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Under Fire: Framing Classic and ‘New Patriotism’ in Israel’s Elite and Popular Press during the El-Aqsa Intifada and World Trade Center Terror Attacks

Group solidarity and structural stability are necessary conditions for the existence of any society in which individuals acknowledge and respect each other’s culture, and conduct their lives in a spirit of mutual commitment. Patriotic feelings are a nationalist facet of this commitment. For years there has been a clear trend in research to present the phenomenon of patriotism as a positive expression of nationalism all around the world, embodied in flag, leader, currency, football team, army, national anthem, and so on (Jinxia & Mangan, 2001; Nicholson, 2001; Latzzonek, 2001; Boyer, 2001; Zelenkov, 2001).

But changes taking place in today’s world, such as globalization, are challenging the cultural, ethnic, and modernistic concepts that are the foundation of familiar national and patriotic identities. Faced with the outbreak and spread of terrorism, counter-forces are being created to preserve and shore up ‘old’ concepts of loyalty. This article will examine the patriotic media discourse in an age of global and localized terrorism. We shall try to answer the question of how terror attacks influence the way the patriotic discourse is framed within the Israeli media.

A New Patriotism – A New Nationalism

Nationalism, according to the ethno-centric research approach, is an ancient cultural phenomenon, rooted in the very soul of the citizen, whereby group identity is defined on an ethnic basis (Smith, 1986, 1991). Nationalism crystallizes around ancient cultural tradition that supplies a clearly and widely understood language for interpersonal communication (Triandaflidou, 1998).
Among the building blocks of nationalism we find materials from culture past and present - from 19th century art and music (Howkins, 1989; Barari, 1989), to 20th century cinema and theater. Nor should we ignore the part played by sport: games of football, basketball, and so on have always served as a focus for popular nationalist identification (Jinxia & Mangan, 2001).

Attempts to focus on ideological principles served, and still serve, as a method for getting psychological and moral support for the army (Zelenkov, 2001). We attribute to the feeling of patriotism great influence on political, public, and economic life, and on the glorification of national interests.

Challenging the primordial-ethnic concept of nationalism, a modernist school of thought has developed. Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner argued that nationalism is a functional replacement for community frameworks undermined by modern life. Far from being “natural” or “primal”, nationalism is merely an artificial construct, an “invention”, whose purpose is to create continuity and attachment. Thus, “nationalistic” societies of the past were illusory, not real societies (Anderson, 1992). The national story is a tradition purposely invented to supply a master frame that makes sense for systematic understanding of historical events.

In the 1990s, along with the idea of imaginary societies, the idea of “global nationalism” appeared on the scene (Greenfeld, 1992), with increasing emphasis being laid on economic globalization and the growing influence of the new media on reduction of the state’s involvement and economic abilities (Held, 1996). There is a revival in common interests, but in the form of civic nationalism, or patriotism, in reaction to ethno-nationalism (Shabani, 2002). New times are wakening civic patriotism, which tends to be cosmopolitan and global.

Global cosmopolitanism is feasible when supported by the constitutional framework of “constitutional patriotism”, a term formulated by Jurgen Habermas in his book Between Facts and Norms (1996). Habermas describes the decay of the nation-state as the ground from which a feeling of identification and involvement came into being. Western society, according to Habermas, has been plunged into a severe identity crisis, caused by the long drawn-out conflict between the constitutional system – which subscribes to a legal framework for communal life – and individuals in society feeling that the law no longer defends their interests. The outcome of this constitutional breakdown is the increasing detachment of citizens from the framework of the state. Since Habermas identifies the shrinking of the nation-state with a reduction in its managerial functions, he proposes a model of “constitutional patriotism” – creating a kind of national identity attached to a constitution rather than to territory, history, or state. Such a system would allow only a bare minimum of nationalism, but would create bonds between the individual, other people, and the world.

Five years later, in a new book The Postnational Constellation (2001), Habermas describes the growing danger to feelings of identity as the global network gains permanence. Habermas describes how feelings of identity are imperiled by the growing consolidation of the global network. The blurring of national borders by international corporations and the atomization of the household. Although the global economy is much more complex and dynamic, it must be accepted that the state is the dominant power, although its power is no longer absolute. Furthermore, the concept of national identity is weakened by the blurring of national borders.

