9. Communication with the protest leadership regarding expectations, potential problem areas, etc.
10. Precautionary interrogation and even detention if there exists clear evidence of intention to disrupt or disregard the conditions of the protest license.
11. Maintaining a sufficient police profile to "warn" the protesters of police presence without influencing the participants.
12. Proper equipment which enables the police to control events without the use of undue force.
13. A general "soft" approach, except where such is proven to be ineffective or counter-productive.[44]
14. Early warnings given to the protest *addressee* so that further complications need not ensue as a result of an accidental encounter with the protesters.
15. Legally arresting (for sufficient cause) some protesters, to be used as bargaining chips by the police in any on-the-spot negotiations for dispersal of the protest.
16. A policy of "measured escalation"—warnings, followed by light force, followed by arrests,etc.—to enable the protesters to extricate themselves or to know precisely what the consequences are of non-compliance.
17. A similar policy during riots, except with greater force and speed: encirclement, warnings, police wedge, arrests, and finally tear gas or other non-lethal agent.
18. A publicly-stated, strictly enforced policy of non-use of guns except with the full and explicit authorization from the highest police echelons and/or circumstances involving immediate danger to life.
19. Special training of selected forces to be called upon in the more difficult protest situations.

In conclusion, it might be asked whether this overall policy and resulting success is appreciated or even recognized by the public at large. Is the 70% "correct" police reaction rate reflected in the public consciousness? At least in Israel, such a question can be answered with a resounding affirmative. When asked—"In your opinion, how does the Israeli police force deal with protest?"—fully 51.7% answered "as it should," with most of the rest virtually evenly split between "overreaction" and "underreaction."[45] Overall, this is remarkably similar to the "reality" in the field.

In the final analysis, then, the Israeli police work hard at their job of enabling protest to thrive without unduly upsetting the public order—and the public itself seems to appreciate that fact. In Israel, at least, when it comes to protest the police definitely do perform a public service—in all senses of that much maligned term. It is, however, a service borne of organization, thought-out policy, meticulous planning, and hard work.

Footnotes

[1]S. Barnes and M. Kaase, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).

[2]S. Lehman-Wilzig, "The Israeli Protester," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, Number 26 (Winter 1983).

[3]S. Lehman-Wilzig, "Public Protest and Its Economic Factors [Hebrew], *Riv'on Le'Kalkalah [The Economic Quarterly]*, No. 114 (September 1982): 277.

[4]S. Lehman-Wilzig and G. Goldberg, "Religious Protest and Police Reaction in a Theo-Democracy: Israel, 1950-1979," *The Journal of Church and State* (forthcoming).

[5]One additional result should be noted. During the first decade the police tended to underreact. As the decades continue the balance is increasingly restored. The 1970s were marked by a very small over-reaction tendency. For a fuller elaboration of the relevant data, see G. Goldberg and S. Lehman-Wilzig, "The Authorities' Reaction to Public Protest in Israel" [Hebrew], forthcoming in *Megamot [Social Trends]*.

[6]See for example H.R. Holzman, "Violence and Dissent: A Comparative Analysis of Police Control of Protest Demonstrations in Japan and the U.S.," *Abstracts on Police Science* 5 (November-December 1977): 337-51; H.M. Kritzer, "Political Protest and Political Violence: A Nonrecursive Causal Model," *Social Forces* 55 (March 1977): 630-40; P. Moodie, "The Use and Control of the Police," in *Direct Action and Democratic Politics*, ed. R. Benewick and J. Smith (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 231-47; A. Paul Hare, "A Dramaturgical Analysis of Street Demonstrations: Washington, D.C., 1971 and Cape Town, 1976," *Group Psychotherapy, Psychodrama, and Sociometry* 33 (n.d.): 92-112.

[7]To be exact, there were 2076 numbered items not including the last half of 1981 where the files are not complete, but in many cases one "number" included several (at times tens of) documents related to that particular protest event. All such items will be listed here as JDA (Jerusalem District Archives), year, volume, and number. Where no number is listed the exact date will be supplied.

[8]It might be argued that other semi-autonomous districts have specific policies which differ from those of Jerusalem. However, while the differences in nuance do exist, overall strategy is much the same in all the other districts. This is because there is a central headquarters which outlines general policy, and that inter-district communication on the protest phenomenon is institutionalized and on-going (more on this later in the paper). In addition, discussions with police personnel from the Tel Aviv District support this contention; they are aware of the policies in the other districts and discuss them with their counterparts. The Jerusalem District is unrepresentative only in that it has had more experience dealing with the problem than other districts. As a model, however, this is an advantage.