It must be noted that the national concept, American Nationality: The Constitution (1787), is a legal and political matter of asset, identity, and culture, but it was an American practice for decades and years groups and classes to define and appropriate their own national identities.

Cecilia Elmeskog demonstrates that the national identity and the nationality of registration are also essential factors, and until World War I, these were essential factors in the national identity. With the birth of the Nazi and Fascist movements, the national identity is strengthened, and it is used to solve critical social and political problems.

It appears that national identities are no longer based on geography, but instead on cultural, social, and political factors. This is a new development in the history of national identity, and it is likely to have a significant impact on the future of American society. The weakening of the national identity is likely to have a significant impact on the future of American society. The weakening of the national identity is likely to have a significant impact on the future of American society.

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corporations and global organizations are leading to dissolution of the state’s autonomy. Although the sovereignty of the state remains formally intact, the congruence of state borders and nationally based societies in the future is being called into question. Furthermore, the weakening of the state undermines its ability to act as an axis for identity formation, exposing a real obligation to develop alternative mechanisms of cohesion.

It must be pointed out that in contradistinction to Habermas’s European-centered concept, American patriotism follows a somewhat different formula. According to the Constitution (before its amendment in the wake of the Civil War), being American was a matter of assent. Anyone consenting to obey the law, pay taxes, and do military service was an American. From the end of the Civil War up to today, we can trace the birth of various groups and movements aiming to forge a “true” American (McClymer, 2002).

Cecilia Elizabeth O’Leary, surveying this process in her book, To Die For (1999), demonstrates the paradox between American political ideas and the persistence of a national identity. Unlike other nation-states, argues O’Leary, the United States administration scarcely played a role in fostering patriotic sentiment amongst its citizens until World War I. During the whole of the nineteenth century it was not anchored in an established church, it developed no national educational system, it did not decide on a national anthem, nor did it extend patronage to the 4th of July celebrations. A patriotic vacuum could be said to characterize the United States up until World War I, but the war changed this situation. The Wilson administration used aggressive tactics to solve critical questions concerning American patriotism and to infuse identity-forming agents, such as the press, the cinema, and the theater, with patriotic content.

It appears that nothing is more effective in arousing a nation than wars, while peace between peoples is a national soporific. With this in mind, globalization, with its potential for establishing peace between nations, creates suspicion and tension in America. There is suspicion of undue reliance on external military forces and the weakening of the nation’s defense abilities, which leads to an anti-global show of patriotism (Craigie, 1996).

However, aside from this patriotic opposition to globalization, America is in a state of waning patriotism. The old rallying points – the Civil War, World War II, the Cold War – have gone. America needs to design “new pillars” (Schaub, 1999) for itself. Therefore, being an American patriot means to be a proud and loyal American, while not expressing one’s personal identity in terms of the nation. On the contrary: American patriotism has typically proclaimed itself as supported by a shared ethos, with no need to resort to oppressive measures. But when personal interest focuses on material values (the ability to make money), and makes these the glue of patriotism, sense of community and care for the welfare of others vanish (Wilfred, 2001).

However, the events of September 2001 placed a big question mark over the deterministic processes outlined above; the outbreak of Islamic terrorism that has posed a threat to the whole world since that day demands new thinking about the whole concept of patriotism.
Presentation: Framing Packages

Since terrorist attacks typically arouse fear, they lead almost instinctively to uniting anew around the nation-state and its leaders, to "rallying 'round the flag", as the saying goes. We refer to the American public's tendency to put aside political differences and support the President during international crises. Evidence in support of this is given in Karamanski's (1993) analysis of the Civil War, in the support given to the President by the public with regard to military action between 1950-1984 (Lian & Oneal, 1993), in President Carter's handling of the Iran hostage crisis (Callahan & Virtanen, 1993) and so on.

There is evidence that this phenomenon gains the most strength when such rallying is linked to declarations from the White House, and when the administration's policy has bipartisan support. In addition, the extent of the rally depends above all on the way in which the crisis is presented to the public, i.e., by its media coverage (Baker & Oneal, 2001), by the framing of the crisis.

Early in the 1970s, Erving Goffman (1974) laid the groundwork for the theory of "framing", which proposes a method of structuring meanings by organizing the process of interpreting events. The theory rests on the premise that reality is no more than the concepts, attitudes and opinions of the writer describing it. In describing reality, the writer relates to the world of the senses, of feelings, and of myths, that accompany the concrete subject. People organize, or "frame" everyday life in order to understand and react to social phenomena.

Framing theory received its most significant improvement and adaptation from Snow and Benford (1992). They defined framing as an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or past environment (1992, p. 137). They also argue that there is a "master frame", a relatively stable configuration of ideas, elements, and symbols that act as a kind of grammar through which collective action is elucidated.

Framing is analyzed, then, by describing the process of creating meanings and elements of persuasion vital to both collective action and to cognitive processes (Benford, 1997). There is, for example, the framing of collective action in relation to social movements, that focuses on the dynamics of movements (Benford & Snow, 2000); or study of how framing dominates political processes, and models of resource mobility (Steinberg, 1999). Such studies analyze various media genres, such as news programs, political caricatures, etc. (Greenberg, 2002).

The basic premise of these analyses is that the media construct various frames for covering various events; the main rationale for the premise being that reporters' attitudes and values influence the way they write (Parenti, 1986; Hess, 1996; Schoemaker & Reese, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997). More attention is paid to the way media content is organized, and to the media background, than to the power of their influence. Very strong interaction is shown between the shaping of the text, the journalists' opinion,
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and the opinion of the political elite (Entman, 1991). According to Robinson (2000), interaction of this kind can even make it possible to foresee how the media will influence government policy.

However, formatting information is open to intentional manipulation. One kind of manipulation is creating “packages of meanings” (Jensen & Janowski, 1995), that form a uniform social reality open to one interpretation only. Outstanding among the groups that have understood the importance of exploiting the media to create awareness and transmit a message are terrorist organizations.

A common argument in communications research is that technological advances in the media have led to much faster transmission of information and news, a rise in the number of viewers, and the ability to broadcast from places previously considered too distant and remote for media coverage. Consequently there has been a dramatic rise in international terrorist incidents (Weimann & Winn, 1994). In the “theater of terror”, the terrorists choose the script for an incident, as well as the stage and the players, and they stage/direct every moment of the event very precisely. The journalists who cover – or comment on – the “theater of terror” draw attention to the players, thereby creating, or reinforcing, myths of heroic victims, and inflame the thirst/hunger for revenge (Lule, 1991). Using the language of myth is not the only method of “framing” a terrorist incident. Documentary or didactic rhetoric can also be used to influence the way the news is received by the public (Picard, 1991).

But what happens to “master framing” in complex situations where there is no shared mythological story? Situations in which there are several conflicting narratives? To put it more precisely, how will the patriotic discourse be framed in a multifaceted media arena?

**A Case Study of Two Events**

Two cases were chosen to test the question of framing for patriotic discourse. The first is the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center; the second is the outbreak of the El-Aqsa Intifada in Israel. There are, of course, obvious differences between the two incidents: the duration of the incident, the number of people killed, the terrorist organization behind the attacks, the modus operandi, etc. There are differences between the two states involved: Israel has been subjected to thousands of terrorist incidents ever since its foundation, and has accumulated experience in dealing with them – for instance, massive enlistment of support from the media. From these differences we may be able to better understand how local and global patriotism is resorted to and used.

**The El-Aqsa Intifada**

On the 13th September 1993, an agreement was signed in Washington including mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. This agreement, commonly known as Oslo One, dealt with interim arrangements preparatory to the establishment of an independent Palestinian government in Gaza and Jericho. Two years later, on the 28th September 1995, a second interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was
signed. This one dealt with security arrangements, elections to the Palestinian Council, transfer of authority, legal topics, economic relations, and cooperation between the two sides. However, on the 4th of November that same year the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated by a Jewish assailant. Notwithstanding the trauma and subsequent change of government, another three substantial agreements were signed between the two sides: the Hebron Agreement, (1997), the Wye Memorandum (1998), and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum (1999).