It should be also noted here that the internal data are by and large buttressed by the Israeli media's reporting of police behavior over time. Indeed, as shall become clear further in the paper, the media may be the only source for substantiating or strongly indicating what may be merely hinted at in the internal police correspondence. As a result, this study does use the extrinsic method as well, when for various reasons the internal material is not sufficient or cannot be reported upon due to security considerations. The two central extrinsic approaches of this study are media reports, and (less systematic but more "objective") personal eyewitness at some selected demonstrations. For an in-depth discussion and experiment of this latter approach, see A. Paul Hare, cited above.

[9]JDA, 1977, I, 8-9. All translations are the author's. This policy tends to follow the guidelines set down by J.L. LeGrande: "The police philosophy in such matters should show an understanding of the social conflict, but should be concerned primarily with the maintenance of civil order and public safety, while at the same time assuring that maximum lawful expression of the individual is permitted." See his "Nonviolent Civil Disobedience and Police Enforcement Policy," *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, 58 (1967): 400.

[10]JDA, August 27, 1978.

[11]JDA, 1980, I, 19. See too 1979, VI, 503 (erroneously listed in the files as 303).

[12]For example, the Prime Minister's Office asking the police to place future protesters on the side of the office which least disturbs the Prime Minister's work (JDA, 1980, I, 27); the Ministry of Education asking the police to inform it of licenses granted for demonstrations against the ministry itself, so that plans could be made to allow for continued functioning of the office (JDA, 1980, I, 33).

[13]There is no denying that Israel's police force is sensitive to the political environment. W.A. Gamson and E. Yuchtman describe the political relationship which does exist. See "Police and Society in Israel," in *Police and Society*, ed. David H. Bayley (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 203-04. My findings suggest too that there is some political sensitivity; police reaction to religious protest becomes "softer" when the religious parties are in the governing coalition, and are softest of all when a religious minister controls the police portfolio. See Lehman-Wilzig and Goldberg, "Religious Protest and Reaction." On the religious protest issue specifically, see Gamson and Yuchtman, p. 211.

[14]JDA, 1977, I, 52-57.

[15]JDA, 1979, II, 133.

[16]Ibid.

[17]JDA, 1977, I, 70-72.

[18]JDA, 1977, IV, 236-244.

[19]It is unclear whether such information sources are monitored by the police themselves, by other security forces, or by independent channels who then report back.

[20]For English into Hebrew see JDA, 1978, V, 252; for Arabic into Hebrew see 1978, VI, 367.

[21]JDA, March 23, 1977, par. 15.

[22]Ibid., pars. 19a and b.

[23]Ibid., par. 8b1.

[24]Ibid., par. 8b2.

[25]Ibid., par. 8c6.

[26]Ibid., par. 8b3.

[27]JDA, 1979, II, 133.

[28]JDA, 1979, II, 128 (Conclusion, sect. 3b).

[29]JDA, 1975, VI, 362 (sect. E3).

[30]JDA, 1979, II, 128 (sects. 1 and 2).

[31]JDA, 1979, II, 148 (sects. 4a and b).

[32]Ibid., (sects. E1 and 2). Gamson and Yuchtman concur: "the police claim that they will not usually intervene in a technically 'illegal' demonstration (one without a permit) unless the demonstration disrupts traffic or the demonstrators employ violence." p. 212. They too note that the Israeli police are loathe to interfere when protest groups occupy government offices.

[33]JDA, 1978, IV, 189–191 (par. 4).

[34]JDA, 1978, V, 326–327 (sect. 1c).

[35]JDA, 1979, I, 9 (sect. 5).

[36]JDA, 1979, III, 269.

[37]JDA, March 23, 1977, par. 13d.

[38]Ibid., pars. 11a and b.

[39]Israeli *Arab* protests—with their quite different set of emotional, security, logistical, and other considerations—are somewhat of a different matter. While no exact statistics could be obtained with regard to Arab fatalities during protest demonstrations, the number seems to be relatively minimal here too. It should be noted that the aforementioned 59 cases where the guns were fired by the Israeli police include all Arab protests as well.

[40]Holzman, cited above.

[41]S. Lehman-Wilzig, "Public Protest and Systemic Stability in Israel: 1960-1979," in *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora*, ed. S. Lehman-Wilzig and B. Susser (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1981), p. 191. The 1960s had a 15.4% violence rate.

[42]JDA, 1981, II, 356.

[43]H.M. Kritzer, pp. 638-39. "The primary determinant of violence by one side is violence by the other side. Violence by the police appears to be somewhat more important in determining protester violence (1.05) than vice versa (.73); however, this difference may not be statistically significant."

[44]Legrande, p. 401, notes: "It must be recognized that the goals of the police may be accomplished by means other than the application of a strict enforcement policy."

[45]15.5% answered "a bit too weakly" while 14.0% said a bit too harshly; 6.7% retorted "much too weakly" while 4.7% thought "much too harshly." 7.4% did not respond. The poll was conducted by Dr. Minah Zemach under the auspices of the DAHAF agency. The sample included 1250 Israeli adults, excluding the kibbutz and Arab sectors.