On September 28, 2000, MK Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, sparking the Eh-Aqsa Intifada—which had been well planned beforehand—and a violent conflagration ensued.

Since that day, life in Israel routinely includes shooting incidents, suicide attacks, and violent disorder. Between then and August 2002 the number of people killed in terrorist attacks, according to the National Insurance Institute, was 619. One hundred eighty-three of these were soldiers or members of the security forces; the remaining 436 were civilians. 4,497 people have been injured in two years of terrorism—3,201 civilians and 1,296 soldiers and members of the security forces. During this period, according to the Red Crescent, 21,375 Palestinians were hit; 1,726 of these were killed, 19,649 injured.

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center

On the 11th September 2001, at 8:46 a.m., the United States was attacked from the air by four airplanes piloted by suicidal hijackers. The attacks resulted in the collapse of the gigantic twin towers of the World Trade Center; an entire wing of the Pentagon was destroyed; later that day, another 47-story skyscraper collapsed in the area of the World Trade Center in the aftermath of the first collapse. Two thousand eight hundred twenty-three people were killed in New York that day.

The shock was great for several reasons. First and most obviously, this was the worst attack on American shores (from the standpoint of loss of life) in American history. Second, the terror attack struck at the core symbols of American power and strength: capitalism (WTC towers) and military might (Pentagon). Presumably, the White House or Congress would have been attacked too if not for the heroic efforts of the passengers on the fourth hijacked plane. Third and finally, it seriously undermined the ethos of multi-culturalism and mutual tolerance that had gradually evolved in America since the 1960s. Here was a specific ethno-religious group—Arab Muslims—targeting Americans for being American.

In any case one of the most patriotic peoples on Earth, American society—as well as the general press (print and electronic)—responded with a patriotic fervor (some would say frenzy) not seen in at least several decades. On Main Street, the American flag appeared everywhere. In the media, the overall story captured the press's almost exclusive attention for several weeks, only to give way to its extension—the military campaign in Afghanistan to uproot Al-Qaeda and their hosts the Taliban.
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But the consequences were/are probably longer-lasting than weeks and months. Eighteen months after the attacks, America and the world were still preoccupied with major issues of terror and security (in addition to Al-Qaeda, Iraq, North Korea, Chechnya), and the problems may only get worse as weapons of mass destruction become more easily available to terrorist groups (potentially from North Korea and in the future, even Iran). In short, Sept. 11, 2001 may well have marked a seismic shift in world politics — reinforcing both centripetal forces (greater local patriotism) and centrifugal forces (globalization through greater international cooperation on the diplomatic and security fronts).

It is to the complex interplay between the two that this article devotes its attention, based on the Israeli case study — a country no less caught in the vortex between local and international security and political exigencies.

Methodology

The aim of this study is to answer the question of how terrorist attacks affect the framing of patriotic discourse in the Jewish-Israeli media environment. Our methodology derives from the corpus of critical research, while our aim is to focus attention on the cultural meanings operating below the technological surface, to create a tool for developing the targets of ideation (Sayer, 1992; Gunter, 2000).

In order to study the traits and significance of terrorism, and its practical effect on patriotic discourse in the press, we make use of critical discourse analysis, which is different in essence from statistical analysis (Wodak, 2001). It focuses on understanding the processes of change in society, politics, and identities, as undergone by a particular society (Fraser, 1992), by identifying the hidden targets of the participants, and locating power centers in the society (Van Dijk, 2001).

The practice we have followed in studying the above phenomena is to use the discourse unit “patriot”. For our purpose, the discourse unit is defined as a word string (a phrase, a sentence, a group of sentences, containing the term “patriot” in all its inflections) that appears in a newspaper article and epitomizes the journalist’s attitude, whether critical or supportive, to patriotic behavior. As our aim is to understand the overt meaning of the utterance by means of linguistic signs and clues, our study has not centered on known and accepted expressions of patriotism. We shall not deal with national symbols such as flag, anthem etc., but with the changing meaning of patriotism, because our intention is simply to study the structure of the discourse by means of discourse processing.

Thus, in order to interpret the underlying structure of the world of patriotic discourse in the press, we studied the overt and covert meanings attached to the term by Jewish Israelis; the rationale for support or criticism displayed in connection with these meanings, and how they are used; and trends in change of content, in the rationale for support/criticism of the world of patriotic discourse in the wake of local and global terrorist attacks. Pursuing these three aims should help us to decode the underlying structure of the world of patriotic discourse in the press.
Israelis generally see the El-Aqsa Intifada as a continuous period of local terrorism that began on 30th September 2000, and which is not yet over. Meanwhile, since 11th September 2001, the whole world has been undergoing terrorist attacks all over the globe. We have therefore built a dual-stage study on the basis of “before” and “after”.

Stage 1 – In order to understand the effect of local terrorist attacks on the Israeli-Jewish discourse of patriotism, we examined the framing of this discourse before the outbreak of the El-Aqsa Intifada (between 30th September 1999 – 30th September 2000) and after (between 30th September 2000 – 11th September 2001).

Stage 2 – In order to understand the effect of local terrorism on the Israeli-Jewish nationalistic discourse, we examined the framing of this discourse before the anti-American terrorist attack (between 11th September 2000 – 11th September 2001) and after the attack (11th September 2001 – 30th September 2002).

The material analyzed includes the entire content of two main Israeli dailies, i.e., news, opinion, business, finance, leisure, sport, art and culture. The two papers are an elite paper “for thinking people”, Ha’aretz; and a popular daily, Ma’ariv. The study covered three years.

Although we defined four periods in our study, we must point out that in practice there are only three, since the year 30.9.2000 – 30.9.2001 covers the period after the outbreak of local violence in Israel and also the period before the start of global violence.

Framing Patriotism

The most outstanding and unequivocal finding in quantitative terms is that patriotic discourse is more prominent in the popular press (1051 articles), and far less in the elite press (a mere 190 articles). It also turns out that in both the period of anti-Israeli terrorism and the period of anti-American terrorism the extent of this discourse increases. The increase is in the scope and depth of direct discussions about the nature of patriotism as well as in the indirect use of the term. Simply put, during a time of terrorism, patriotic discourse becomes more fashionable (see note).

Apart from this, a more searching examination shows that this discourse is neither uniform nor homogenous, and that its framing package consists of two main parts: the local and the global. From here on, we shall try to clarify what this patriotism is, how it is presented, what use is made of it, and to what ends.

The Framing of National Patriotism around the World

Manifestations of national patriotism framing around the world in the period classified as pre-intifada is admiring but skeptical. In the popular press, there are effusive reports on the British people’s admiration for their DJs (Geffen, 1999) and the automobile of Special Agent James Bond (Paz-Melamed, 2000); on the patriotism maintained by the Dutch press in its coverage of the European football championships (Ziv & Avidor, 1999); and on the Americans’ use of the colors of their flag on cans of Campbell’s soup in a successful marketing campaign, because “American citizens cannot remain indifferent to this salute to patriotism” (Paz-Melamed, 1999).
The elitist press, however, takes a more judicious stand. Whereas the Americans win its support and admiration for the way dog owners in the U.S. voluntarily handed over their dogs to help troops in Vietnam (Kupfer, 1999), and the Australians win praise for their display of patriotism in a solar-powered car race (Gil’ad, 1999), patriotic outrage expressed in Turkey after a severe earthquake is criticized as encouraging feelings of helplessness and an atmosphere of “losing all restraint” (Shavit, 1999a).

During the first year of the intifada, references to manifestations of patriotism around the world vanished almost completely from the popular press. In the elitist press, on the other hand, the judicious attitude remains, but now elitist ridicule is aimed at American political patriotism: ...but the ocean of flags has become a national joke ... once, one flag was enough; now half a dozen at least are de rigueur (Bruni, 2000).

The same ridicule is directed, incidentally, at the English — whose xenophobia is a harmful and distorted version of patriotism — as they cheer for the English sports teams at away games (Hughes, 2001). Europe, it appears, has always been characterized by a tribal patriotism where sport is concerned (Laor, 2001).

Immediately after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the popular press wrote that the stunned and mourning American public have united around patriotic sentiment in an attempt to find some consolation. One outward piece of evidence for this was the scope of sales of the national flag all over the country. “Wal-Mart, the world’s largest supermarket chain, reported sales of 88,000 flags in one day, compared to 6,000 on a regular day” (Simhi, 2001). The Israeli press went so far as to note that even the New York Stock Exchange opened for business in the hope that the wave of patriotism sweeping America would save the collapsing share prices (Lipkin & Kessler, 2001).

But the patriotic sentiment is accompanied by fear (Talpaz, 2001), and that, in turn, creates more fear-based patriotism (Kessler, 2001a). Nevertheless, or perhaps because of this, when the Americans are scared, patriotism swells their chests as they sing “America the Beautiful” (Kessler, 2001b). The same shell-shocked feeling fosters waves of economic patriotism (Eisenberg, 2001).

The Israeli elitist press is much more critical, and voices a fear that a distorted patriotism might accompany the commemoration of the WTC attack (Keller, 2001). This suspicion is mingled with snide references to cultural phenomena such as Arnold Schwarzenegger’s appearance on the Jay Leno show: Schwarzenegger hoisted a big American flag, the audience cheered and got to its feet for him, as he declared in his heavy Austrian accent that he had never been so proud to be an American (Klein, 2003).

Another public demonstration of the way people have rallied together is the countrywide proliferation of billboards saying, “We are all united”, and “I’m a proud American” as portrayed by Handwerker (2002a). Even the success of Fox Television is interpreted as sign of a growing conservative trend in America and a weakening of the left-liberal media’s control over American television, now thirsty for more patriotic, “values-oriented” news (Handwerker, 2002b). In other words, patriotism is “psychological group therapy” (Handwerker, 2001) and September 11 established itself as a
never-failing source for declarations of loyalty to national values (Shamir, 2002). We must make it clear that while the flood of American patriotism is presented as the solution to an economic crisis, similar outpourings of patriotism in Communist China and Russia continue to be presented as a manipulative tactical exercise carried out by the Party.

The Framing of National Patriotism in Israel

Revelations of Israeli national patriotism during the period classified as pre-Intifada are shaped by a framing package both nostalgic and critical. On the one hand, there is open contempt for old-style nationalism, and on the other, there is nostalgia for the old, disappearing world.

On the popular press front, Israeli television is accused of continuing to serve the system, because its patriotism is stale, formulaic and vague, and because its intellectual level is low. “A stupid patriot is worse than a cruel enemy” declared Baruch (1999a). The open sneers at the 1950s love of motherland, when the media were an extension of the administration, and when keeping silent was equated with patriotism—these are mingled with happiness that the Supreme Court saved the situation and brought us back to reality (Baruch, 1999b). This same love of country is presented as a cover-up for national covetousness, for lying to ourselves, and for settlements that have been from the start an encroachment on our neighbor, at times even flouting the law (Alloni, 1999). Anyone who continues to educate his/her children this way and keeps quiet about questionable laws of the country is portrayed in the media as someone committing a very grave error (Goren, 2000), a believer in a collection of hollow cliches from old men living in a world that no longer exists in reality (Shaliev, 2000), a poor man with nowhere to run (Baruch, 2000a).

On the elitist front, too, admiration compounded with scorn is prominent—wherever money is concerned, Israelis like to boast about their wealthy achievers and sprout patriotic feelings (Rohnik, 2000), but understand that this kind of patriotism is part of the “old values”, which are connected with terms such as “decent behavior”, “contributing”, and above all, “the dream that floundered” (Shavit, 1999b), a patriotism that “had its day” (Lavie, 1999).

In the course of the Intifada’s first year, the popular press was glad to note the return of the good patriot, and the framing package of national patriotism was renewed: Many people celebrating a special occasion ask the DJ to play only Hebrew songs, as a sort of declaration of patriotism ... one has to celebrate, after all ... so they play hora medleys, and get the public on its feet and enjoying itself in spite of it all (Assaf & Shachar, 2000).

Cultural expressions of the renewed patriotism are evident in musical preferences on radio programs: “If you’re longing for a good old nostalgic Hebrew song, especially these days, when radio stations are playing lots of old war songs, check out your Napster” recommends Ma’arriv (2001). Even young songwriters are going back to

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values (Shamir, 2002). We learned that patriotism is presented as the social glue in Communist China despite the exercise carried out by the state to classify it as pre-intifada patriotism. On the one hand, there is the nostalgia for the past. On the other hand, there is a need to continue serving the state because its intellectual decay is not as explicit as it was in the past. The media are an instrument to express this emotional need. In the past, the media were an instrument to express the national spirit and to promote patriotism. Today, the situation is different. The media are used to promote the state and its achievements. The media are seen as a tool to promote the state and its achievements. The media are used to promote the state and its achievements.

The New-style Patriotism Frame – Early Signs

During the first year of the intifada, unmistakable voices begin to be heard calling for a new patriotism. At first, there was a show of force from the old loyalties and values, but gradually the groundwork for the new “civil patriotism” was laid down. The first signs of this new patriotism can be found, perhaps, in the criticism of the media, which were still representing the government’s point of view, although the Israeli was not likely to fall apart if his government is subjected to a critical look. A second and different look is not the opposite of patriotism, but rather a spiritual and political necessity for the good patriot (Baruch, 2000).

At this point, the government is increasingly accused of playing the patriot card as a cover for political and other interests (Benn, 2001), and for the first time objection is heard to the “silly rule” enforcing the singing of the national anthem before every game in the basketball league (Bros, 2001b). Yet the new patriotism still has some fear of being called disloyal. Hence, “blue-white“ is tagged on a recommendation even to a Thai restaurant, “so they won’t accuse us of being unpatriotic and betraying the State,” quotes Shamir (2001).

In an age of “intelligent patriotism” (Baruch, 2001a), nationalism is presented as the reverse of normality (Harel, 2001). The “authentic patriotism” identified with “the man in the street” is described as ridiculous, as causing sobbing and wailing in times of crisis (Baruch, 2001b). But still: At a time of military emergency public television changes its look, its language, and its pulse. No one announces the change. There is no need for an announcement. The change takes place of its own accord. A patriot
knows without being told when he must act, and how. At a time of military crisis television volunteers its services and enlists others. It is patriotic. It sorts through “the Israelis” and marks out who is truly Israeli and who is not. It even presses some of the entertainment and leisure sections into service for the emergency (Baruch, 2001c).

The pendulum also swings between attraction and repulsion in the elitist press, which is committed to the creation of a civil patriotism, and wishes to establish here an ethical place whose existence is founded on love of man (Levi, 2002). “[Especially] now, when our political leaders have lost all shame, have prostituted themselves and let us down, there is a task for people in the educational and legal professions, in the humanities and in universities, for religious and community leaders, leading journalists… and the task is to show civic patriotism and responsibility; to foster shared ethical and cultural awareness that will provide the public with positive standards/yardsticks for the existence of a worthy democratic life,” warns Aloni (2001a). Hence, he concludes, “educational policy in Israel is anti-Zionist and lacking in even elementary patriotism” (Aloni, 2001b).

The terrorist destruction of the WTC posed a challenge to the new patriotic frame in every arena of the communications world. Israel hastened to imitate the Americans and sell patriotic symbols. One saw more and more cars with little flags, buses with patriotic stickers, and announcements in the same spirit in the newspapers (Plati, 2001). But this sentimentality had an ugly political aspect. The public television channel, for instance, was left without a managing director, as the Prime Minister had disqualified the temporary holder of the post on the grounds that he had permitted “unpatriotic” broadcasts. The Prime Minister’s intervention received scathing criticism in Ha’aretz (Alper, 2002). The director of Kol Yisrael (radio) reacted by canceling all his staff’s subscriptions to the paper, in his desire to ingratiate himself with the Prime Minister’s Office and “prove his patriotism” (Eylon, 2002).

Once again the country revealed itself as characteristically suspicious, anxious, haunted, forever seeking approval, always oscillating between defensiveness and aggression (Schweizer, 2002). There is no room at all for discussing the depiction of reality or the wisdom of policy, and certainly none for alternative proposals of a skeptical, critical or subversive nature: Everybody is potentially suspect as lacking in patriotism, and those in any way different merit constant checks and surveillance. Such is the totalitarian state of Orwell’s “1984”; such is the emergent trend in Israel, 2002 (Aloni, 2002). Accordingly, new types of patriotism, leadership and media must be fostered: Leaders who understand that there comes a moment when to refrain from challenging the government and the army, by any democratic means, is to weaken, not strengthen Israel … leaders who see no contradiction between radicalism and patriotism (Kleinberg, 2002).

Discussion

The “master framing” of patriotic discourse is complex and variegated. On the one hand, it has obvious and persistent elements of nostalgia for nationalism based on...
territory, culture and state (with respect to Israel and also to other countries); on the other hand, there is mordant criticism of the same phenomenon. Parallel with this, there is a trend towards seeing a "national-civic" frame as part of the model to adopt. We are looking at a young state in the process of growing up and moving on to a more mature kind of patriotism, so that there is also a need for the crystallization of a national Israeli identity to be completed. During these adolescent and maturaion stages, strong, classical patriotism continues to take the place of true identity. As this identity is not yet fully formed, it is still too early to determine if it is capable of building a strong enough foundation for a civic bond of citizenship. Not until the foundations of identity are stronger will it be possible to make a transition to a milder form of patriotism, with a high degree of willingness to formally join a wider global entity.

In this context, there is one additional — and complicating — sociological aspect that needs to be mentioned regarding the emergence of a new patriotism. It is no coincidence, in our opinion, that the new patriotism is gaining strength in Israel at the very time that hundreds of thousands of foreign laborers are streaming to Israel to make a living, not to mention a couple of hundred thousand non-Jewish immigrants (of Russian extraction) who have immigrated to Israel in the past decade and a half. Thus, when approximately 5% of a state's inhabitants cannot be included in its collectivity according to nationalistic and classic patriotic criteria, society naturally looks for other solutions. Nor should we forget that this 5% joins the almost 20% of the population who are Israeli Arabs, plus another 10% ultra-orthodox Jews who cannot be called patriots, since ideologically they do not (fully) accept the legitimacy of the state for religious reasons. In other words, about a third (!) of the state’s inhabitants do not feel themselves (or are not made to feel) an integral part of Israeli society and concomitantly cannot hold a classic-style nationalism.

Indeed, paradoxically it is this demographic, “ethno-national threat,” that may even push the non-elite, general public and its mainstream popular press back to more a visceral and primal form of nationalism and patriotism (similar to what we see in France with Le Pen, in Austria with Heider, etc.). What this means for a country (and its press) such as the United States with a “multi-cultural” ethos is an open question, worth looking into in its own right — especially when attacked by members of the very religio-ethnic groups that form its multi-culturalism. But for now, based on the Israeli evidence, we can say with relative certainty that in times of national security crisis, the press and society in general within countries younger than the U.S. will tend to sway back and forth between the old-style patriotism and its newer “civic” incarnation.

Notes
During the period before the intifada, the discourse unit “patriot” was used in 42 articles in Ha'aretz, and in 157 articles in Ma'ariv. By contrast, during the period after the intifada, Ha'aretz used this unit in 66 articles, and Ma'ariv in 221 articles.
During the period before the terrorist attack on the WTC, the unit was used 66 times in Ha'aretz, and in 221 articles in Ma'ariv. By contrast, during the period after
the attack, *Haaretz* used the unit in 81 articles, and *Ma'ariv* used it in 673 articles. A total of 1241 articles using the discourse unit “patriot” were analyzed.

**References**


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Under Fire: Framing Classic and ‘New Patriotism’ in Israel’s Elite


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**Sympathy for the Enemy: Regarding the Ritual of Faction**

In the following years many after 1990, the Red Army Faction (RAF) was a terrorist organization that was played by millions of members of the German public opinion. It was a group of people who were active in some research projects, but when terrorism reappeared.

In 2002 on the German day of remembrance for the victims of terrorism, the German government established a book, *Eine dokumentarische Entwicklung Schleyer. A Documentary (Perspective) the event*.